政府碳税政策对三种再制造模式影响对比分析研究

为分析碳税政策对不同再制造模式的影响，基于三种再制造模式构建制造/再制造博弈模型。基于三种再制造博弈模型，对比分析碳税政策对不同再制造模式均衡解的影响。研究主要得到：1)政府实施碳税政策会增加两种产品的单位零售价格，碳税较高时选择外包再制造，单位再制造单位产品零售价格最低，碳税较低时选择独立再制造，单位再制造产品零售价格最低；2)当废旧产品回收率较高时，政府实施碳税政策会使新产品的需求量减少，再制造产品的需求量增加；3)当消费者对再制造产品的偏好大于某一阈值时，采取外包再制造模式可以同时使原始制造商和再制造商收益实现最优；4)政府实施碳税政策有利于降低对环境的影响，但是影响程度与单位新产品和再制造产品对环境的影响之比有关。     

授权再制造视角下再制造设计对制造再制造影响研究

为分析授权再制造下, 再制造设计对制造/再制造影响, 构建了再制造设计不同承担模式下原始制造商与再制造商博弈模型, 对比分析再制造设计费用不同承担模式下, 再制造设计对最优纳什均衡解影响。研究主要得到:授权再制造不仅可以改变原始制造商市场竞争不利地位, 还可以增加其收益; 在授权再制造下, 只有再制造设计带给两种单位产品收益之比较大时, 两者才愿意承担再制造设计费用; 虽然再制造设计可以减少两种产品单位零售价格, 但是再制造设计不一定总是增加消费者剩余。     

"一带一路"背景下中国企业跨国 再制造决策研究

以"一带一路"倡议为背景,考虑了出口国原始设备制造商(OEM)自行生产新产品和再制造品、OEM生产新产品并授权进口国第三方制造商(TPR)生产再制造品两种跨国再制造模式,对比分析了两种模式下,再制造品价格、数量、决策主体利润等变量值的变化.结果表明:TPR生产的再制造品数量主要基于进口国消费者对其的认可程度;出于再制造生产过程更环保的角度考虑,政府会基于产品节能程度对产品市场需求的影响系数的大小选择OEM或TPR再制造;在不同的产品节能程度对产品市场需求的影响系数和投入的节能成本系数影响下,OEM和TPR对新产品和再制造品的价格、数量、利润等变量有不同的决策偏好.     

两类零售企业竞争策略选择的演化博弈分析

运用演化博弈理论分析了在同一市场两类零售企业行为的演化过程.根据两类企业竞争策略的复制者动态方程,分析了两类企业策略选择的演化均衡特征,并分析了一些主要参数对企业竞争策略选择的影响.结果表明,企业的相对实力和两企业竞争成本的乘积对企业行为的演化起着至关重要的作用.     

化工产业群体性事件演化博弈分析及仿真

化工产业事故对环境、居民等带来的损害日益增加,并由此引发了一系列群体性事件.运用演化博弈理论,构建地方政府和周边居民策略互动得益矩阵,利用复制动态方程,对参与方策略互动进行分析,揭示政府与居民行为策略选择的演化规律,最后在Netlogo软件平台上对演化结果进行多情景仿真分析.理论研究和仿真分析结果表明:地方政府和周边居民之间的博弈存在四种策略组合,其中三个是演化稳定策略组合(公开处理,接受)、(暗箱操作,接受)和(暗箱操作,抗议),一个是不稳定策略组合(公开处理,抗议).     

知识创造行为与组织惯例的演化博弈及其仿真研究

以演化博弈模型为主要理论工具,在对知识创造行为与组织惯例关系予以描述的基础上,构建知识创造行为与组织惯例的演化博弈模型。通过求解复制动态方程,分析不同条件下知识创造行为与组织惯例分别达到演化稳定均衡的策略。研究结果表明:知识创造行为与组织惯例的匹配属于动态、重复博弈过程,参与博弈的预期收益、激励成本、转换成本直接决定演化稳定策略且影响个体对知识创造行为与组织惯例的选择,知识创造行为则倾向以承袭为主的保守策略。演化博弈方法的引入为知识创造行为和组织惯例的研究开辟了全新视角,也为相关领域的进一步探索提供有利的理论支持。     

多主体参与下我国光伏设备合作研制演化博弈模型

针对我国光伏设备合作研制的问题,建立了以光伏企业、设备制造商和地方政府为博弈主体的三方演化博弈模型。通过演化稳定策略分析可知,实现更多的创新价值增值是各方主体趋于合作的基础,确定合理的利益分配比例是光伏设备合作研制成为可能的关键;与此同时,应构建惩罚机制以抑制各方主体的背叛行为,并通过政府的有效激励以降低合作研制成本。     

基于竞合关系的合同制造商融资策略研究

考虑由竞争合同制造商和原始设备生产商(OEM)组成的竞合供应链,竞争合同制造商在上游是OEM的合作者,在下游市场上是OEM的竞争者。当合同制造商因资金约束而不能进行生产运营时,一个通常做法是向银行贷款或者OEM融资;为了更好地探讨竞合供应链的融资决策,考虑了批发价格分别为外生变量和内生变量两种不同的情况下,以OEM为Stackelberg领导者的博弈,这与实际情况很接近。分析结果表明,当批发价格分别为外生变量时,合同制造商融资方式的选择主要受融资利率的影响;当批发价格为内生变量时,合同制造商融资方式的选择主要受自身自有资金量的影响。研究揭示了竞合供应链的融资决策过程,阐明了合同制造商的融资方式选择与自身的自有资金量和融资利率的关系。最后用数值算例对上述结论进行了验证说明。     

不完全信息下房地产价格的演化博弈分析

基于PAB(Pay-As-Bid)竞价机制,探讨不完全信息情况下供需关系对房屋成交价格的影响.在购房者对房屋价格预期不确定和购房者有限理性的假设下,利用鲁棒优化技术和演化博弈论中的"复制动态"思想,提出鲁棒演化博弈均衡的概念,建立相应的复制动态系统,并对系统的鲁棒演化均衡的渐进稳定性进行分析,得到在不同市场供需情况下购房者价格策略演化的一般规律.最后选用数值算例对模型加以验证.     

上市公司控制权转移的演化博弈分析

在演化博弈理论的框架下建立了控制权转移的接管机制模型.在具有不完全信息的控制权市场,将控制权争夺的参与者分为两个群体:接管者(进入者)群体和管理者(在位者)群体,他们随机配对进行不对称两人博弈.接管者选择进入和不进入且其特性有强、弱之分,在位者选择合作和抵制.通过建立复制者动态模型并对其均衡点进行分析,得到了控制权转移的路径及接管者与管理者的最优策略.     

Product-design and pricing strategies with remanufacturing

In this paper, we consider a supply chain that consists of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) producing new products and a remanufacturer recovering the used items. The OEM often faces a strategic dilemma when determining the degree of disassemblability of its product design, as high disassemblability decreases the OEM’s production costs as well as the remanufacturer’s recovery costs. However, high disassemblability may be harmful to the OEM in a market in which the remanufacturer is encouraged to intensify price competition with the OEM because design for high disassemblability leads to larger cost savings in remanufacturing. We first formulate a two-period model to investigate the OEM’s product-design strategy and the remanufacturer’s pricing strategy in an extensive-form game, in which the equilibrium decisions of the resulting scenarios are derived. Next, we show the thresholds that determine whether remanufacturing is constrained by collection, the thresholds for the remanufacturer’s choice of a profitable pricing strategy, and the thresholds for determining the OEM’s product-design strategy. Finally, we expand the model for a multiple-period problem to show that the main insights obtained from the two-period model can be applied.     

基于仓单质押融资的物流企业与银行的演化博弈分析

物流企业与银行之间的良好合作关系是物流金融业务继续发展的前提和基础。以仓单质押融资业务为例,运用演化博弈理论对物流企业与银行之间的监督包庇问题进行了分析,构建复制动态方程和运用动态相位图分析群体策略的演化过程及结果,为建立良好的合作关系提供理论依据。分析结果表明:该动态系统的演化方向受到博弈支付矩阵以及系统的初始状态的影响。银行监督成本、银行的收益损失、物流企业的包庇成本和物流企业的罚金是影响演化结果的关键性因素。通过外部力量的加入,可促使系统演化至(不包庇,不监督)这一期望演化稳定策略。     

Competition for cores in remanufacturing

We study competition between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and an independently operating remanufacturer (IO). Different from the existing literature, the OEM and IO compete not only for selling their products but also for collecting returned products (cores) through their acquisition prices. We consider a two-period model with manufacturing by the OEM in the first period, and manufacturing as well as remanufacturing in the second period. We find the optimal policies for both players by establishing a Nash equilibrium in the second period, and then determine the optimal manufacturing decision for the OEM in the first period. This leads to a number of managerial insights. One interesting result is that the acquisition price of the OEM only depends on its own cost structure, and not on the acquisition price of the IO. Further insights are obtained from a numerical investigation. We find that when the cost benefits of remanufacturing diminishes and the IO has more chance to collect the available cores, the OEM manufactures less in the first period as the market in the second period gets larger to protect its market share. Finally, we consider the case where consumers have lower willingness to pay for the remanufactured products and find that in that case remanufacturing becomes less profitable overall.     

Role of update dynamics in the collective cooperation on the spatial snowdrift games: Beyond unconditional imitation and replicator dynamics

In this paper, we investigate the role of update or imitation rules in the spatial snowdrift game on regular lattices. Three different update rules, including unconditional imitation (UI), replicator dynamics (RD) and the Moran process, are utilized to update the strategies of focal players during the game process in the spatial snowdrift on the lattice. We observe that the aggregate cooperation level between players is largely elevated by using the Moran process in the spatial snowdrift game, when compared to the UI or replicator dynamics. Meanwhile, we carefully explore the dynamical evolution of frequency of cooperators and the cluster formation pattern for these three update rules. Moreover, it is also shown that the evolutionary behavior under the Moran update is independent of and insensitive to the randomly initial configurations of cooperators and defectors. The current results clearly indicate that the introduction of moderate randomness in the strategy update will highly promote the maintenance and persistence of cooperation among selfish individuals, which will be greatly instrumental to deeply understand the evolution of cooperation within many natural, biological and social systems.     

Transnational remanufacturing decisions under carbon taxes and tariffs

Considering the influence of carbon taxes and tariffs on transnational closed-loop supply chains, this paper establishes three remanufacturing modes of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in an exporting country. In one remanufacturing mode, the OEM conducts remanufacturing itself, and in the other two modes, the OEM authorizes a retailer in the importing country to engage in remanufacturing. Next, we analyse the optimal pricing and carbon emissions reduction decisions of the OEM and retailer in the different modes and further study how different levels of carbon tax and tariff combinations impact OEM remanufacturing decisions, the social welfare of importing countries and the environment. The results show the following. (1) When the carbon tariff is high, the optimal sales of remanufactured products increase. However, this does not contribute to the continuation of the product system; thus, it is short sighted for the government to hastily set high carbon tariffs to discourage the import of new products to protect domestic enterprises. (2) Carbon tariffs cannot effectively encourage the OEM to invest in emission reduction because carbon tariffs are passed on to consumers in importing countries through price adjustment. However, carbon tax may be an indirect factor affecting the OEM's willingness to invest in emission reduction. (3) The OEM favours allowing the retailer to remanufacture when the carbon emissions of the remanufactured products are similar to those of new products. Co-investment in emission reduction has the potential to align the profit maximization of the OEM with the social welfare maximization of the importing country. (4) It is not profitable for the importing government to set high carbon tariffs to protect its own enterprises.     

考虑创新投入的OEM/ODM供应链结构选择研究

针对由原材料供应商、OEM品牌商和制造商组成的供应链系统,本文构建了委托(Agent)、控制(Consignment)和设计代工(ODM)三种代工结构,分析了OEM品牌商和制造商的最优代工策略。本文重点讨论企业创新投入的影响,且制造商不仅在上游与OEM品牌商合作,还在下游与OEM品牌商在市场上竞争。研究结果表明:针对不同的市场竞争程度和创新投入效率,OEM品牌商会策略性的调整代工模式,在控制和设计代工中进行选择;制造商同样也有其所倾向的代工模式,但只有在较极端的情况下,才会倾向于选择设计代工模式,这反映出制造商缺乏动力进行产品设计创新。并且,当创新投入效率适中时,双方会出现决策一致的情况,但随着市场竞争程度的增加,这个区间会逐渐减少。     

Cooperation in changing environments: Irreversibility in the transition to cooperation in complex networks

In the framework of the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on complex networks, we investigate the possibility that the average level of cooperation shows hysteresis under quasi-static variations of a model parameter (the “temptation to defect”). Under the “discrete replicator” strategy updating rule, for both Erdös–Rényi and Barabási–Albert graphs we observe cooperation hysteresis cycles provided one reaches tipping point values of the parameter; otherwise, perfect reversibility is obtained. The selective fixation of cooperation at certain nodes and its organization in cooperator clusters, that are surrounded by fluctuating strategists, allows the rationalization of the “lagging behind” behavior observed.