基于竞合关系的合同制造商融资策略研究

考虑由竞争合同制造商和原始设备生产商(OEM)组成的竞合供应链,竞争合同制造商在上游是OEM的合作者,在下游市场上是OEM的竞争者。当合同制造商因资金约束而不能进行生产运营时,一个通常做法是向银行贷款或者OEM融资;为了更好地探讨竞合供应链的融资决策,考虑了批发价格分别为外生变量和内生变量两种不同的情况下,以OEM为Stackelberg领导者的博弈,这与实际情况很接近。分析结果表明,当批发价格分别为外生变量时,合同制造商融资方式的选择主要受融资利率的影响;当批发价格为内生变量时,合同制造商融资方式的选择主要受自身自有资金量的影响。研究揭示了竞合供应链的融资决策过程,阐明了合同制造商的融资方式选择与自身的自有资金量和融资利率的关系。最后用数值算例对上述结论进行了验证说明。

Financing Strategies for a Capital-constrained Contract Manufacturer under Co-opetition

We consider a co-opetition supply chain consisting of acompeting contract manufacturersand an original equipment Manufacturers (OEM) where acompeting contract manufacturer acts as both anupstream partner and a downstream competitor to an originalequipment manufacturer (OEM). When a contract manufacturer is unable to carry out sufficient production due to financial constraints, one common practice is to seek bank loans or OEM financing.In order to better explore the financing decision of co-opetition supply chain, we consider two different situations of exogenous and endogenous wholesale prices. OEM is the game of Stackelberg leader, which is close to the actual situation. The analysis results show that when the wholesale prices are exogenous variables, the choice of financing mode for contract manufacturers is mainly affected by the financing interest rate.When the wholesale price is an endogenous variable, the choice of financing mode of contract manufacturers is mainly affected by the initial amount of capital. This paper reveals the financing decision-making process of co-opetition supply chain, expounds the relationship between the choice of financing mode of contract manufacturers and their initial capital amount and financing interest rate. Finally, numerical examples are used to verify the above conclusions.