供需不确定条件下考虑双边努力的供应链组合契约设计

本文研究供需同时不确定条件下考虑双边努力的供应链契约设计问题,在一个供应商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链系统中,供应商的努力影响产量的不确定性,零售商的努力影响市场需求的不确定性。首先,利用Stackerberg主从博弈模型计算了分散决策时零售商、供应商的最优期望利润,并将计算结果与集中决策时供应链整体的最优期望利润进行对比。由于双重边际效应的存在,分散决策时供应链的最优期望利润小于集中决策时供应链的最优期望利润。基于此,本文设计了回购和成本分担组合契约来协调该供应链,计算了回购价格和成本分担系数的表达式,得到了回购和成本分担契约下供应商和零售商的最优期望利润。结果表明,在特定条件下,该组合契约不仅可以协调供应链,还可以实现供应链利润的任意分配。最后,通过数值计算,分析了供需双方的决策变量和期望利润随契约参数的变化情况。     

不确定性需求下易逝品零售商横向调货策略研究

本文通过建立易逝品零售商间横向调货模型,研究了不确定性需求与不确定性需求更新零售商之间协调调货行为下最优调货价格和调货量。研究结果表明,在不确定性需求条件下,零售商间横向调货模型中调货价格和调货量的存在纯策略纳什均衡解;在不确定性需求更新条件时,零售商间横向调货价格和调货量在任意时刻均存在纯策略纳什均衡解。数值实验也证实了理论部分的研究结论。     

产需不确定下面向资金约束供应商的供应链融资策略研究

以包含一个供应商和一个分销商的供应链为研究对象,其中分销商面临市场需求不确定性,供应商存在资金约束且面临产出不确定性。 提出期望利率的概念,研究银行贷款期望利率一定的情况下,供应链银行融资最优策略。 构建了供应链预付款融资机制,在此基础上研究预付款模式下供应链的融资与生产订购的最优策略,并讨论了预付款期望利率的可行范围。 研究表明,预付款融资模式下,分销商愿意以低于银行贷款利率的期望利率向供应商提供预付款; 存在预付款期望利率可行区间,实现预付款协调模式下供应链系统的帕累托改进。     

考虑消费者从众特性的动态定价研究

面对掌握大量信息的消费者,厂商需考虑多方因素制定价格策略。研究运用经典的博弈模型,讨论不同消费者特性情况下厂商的定价机制。模型按从众特性和等待特性将消费者分为六类,并引入一个价格偏差变量,分析各类型消费者比例变化对厂商定价和利润的影响。结果显示,一般情况下降价幅度、消费者期望购买总数量和期望销售利润都随着反从众消费者比例的增大而增加。最后扩展分析了效益贴现率,反从众消费者比例和短视型消费者比例三因素对厂商总利润的影响,研究认为效益贴现率和从众消费者比例较高时,厂商利润会随着短视型消费者比例的降低而有所提高。因此,为使收益最大化,厂商在制定定价策略时需同时考虑贴现因素和消费者行为特性。     

一类随机模型的最优捕获问题研究

在Volterra两种群竞争模型的基础上,构造了随机的具有捕获的两种群竞争模型,研究讨论了捕获对种群生长过程的影响和如何实现最优捕获等问题.从确定性模型入手,深入讨论随机竞争模型的收获最优问题.通过对捕获强度E和贴现率等的估计与讨论,计算出了最优捕获强度最优捕获量最优经济收益.     

不确定需求与产出供应链回购契约决策

针对市场需求的不确定性和供应商产出产品合格率的不确定性,提出供应商产出量小于销售商订购量时需再生产满足销售商的订购,以及供应商生产过量和回购的产品通过折扣市场出售,建立以供应链期望利润为目标函数,以回购单价为决策变量的供应链回购契约决策模型.通过模型的分析,证明了模型存在最优的期望利润,给出了最优回购单价满足的方程;同时,也证明了最优订购量,最优生产量和销售商最优期望利润是回购单价的增函数.最后,通过算例验证了模型的有效性.     

供应链中产品替代性对柔性资源的影响

考虑了一个公司采用柔性资源来应对不确定性,这种柔性资源可以用来生产两种不同的产品,此两种产品有一定的替代性.在第一阶段,基于对市场的不确定需求信息,公司决定柔性资源的购买数量;在第二阶段,随着对市场的了解,公司决定如何将这柔性资源分配给两种产品使得实际收益最大.研究了对于给定柔性资源的购买价格,为了使期望收益最大化,公司如何决定其最优的购买数量以及产品之间的替代性对最优决策的影响.发现柔性资源的最优购买数量取决于顾客需求市场大小和购买价格,并且关于购买价格是递减的;当其他因素不变时,柔性资源的最优购买数量关于产品替代性是递增的;离散程度大的产品市场不确定性对公司的决策有直接的影响,且当需求以更大的概率为高市场时,公司将增加柔性资源的购买数量.     

在消费者偏好不确定下双寡头定位定价博弈

本文通过建立在企业对消费者偏好信息不确定情形下,双寡头企业动态定位、定价博弈模型,研究企业的定位策略、定价策略以及产品差异化问题。证明了该动态博弈存在唯一的子博弈精炼均衡。均衡结果表明,偏好不确定性是一种差异化力量,与消费者偏好信息确定情形相比,企业的不确定性能够提高均衡价格、增加均衡利润。最后,分析了偏好不确定性对社会最优定位和社会最优差异化的影响。     

基于不确定性期望效用模型的投资优化

针对资产的收益的分布不确切知道,并且所获得的矩信息也不是准确值的问题,提出了最大化最坏情形期望效用的鲁棒性方法.引入了凹凸类效用函数来度量模型不确定情形下投资者的效用,用一个不确定性结构来刻画资产收益的所有可能的分布和收益的矩信息,通过把具有不确定性结构的鲁棒性模型转化成参数二次规划问题,得到了最优投资策略、有效前沿和均衡价格的解析表示.方法为采用保守策略并且厌恶不确定性的投资者提供了一种有效的投资决策方案.     

需求依赖销售努力库存系统的随机比较

研究需求依赖销售努力库存系统中需求不确定性对系统最优订货量、利润和销售努力的影响.对一般需求模型给出期望利润关于订货量和努力水平为联合凹的充分条件,证明期望利润函数的超模性质.对加乘需求模型证明系统最优利润和最优努力水平都可由一类与需求分布有关的广义TTT变换来表示.通过引入定义在不同支撑分布集合上一阶、二阶和三阶随机占优,得到广义TTT变换之差与二阶和三阶随机占优之间的关系式,建立了比较库存系统最优利润或努力水平的理论基础.在一阶和二阶随机占优意义下对加乘需求模型得到比较系统最优利润和努力水平的充分条件或充分必要条件.进一步,证明存在一类需求分布当系统关键比(或市场价格)足够大时系统最优利润和努力水平随需求可变性的增加而增加.最后给出几个数值例子验证了研究结果.     

油价波动和资源环境补偿视角下石油资源税率研究——基于山东省数据

油价、资源与环境统筹管理政策缺失导致石油资源外部性问题日益严重,从油价波动和资源环境补偿视角出发研究石油资源税率是解决石油资源外部性,实现对油价、资源与环境统筹管理的关键。基于山东省2000~2013年石油资源开采行业数据,根据使用者成本法测算山东省石油开采行业的资源耗减成本,发现当前资源税费比率应提高14%;根据生态补偿标准模型测算生态环境成本,结合大量实地调研,指出生态环境补偿水平应从目前补偿水平的22%逐步提高至完全补偿生态环境成本。然后,根据价值对等原则构建资源生态环境补偿方程,探索性地计算了基于油价波动的石油资源税率,发现当油价处于(23~52)、(52~78)、(78~115)美元/桶的油价区间时,在7%折现率下分别对应17.51%、18.84%、19.04%的补偿税率,得出结论:当前条件下将资源税费与环境补偿费用合并征收,需要将补偿税率逐步提高至15%~20%。最后,从税率确定、计征方式以及监管体系三方面提出了执行对策。     

Polluting resource extraction and climate risk

Using a fossil fuel extraction model that treats the atmosphere as a depletable resource, we study the optimal price of carbon in the presence of endogenous uncertainty around a climatic regime shift. We find that the optimal carbon tax should account an uncertainty-adjusted cost term associated with the environment's scarcity. This term is shown to be sensitive to the natural sequestration rate of the atmosphere and to the probability surrounding a climate tail event. Our analysis also shows that in the presence of uncertainty, the shadow price of the environment should grow at a faster rate. Lastly, compared to the endogenous uncertainty case, we find that if the probability surrounding a regime shift is exogenously given, this shadow price should even grow at a higher rate.     

垄断厂商在固定折扣率条件下的二度价格歧视研究

在线性需求函数的条件下,研究了垄断厂商实行二度价格歧视时确定最优固定折扣率的方法,研究结果表明,如果销售量和分段区间数既定,则最优固定折扣率存在。     

MANAGING THE CLIMATE RENT: HOW CAN REGULATORS IMPLEMENT INTERTEMPORALLY EFFICIENT MITIGATION POLICIES?

This paper provides a formal framework to analyze informational and commitment requirements of several intertemporal price and quantity instruments for mitigating global warming. We ask under what conditions and to what extend the regulator can shift the complex and daunting intertemporal optimization of fossil resource use to markets. Mitigation always generates an intertemporal climate rent which reflects the stock‐dependent damages and emerging scarcities of the atmospheric carbon deposit. In order to calculate and to manage this climate rent appropriately, common policy instruments like Pigouvian taxes or emissions trading presume perfect information about resource demand, extraction costs, reserve sizes, and damages for the entire planning horizon. To reduce these informational requirements we develop an alternative policy approach—a state dependent tax rule—that relies only on current observations of cumulative extraction (or atmospheric carbon concentration). Within a cost–benefit analysis, this instrument is capable to shift the complex intertemporal optimization problem completely to the resource sector when resource owners are homogeneous. Under a cost‐effective carbon budget approach, emissions trading with banking and borrowing can also unburden the regulator from solving the intertemporal social planner optimization problem. Additionally, we discuss which instruments can obtain an optimal allocation even if resource owners employ discount rate mark‐ups (i.e., due to imperfect commitment or insecure property rights). While an emissions trading scheme without banking and borrowing is robust against discount rate mark‐ups, resource taxes have to be modified in order to achieve an optimal allocation.     

基于社会福利最大化的油气资源税费研究

合理的油气资源税费能够引导企业优化开发决策,平衡当代与后代利益关系,实现跨期资源有效配置。从跨期油气资源最优分配的角度,通过最优控制理论构建寡头垄断市场中社会福利最大化和企业利润最大化目标下的油气资源开发决策模型,并以社会福利最大化目标下的资源开发决策为基准,研究从价、从量、储量三种不同形式的油气资源税费对资源开发决策的调节作用,研究发现:(1)征收从价税费,最优的从价税率为26.4%,政府既可以保障社会最优,还可以获得较多的税费收入;(2)征收从量税费,从量税率为1.77元/吨,政府可以保证社会福利最大化,但相比从价税费政府的税费收入较少;(3)征收储量税费,社会福利最大化下的储量税费为-0.13元/吨,也就是政府需向企业进行补贴才可以保证社会最优,会形成一定的财政压力。     

双重约束下野生动物资源的动态均衡管理研究

野生动物资源功能用途的复合性使得其受到生物系统及经济系统双重约束,在传统生物均衡模型基础上,分别构建经济系统和生物系统的联立方程组模型,然后根据目标函数形成野生动物资源动态均衡管理的理论模型及实证应用分析,得出结论：1）野生动物资源最优种群水平不仅受种群内禀增长率和栖息环境最大承载量的影响,也受到市场价格,维持及收获的成本及税费,产品利用率以及社会平均折现率的影响.但长期来看,环境承载量是影响种群水平的最终决定性因素.2）经济系统的各项变量并不影响野生动物最优种群水平的最终结果,而只影响其趋向最终结果的路径.3）最优猎捕收获量主要取决于最优种群水平以及环境承载量和种群内禀增长率.4）麝类资源的生物系统、经济系统的各个因素的影响方向和影响力大小,并不完全和一般假设相同.     

基于价格可变的占线优惠卡问题及其竞争分析

优惠卡问题是租赁问题的一个推广,已往的研究都是考虑只存在一种优惠活动的情况,并给出最优的单阀值购买策略。在本文中,则考虑更接近实际的情况,即存在多种优惠活动的问题,给出了当所有优惠卡价格在有界范围内的双阀值购买策略,分别给出了其竞争比上下界。最后,通过数值分析说明优惠卡价格和折扣率对消费者购买策略和竞争比的影响。     

E-retailing of restaurant services: pricing strategies in a competing online environment

Establishing online channels and providing online discounts by building business partner relationships with third-party websites have emerged as important and effective marketing strategies in the restaurant industry. This study examines the optimal pricing strategy of restaurants in a competing environment when they participate in this relationship with a third-party website. Results suggest that neither participation nor online price discount should be encouraged for all restaurants. In particular, for a restaurant with a fixed service capacity, participation and online price discount are recommended when the number of offline loyal customers is relatively small. With the increase in the number of loyal offline customers, the optimal online discount rate decreases, whereas the unit commission fee for the third-party website remains constant. When the optimal discount rate reaches zero, the optimal decision for the restaurant is to decrease the unit commission fee. Based on these findings, this study analytically provides the optimal pricing strategies for restaurants and the corresponding boundaries for the strategy set.     

Price markdown scheme in a multi-echelon supply chain in a high-tech industry

This paper studies the price markdown scheme in a supply chain that consists of a supplier, a contract manufacturer (CM), and a buyer (retailer). The buyer subcontracts the production of the final product to the CM. The CM buys the components from the supplier and charges the buyer a service fee for the final product produced. The price markdown is made possible by the supplier with the development of new manufacturing technologies that reduce the production cost for the sourced component. Consequently, the buyer adjusts the retail price in order to possibly stimulate stronger demand that may benefit both the supplier and the buyer. Under this scenario, we identify the optimal discount pricing strategies, capacity reservation, and the stocking policies for the supplier and the buyer. We also investigate the optimal inventory decision for the CM to cope with the price discount by considering both demand and delivery uncertainties. Our results suggest that higher production cost accelerates the effects of higher price sensitivity on lowering the optimal capacity and stocking policies in the supply chain. The effect of mean demand error on the optimal prices is relatively marginal compared with that from price sensitivity. We also found that increasing the standard deviation of the random demand does not necessarily increase the stocking level as one would predict. The results show that delivery uncertainty plays an important role in the inventory carried beyond the price break. We discuss potential extensions for future research.     

THE RATE OF DISCOUNT AND THE PRESERVATION OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS

This paper examines the relationship between the rate of discount and the the optimal level of permanently preserved natural environments. A lower rate of discount increases the demand for both preserved environments and capital accumulation. The greater demand for capital indirectly increases the demand for the productive resource inputs found within the natural environments thereby reducing the level of preservation. This indirect effect outweighs the direct effect of the rate of discount on the level of preservation if the elasticity of output with respect to capital is greater that the elasticity of output with respect to the resource input. In general, the asymptotic values of the output elasticities depend upon the rate of discount and so there can be a nonmonotonic relationship between the rate of discount and the optimal level of permanently preserved natural environments.