具有动态信用风险的可转债的定价研究

本文基于鞅方法的定价理论,在全面考虑赎回条款、回售条款、公司不具稳定性的信用风险以及转股时股市受到稀释作用对可转债价值的影响后,给出可转换债券一个比较精确的定价公式。应用这些公式对南京水运公司可转换债券做实证分析,结果表明:定价公式的数值与实际市场可转债的价格波动情况吻合相当好,能反映出良好的预测效果.因此该可转债定价结果将有助于发行公司、投资者、监管机构和中介机构更准确的了解可转债的定价机制,而发行公司、投资者、监管机构和中介机构对可转债定价机制的熟悉将有助于在我国证券市场建立起一种成熟稳健的避险工具,从而推动证券市场的发展。     

A numerical PDE approach for pricing callable bonds

Many debt issues contain an embedded call option that allows the issuer to redeem the bond at specified dates for a specified price. The issuer is typically required to provide advance notice of a decision to exercise this call option. The valuation of these contracts is an interesting numerical exercise because discontinuities may arise in the bond value or its derivative at call and/or notice dates. Recently, it has been suggested that finite difference methods cannot be used to price callable bonds requiring notice. Poor accuracy was attributed to discontinuities and difficulties in handling boundary conditions. As an alternative, a semi-analytical method using Green's functions for valuing callable bonds with notice was proposed. Unfortunately, the Green's function method is limited to special cases. Consequently, it is desirable to develop a more general approach. This is provided by using more advanced techniques such as flux limiters to obtain an accurate numerical partial differential equation method. Finally, in a typical pricing model an inappropriate financial condition is required in order to properly specify boundary conditions for the associated PDE. It is shown that a small perturbation of such a model is free from such artificial conditions.     

Monte Carlo analysis of convertible bonds with reset clauses

This paper analyzes some features of non-callable convertible bonds with reset clauses via both analytic and Monte Carlo simulation approaches. Assume that the underlying stock receives no dividends and that it has credit risk of the issuer. We mean by reset that the conversion price is adjusted downwards if the underlying stock price does not exceed pre-specified prices. Reset convertibles are usually issued when the outlook for the issuer is unfavorable. The price of any convertible bonds can be approximately viewed as a sum of values of an otherwise identical non-convertible bond plus an embedded option to convert the bond into the underlying stock. In this paper, we first develop an exact formula for the conversion option value of the European riskless convertible in the classical Black–Scholes–Merton framework. It is shown by Monte Carlo simulation that conversion option value estimates of the American risky convertible are located in a certain region defined by this formula. From estimates of the conversion probability, it is also shown that there exists an optimal reset time in the latter half of the trading interval.     

委托代理冲突下的企业投融资决策

采用实物期权与均衡定价理论,研究委托-代理冲突下的企业投融资决策问题.考虑管理者拥有企业投融资决策权时,其如何同时选择投资时机、投资规模及资本结构.分析了管理者持股与项目风险(不确定性)对企业非效率投融资的影响.数值分析表明:给定资本结构下,杠杆企业管理者决策的投资时机与投资规模变化呈现出负相关;对比于纯股权融资企业,杠杆企业管理者加速了投资期权的执行并增大了投资规模;财务杠杆率是管理者持股比例的U形函数,且管理者持股比例的增大,会加速投资期权的执行、增大投资规模与债务融资规模,并降低代理成本;项目风险的增大会导致企业投资时机、投资规模、债务融资规模和代理成本增大及财务杠杆率降低.     

On a game in manufacturing

We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved that a Nash equilibrium is unique if it exists and that a Nash equilibrium exists when the capital costs of the players are zero or when the players are equal in every respect. However, when the capital costs differ, in general a Nash equilibrium exists only when the players' capital costs are high compared to their profit rates.     

Patent-investment games under asymmetric information

This paper analyzes preemptive patenting in a two-stage real options game where an incumbent firm competes with a potential entrant firm for the patent of a substitute product in a product market with profit flow uncertainty. The incumbent suffers loss of monopoly in the product market if the entrant acquires the patent of a substitute product and later commercializes the product. Our patent-investment game model assumes that the entrant has complete information on the incumbent’s commercialization cost while the incumbent only knows the distribution of the entrant’s cost. We investigate the impact of information asymmetry on the preemption strategies adopted by the two competing firms on patenting the substitute product by comparing the optimal preemption strategies and the real option value functions of the two competing firms under complete information and information asymmetry. Our analysis reveals that the informationally disadvantaged incumbent always suffers from loss in its real option value of investment since it tends to act more aggressively in competing for the patent. On the other hand, the real option value of investment of the informationally advantaged entrant may be undermined or enhanced. The incumbent’s aggressive response under information asymmetry may lead to reversal of winner in the patent race. We also examine how information asymmetry may affect the occurrence of sleeping patent and the corresponding expected duration between the two stages of patenting and product commercialization.     

The pricing and optimal strategies of callable warrants

In this paper, we introduce a valuation model of callable warrants under a setting of the optimal stopping problem between the holder (investor) and the issuer (firm). A warrant is the right to purchase new shares at a predetermined price. When the new stocks are issued, the value of the stock is diluted. We consider the model taking the dilution into account. After identifying optimal policies for the issuer and the investor, we explore the analytical properties of the optimal exercise and call boundaries for the holder and the issuer, respectively. Furthermore, the value of such a callable warrant and the optimal critical prices are examined numerically using the binomial method.     

Non-cooperative joint replenishment under asymmetric information

We consider jointly replenishing n ex-ante identical firms that operate under an EOQ like setting using a non-cooperative game under asymmetric information. In this game, each firm, upon being privately informed about its demand rate (or inventory cost rate), submits a private contribution to an intermediary that specifies how much it is willing to pay for its replenishment per unit of time and the intermediary determines the maximum feasible frequency for the joint orders that would finance the fixed replenishment cost. We show that a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists and characterize the equilibrium in this game. We also show that the contributions are monotone increasing in each firm’s type. We finally conduct a numerical study to compare the equilibrium to solutions obtained under independent and cooperative ordering, and under full information. The results show that while information asymmetry eliminates free-riding in the contributions game, the resulting aggregate contributions are not as high as under full information, leading to higher aggregate costs.     

市场需求信息不对称下的保兑仓融资风险控制策略

信息不对称风险广泛存在于保兑仓融资过程当中,本文运用Stackelberg博弈模型刻画融资系统成员关系,运用动态规划优化分析方法求解对应博弈均衡策略。总结出需求信息不对称的三种表现形式:信息造假,信息优势及信息隐匿,分析各类信息不对称情形对融资系统所造成影响,并相应提出实现信息显示功能的契约甄别机制。研究表明:零售商可从信息不对称中获取巨大信息优势,但对其他成员造成损害,其中信息隐匿对生产商损害程度更高;二部定价机制可实现信息甄别,但生产商须为之付出信息租金,造成效率损失;而合理参数设定下的二部定价加回购机制有助于进一步改进融资系统及各成员收益,甚至达到次协调状态,最终实现融资成员收益的帕累托改进。本研究对于控制供应链融资中的信息风险、改善融资效率提供了理论依据及决策参考。     

连续区间策略下二人零和对策问题研究

考虑连续区间策略下的二人零和对策问题,研究其均衡策略的存在性。首先分析了完全信息下的二人零和对策问题,证明了该问题均衡策略的存在性并给出求解方法。然后进一步研究了收益函数不确定的不完全信息二人零和对策问题,在各局中人都认为对方是风险厌恶型的假设下,分析该类对策纯策略均衡的存在性,并通过研究纯策略均衡存在的充要条件给出判断并寻找纯策略均衡解的方法。最后给出一个数值算例,验证本文所提出方法的可行性。     

信息波动条件下的机构重复博弈分析

本文建立了一个信息波动条件下的机构重复博弈模型，对机构投资者之间的博弈行为进行了分析。结果表明。信息冲击是导致机构投资者做出买卖决策的关键原因；机构投资者的合作均衡和背离均衡均不是风险占优均衡；在信息冲击下，机构博弈是动态的重复博弈过程。     

Free boundary problem concerning pricing convertible bond

In this paper, we consider some behaviors of the optimal conversion boundaries (i.e. free boundaries) of American‐style convertible bond with finite horizon in some case. The bond's holder may convert it into the stock of its issued firm at any time before maturity, and the firm may call it at any time before maturity. Its pricing model is a parabolic variational inequality, in which the fundamental variables are time and the stock price of the bond's issuer. We achieve some properties of the free boundary, besides the existence and uniqueness of the solution of the variational inequality, such as: the monotonicity, the boundedness, smoothness and its starting point. Moreover, we analyze the relationship between the free boundary and the parameters in the problem, as well as, obtain the critical condition where the free boundary is a constant independent of time. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Callable risky perpetual debt with protection period

Issuances in the USD 260 Bn global market of perpetual risky debt are often motivated by capital requirements for financial institutions. We analyze callable risky perpetual debt emphasizing an initial protection (‘grace’) period before the debt may be called. The total market value of debt including the call option is expressed as a portfolio of perpetual debt and barrier options with a time dependent barrier. We also analyze how an issuer’s optimal bankruptcy decision is affected by the existence of the call option by using closed-form approximations. The model quantifies the increased coupon and the decreased initial bankruptcy level caused by the embedded option. Examples indicate that our closed form model produces reasonably precise coupon rates compared to numerical solutions. The credit-spread produced by our model is in a realistic order of magnitude compared to market data.     

Security design and firm dynamics under long‐term moral hazard

This paper addresses a moral hazard problem in which the agent's actions affect the future profits of the firm. The optimal contract can be implemented through the issuance of variable coupon debt and purchase of fixed‐coupon debt. Consequently, the resulting capital structure acts as a hedge for the firm, reducing underinvestment costs in bad states of nature and controlling overinvestment incentives in good ones. However, owing to asymmetric information between the firm's manager and investors, this hedge is only partial. The firm's investments vary with cash flows, disclosing the agent's asymmetric information to the principal. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Investment and financing decisions in the presence of time-to-build

We study a firm’s optimal decisions on investment, default, and financing when the amount of time and the running costs for project completion are uncertain. In the presence of time-to-build, a firm makes conservative investment and financing decisions; investment is delayed, and the optimal leverage ratio is inverted U-shaped with respect to the size of the lag. Although equity holders can choose to default before the project has been completed, the default probability in the presence of time-to-build is lower than that in the absence of a lag in most cases because of the conservative investment and financing decisions. Given the lower default probability, equity holders may benefit more from debt financing in the presence of time-to-build than they would in the absence of a lag. When firms can shorten their expected time-to-build by bearing more costs, unlevered firms strive to reduce the lag more than optimally levered firms do. However, highly levered firms utilize more resources to reduce the lag than all-equity firms do because equity holders are more concerned about the possibility of default before the project’s completion.     

Valuation of sinking-fund bonds in the Vasicek and CIR frameworks∗Financial support from Murst Fondo 40% on ‘Modelli di struttura a termine dei tassi d'interesse’ is gratefully acknowledged.

In a sinking-fund bond, the issuer is required to retire portions of the bond prior to maturity, with the option of doing so either by calling the bonds by lottery, or by buying them back at their market value. This paper discusses the valuation of a default-free sinking-fund bond issue in the Vasicek (1977) and, alternatively, the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (CIR) (1985) frameworks. We show in particular that, calling the bond issue without the delivery option ‘corresponding serial’, and the one without the prepayment feature ‘corresponding coupon’, under no-arbitrage a sinking-fund bond can be priced either in terms of the corresponding coupon bond and a bond call option, or in terms of the corresponding serial and a bond put option. We also present a detailed comparative-statics analysis of our valuation model, where we show that a sinking-fund bond has a stochastic duration intermediate between the ones of the corresponding serial and coupon bonds. We argue that such a feature gives a further rational for the presence of the delivery option. Moreover, we compare our results with the ones of Ho (1985), who has previously discussed the valuation problem under scrutiny.     

负债代理冲突下企业投融资互动行为的实物期权分析

准确分析企业投融资之间的互动关系,实现两种决策的协同,有助于提高企业决策效率和项目价值.通过把项目融资政策内生到投资决策的实物期权模型中,构建基于股东价值最大化和企业价值最大化的投融资决策互动模型,得到两种情形下的投融资决策临界点和期权价值,并借助数值分析负债代理冲突对企业投融资行为的影响.研究结果表明,负债融资既可能引发过度投资问题,也可能抑制投资.这种非效率投资将相应地提高负债融资的成本,对企业的负债融资产生抑制作用.     

Note on nash equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information

We consider two-person repeated games with lack of information on one side where the role of the informed player consists exclusively of transmitting information. We show that, even in this case, there exist Nash equilibria that cannot be achieved with a single stage of signalling. We also provide an example where the number of revealing stages required by such an equilibrium is unbounded.     

基于CAPM框架下的创业企业风险资本融资契约设计

从组合的视角出发,考虑创业企业家的风险厌恶程度,通过等价利率将创业企业的风险资本融资契约适应到CAPM框架下,利用纳什议价解刻画双方在信息不对称下的均衡解,基于风险-收益的角度建立了最优融资契约设计模型,为创业企业融资提供了契约设计和风险资本类型选择的一个依据,并通过算例说明了模型的可行性。研究还表明,创业企业引入风险资本优于纯债务融资,而股权的分配则取决于双方的议价力。同时,风险厌恶程度越低的创业企业家越趋向于选择独立的风险投资机构;风险厌恶程度越高的创业企业家越趋向于选择公司背景的风险投资机构;而风险厌恶程度不高,考虑后期贷款的创业企业家则趋向于选择银行背景的风险投资机构。