一种n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在性判别法

本首先给出了n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在的充要条件。然后给出n人静态博弈纯策略纳什均衡存在性的一种判别方法。最后在判别纯策略纳什均衡存在的条件下，给出判定该静态博弈存在多少纯策略纳什均衡以及哪些纯策略组合是纯策略纳什均衡(解)的方法。     

具有不完全信息的多重支付二人零和对策问题

本文研究多品性支付的二人零和对策问题,其中局中人可利用的信息是不完全的。同时假定局中人1并不知道各支付矩阵的数值,而只是对各支付品性在各自然状态下把局势的后果排出倾向上的次序。对于给定的置信水平,引进了权序上限和权序下限的概念,进而引出有效策略的概念。通过一系列的推导,给出了求最优策略的近似算法。     

模糊值二人零和对策的Nash均衡策略

我们将在Ramik定义的模糊最大序关系基础上研究模糊环境中的二人零和对策。在非对称模糊数基础上,引入模糊环境中的几种Nash均衡策略,讨论各种均衡策略存在的充要条件。并引入含参变量确定性矩阵对策及其均衡策略的概念,讨论含参变量确定性矩阵对策的Nash均衡策略和模糊值矩阵对策的均衡策略的关系。     

全支付拍卖模型的信息结构及其对均衡的影响分析——纪念李国平院士吴新谋教授诞辰100周年

研究全支付拍卖模型中参与人的参与结构以及均衡问题.首先给出了非对称信息下参与人的参与选择问题,分析了异质参与人的参与选择. 尔后给出了参与人参与均衡策略,给出当参与人估价分布函数在对称和非对称情形时, 竞赛中的对称均衡策略.最后给出了当均衡存在时, 竞争对手对均衡分布函数的估计.     

三群体2×2×2非对称演化博弈稳定性分析

针对目前三方演化博弈的稳定性研究不足这一问题,利用复制动态方程构建了一般化的三维动力系统,首先讨论了单群体策略演化趋势,接着根据李雅普诺夫稳定性理论分析了系统的渐进稳定性,并结合单群体策略的演化趋势对系统稳定性作了深入研究。研究表明:严格纯策略纳什均衡是ESS,不严格纯策略纳什均衡是线性策略收敛(自定义概念),所有类型的混合策略纳什均衡均为鞍点,共同划分了ESS的吸引域,并证明了零特征值非ESS定理,以及ESS不共边定理,在此基础上给出了N维双策略系统中ESS的最多个数。最后,设计了六组经典算例,首先结合研究结果分析了算例,接着对算例进行系统仿真,仿真结果与理论分析一致,为演化博弈的进一步研究提供借鉴与启发。     

直觉模糊多目标二人零和矩阵对策

研究矩阵对策是深入研究对策理论的一个基本途径和重要手段。根据直觉模糊多目标决策和模糊对策理论,研究了支付值为直觉模糊值的多目标二人零和矩阵对策。首先介绍了基于直觉模糊集的多目标二人零和矩阵对策模型,接着提出了求解直觉模糊多目标二人零和矩阵对策的线性规划方法。最后以数例说明本文提出的方法。结果表明该方法能方便地得到对策的均衡策略和均衡解。     

一般化两人零和模糊对策

定义一般化两人零和模糊对策,分别对具有纯策略和混合策略的一般化两人零和模糊对策进行研究,得到相应的最小最大值定理,以及一些与经典矩阵对策相类似的结果。     

需求信息泄露条件下供应链零售商订货策略研究

针对供应链订货过程中的需求信息泄露现象,通过对比供应商在泄露信息和不泄露信息情况下的收益,研究了供应链需求信息泄露的产生机理。建立了需求信息泄露条件下订货过程中零售商之间的信号博弈模型,通过模型求解得到了分离均衡和混同均衡的存在条件,并对不同均衡状态下零售商的最优订货策略和最优收益进行了分析。在此基础上,进一步讨论了零售商的订货策略选择问题。最后,通过一个数值算例说明了有关结论的有效性。     

模糊二人非合作对策的简单Berge均衡

研究模糊二人非合作对策的简单Berge均衡的存在性.基于Zimmermann处理模糊多目标线性规划的观点和Zhukovskii提出的简单Berge均衡概念,定义了模糊二人非合作对策的简单Berge均衡并借助于Ky Fan不等式证明其存在性.     

模糊二人零和对策的纳什均衡求解

用三角模糊数刻画二人零和对策支付值的不确定性,提出了计算模糊二人零和对策纳什均衡解的多目标规划方法.给出了一种基于区间数比较的三角形模糊数排序方法,根据该方法将模糊二人零和对策转化为多目标线性规划.通过一个数值实例说明了该方法的有效性和实用性.     

On Nash Equilibrium Strategy of Two-person Zero-sum Games with Trapezoidal Fuzzy Payoffs

In this paper, we investigate Nash equilibrium strategy of two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs. Based on fuzzy max order, Maeda and Cunlin constructed several models in symmetric triangular and asymmetric triangular fuzzy environment, respectively. We extended their models in trapezoidal fuzzy environment and proposed the existence of equilibrium strategies for these models. We also established the relation between Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy and parametric bi-matrix game. In addition, numerical examples are presented to find Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy and weak Pareto Nash equilibrium strategy from bi-matrix game.     

Stationary,completely mixed and symmetric optimal and equilibrium strategies in stochastic games

In this paper, we address various types of two-person stochastic games—both zero-sum and nonzero-sum, discounted and undiscounted. In particular, we address different aspects of stochastic games, namely: (1) When is a two-person stochastic game completely mixed? (2) Can we identify classes of undiscounted zero-sum stochastic games that have stationary optimal strategies? (3) When does a two-person stochastic game possess symmetric optimal/equilibrium strategies? Firstly, we provide some necessary and some sufficient conditions under which certain classes of discounted and undiscounted stochastic games are completely mixed. In particular, we show that, if a discounted zero-sum switching control stochastic game with symmetric payoff matrices has a completely mixed stationary optimal strategy, then the stochastic game is completely mixed if and only if the matrix games restricted to states are all completely mixed. Secondly, we identify certain classes of undiscounted zero-sum stochastic games that have stationary optima under specific conditions for individual payoff matrices and transition probabilities. Thirdly, we provide sufficient conditions for discounted as well as certain classes of undiscounted stochastic games to have symmetric optimal/equilibrium strategies—namely, transitions are symmetric and the payoff matrices of one player are the transpose of those of the other. We also provide a sufficient condition for the stochastic game to have a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. We also provide examples to show the sharpness of our results.     

Stochastic Games with Average Payoff Criterion

We study two-person stochastic games on a Polish state and compact action spaces and with average payoff criterion under a certain ergodicity condition. For the zero-sum game we establish the existence of a value and stationary optimal strategies for both players. For the nonzero-sum case the existence of Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies is established under certain separability conditions. Accepted 9 January 1997     

Existence of value in differential games with terminal cost function

A two-person, zero-sum differential game with general type phase constraints and terminal (not fixed) cost function is investigated. Player II (possessing complete information) can choose any strategy in the Varaiya-Lin sense, while his opponent (having incomplete information) can select any lower II-strategy introduced by Friedman (Ref. 1). The existence of a value and an optimal player II's strategy is obtained under assumptions ensuring that the sets of all admissible trajectories for the two players are compact in the Banach space of all continuous functions. The present paper largely extends the results of Ref. 2.     

Correlated equilibria in some classes of two-person games

A correlated equilibrium in a two-person game is “good” if for everyNash equilibrium there is a player who prefers the correlated equilibrium to theNash equilibrium. If a game is “best-response equivalent” to a two-person zero-sum game, then it has no good correlated equilibria. But games which are “almost strictly competitive” or “order equivalent” to a two-person zero-sum game may have good correlated equilibria.     

On the foundations of game theory: The case of non-Archimedean utilities

Contrary to what appears to have become an accepted part of the folklore of game theory, a finite two-person zero-sum game with non-Archimedean utilities may have no equilibrium-point solution, and either one or both players may have no “minimax” strategy. Even when both players have “minimax” strategies, such a game may lack an equilibrium point.     

Perfect information two-person zero-sum markov games with imprecise transition probabilities

Based on an extension of the controlled Markov set-chain model by Kurano et al. (in J Appl Prob 35:293–302, 1998) into competitive two-player game setting, we provide a model of perfect information two-person zero-sum Markov games with imprecise transition probabilities. We define an equilibrium value for the games formulated with the model in terms of a partial order and then establish the existence of an equilibrium policy pair that achieves the equilibrium value. We further analyze finite-approximation error bounds obtained from a value iteration-type algorithm and discuss some applications of the model.     

Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games

We observe that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. Our findings extend to general two-player zero-sum games using the symmetrization of zero-sum games due to von Neumann. We point out that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with the class of relative payoff games associated with symmetric two-player games. This allows us to derive results on the existence of finite population evolutionary stable strategies.     

Infinite dimensional differential games with hybrid controls

A two-person zero-sum infinite dimensional differential game of infinite duration with discounted payoff involving hybrid controls is studied. The minimizing player is allowed to take continuous, switching and impulse controls whereas the maximizing player is allowed to take continuous and switching controls. By taking strategies in the sense of Elliott-Kalton, we prove the existence of value and characterize it as the unique viscosity solution of the associated system of quasi-variational inequalities.