Restricted domains,arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and non-manipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives

An n-person social choice problem is considered in which the alternatives are n dimensional vectors, with the ith component of such a vector being the part of the alternatives affecting individual i alone. Assuming that individuals are selfish (individual i must be indifferent between any two alternatives with the same components), that they may be indifferent among alternatives and that each individual may choose his preferences out of a different set of permissible preferences, we prove that any set of restricted domains of preferences admits an n person non-dictatorial Arrow-type social welfare function if and only if it admits a two-person Arrow-type social welfare function: we characterize all the sets of restricted domains of preferences which admit two-person Arrow-type social welfare functions (and therefore also admit n-person Arrow-type social welfare functions) and then we prove that we also characterized all the sets of restricted domains of preferences which admit nondictatorial, nonmanipulable, noncorruptible and rational social choice correspondences.     

On the existence of an arrow and a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function

Let Σ be the set of all possible preferences over a given set of alternatives A. Let Ω be a proper subset of Σ and let P?Ωⁿ be a fixed profile of preferences. P is heterogeneous in Ω if for all a,b,c?A and Q?Ωⁿ, there exist three alternatives x,y,z?A such that Q(a,b,c)=P(x,y,z) where Q(B) denotes the subprofile over a set of alternatives B?A. An Arrow SWF ? is a function ?:Ωⁿ→Σ satisfying the conditions Pareto and IIA. A Bergson-Samuelson SWF is a function ?:P→Σ satisfying Pareto and Independence+Neutrality. The paper shows that (a) there exist a neutral nondictatorial Arrow SWF on Ω if and only if there exist a neutral nondictatorial Bergson-Samuelson SWF on P. (b) There exist a nondictatorial n person Bergson-Samuelson SWF on P if and only if there exists a 3 person Bergson-Samuelson SWF on P. (c) There exists a nondictatorial Arrow SWF on Ω if and only if there exists a nondictatorial Bergson-Samuelson SWF on P.     

The incompatibility of individualism and ordinalism

A formal proof is offered of the fact that Individualism and Ordinalism imply the controversial condition A3 used by Kemp and Ng (1976) to show the non-existence of an individualistic social welfare function based only on ordinal preferences but objected to by Samuelson (1977) as unreasonable. Mayston's argument against our definition of ordinality is refuted; his notion of ‘true ordinality’ involves elements of cardinality and/or goes against individualism.     

阿罗不可能性定理的几个等价形式

在这篇短中。给出了关于社会福利函数F的防止策略性操纵的概念,并且证明了如果备选对象至少有三个。则下面结论是相互等价的：(1)F满足Pareto与IIA性质;(2)F满足Pareto与RID性质;(3)F是独裁的;(4)F是满的、正向响应的;(5)F是防止策略操纵的且F是满的。     

Multiutility representations for incomplete difference preorders

A difference preorder is a (possibly incomplete) preorder on a space of state changes (rather than the states themselves); it encodes information about preference intensity, in addition to ordinal preferences. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for a difference preorder to be representable by a family of cardinal utility functions which take values in linearly ordered abelian groups. We also discuss the sense in which this cardinal utility representation is unique up to affine transformations, and under what conditions it is real-valued. This has applications to interpersonal comparisons, social welfare, and decisions under uncertainty.     

On the probability of a rational outcome for generalized social welfare functions on three alternatives

In Kalai (2002) [10], Kalai investigated the probability of a rational outcome for a generalized social welfare function (GSWF) on three alternatives, when the individual preferences are uniform and independent. In this paper we generalize Kalai's results to a broader class of distributions of the individual preferences, and obtain new lower bounds on the probability of a rational outcome in several classes of GSWFs. In particular, we show that if the GSWF is monotone and balanced and the distribution of the preferences is uniform, then the probability of a rational outcome is at least 3/4, proving a conjecture raised by Kalai. The tools used in the paper are analytic: the Fourier-Walsh expansion of Boolean functions on the discrete cube, properties of the Bonamie-Beckner noise operator, and the FKG inequality.     

社会福利函数独裁的特征

在这篇短文中,给出了关于社会福利函数F的半严格正向响应的概念,并且证明了如果备选对象至少有三个,则弱帕累托性质与半严格正向响应性质是独裁的充分必要条件.作为应用,我们给出了社会选择函数防止策略性操纵的一个等价描述,并对社会福利函数引进了防止局部策略性操纵的概念,得到了一个类似于Gibbard—Satterthwaite定理的结论.     

基于FDI收益分成视角的FTA网络演化

本文假定双边自由贸易协定(bilateral free trade agreement,简称FTA)包含着无限制对外直接投资(foreign direct investment,简称FDI),并且通过FDI销售到非FTA伙伴国的收益按照一定比例在母国和东道国之间进行分配。基于Goyal和Joshi^[1],本文构建了FTA网络形成博弈模型。本文发现,FTA网络演化过程分为两个阶段:第一阶段,从空FTA网络到星状FTA网络,存在一条路径使得个体国家福利、世界总福利均改善,在此过程中,国家福利存在不对称性;第二阶段,从星状FTA网络到全连接FTA网络,存在一条路径使得个体国家福利改善,在此过程中,世界总福利不变,国家福利不对称性逐步消除。     

Over-aging — Are present-day human populations too old?

This paper investigates the problem of an “optimum population” concerning age structures in a 3-period OLG-model with endogenous fertility and longevity. The first-best solution for a number-dampened total social welfare function, including Millian and Benthamite utilitarianism as two extreme cases, identifies the optimal age structure, which generally fails in laissez-faire economies. As individuals do not internalize the effect of longevity on life-cycle income, they over-invest in health. Additionally, they choose a non-optimal number of offspring. A calibration exercise for 80 countries emphasizes that the over-aging of populations crucially depends on social preferences and on observed age structures. Interestingly, it appears that, unlike taxes on health expenditures, taxes or subsidies on children to decentralize the first-best solution are sensitive to social preferences. Still, with the introduction of sufficiently large positive externalities of health expenditures or of individuals who do not fully internalize the effect of health efforts on longevity, taxes might become subsidies on health efforts to avoid an under-investment in longevity.     

Social welfare and the gini coefficient revisited

The question of conflict between the rankings of income distributions with the same mean by the Gini coefficient and by individualistic social welfare functions is re-examined. The negative result of Newbery (1970) is extended. However, positive results are obtainable which reverse Newbery's conclusion by admitting into the individual's utility index a measure of his position in the income distribution, or of his deprivation with respect to others' incomes.     

Nothing else matters: Evolution of preference for social prestige

This paper seeks answers to two questions. First, if a greater social activity of an individual enhances oblique (i.e. to non-relatives) transmission of her cultural traits at the expense of vertical (i.e. to children) transmission as well as family size, which behavior is optimal from cultural evolution standpoint? I formalize a general model that characterizes evolutionarily stable social activity. The proposed model replicates the theory of Newson et al. (2007) that fertility decline is caused by increasing role of oblique cultural transmission. Second, if social activity is a rational choice rather than a culturally inherited trait, and if cultural transmission acts on preferences rather than behaviors, which preferences survive the process of cultural evolution? I arrive at a very simple yet powerful result: under mild assumptions on model structure, only preferences which emphasize exclusively the concern for social prestige, i.e. extent to which one’s cultural trait has been picked up by others, survive.     

The categorical approach to social choice theory

A number of different problems in social choice theory are given a common treatment in the framework of category theory. A social choice function is a map μ from a set Hom(A, PX) of profiles - in applications functions from a set A of agents to the set PX of linear orders on a set X of alternatives - to a set GPX the nature of which depends on the application. The main theorem established is applied to social welfare functions and strategy-proof voting schemes.     

网络外部性条件下差异化双边平台买者参与问题

双边平台存在的基础是参与的用户,因此用户的分配是双边市场上各利益主体最关心的问题。为研究用户分配问题,本文在具有差异性的竞争双边市场上,建立了两阶段的双边平台竞争模型。第一阶段使用Rubinstein讨价还价模型对卖者的参与人数进行分配,利用讨价还价顺序描述卖者进入的先后顺序;第二阶段分别在平台利润最大化和社会福利最大化两种情况下,刻画买者对平台的规模偏好,并求均衡的市场份额。通过此模型分析竞争性平台差异化的情况下,网络外部性系数对平台均衡市场份额以及市场利益相关者利得的影响。研究表明:在考虑平台利润最大化的情况下,买者参与人数受卖者规模与网络外部性系数的影响,平台规模并非越大越好;在考虑社会福利最大化的情况下,买者的网络外部性系数与买者参与人数不相关,但与总社会福利正相关。     

奖惩机制下零售商信息分享对闭环供应链的影响研究

研究奖惩机制下零售商的信息分享策略以及对闭环供应链的影响,建立了由制造商和零售商以及消费者组成的闭环供应链,其中制造商负责回收废旧产品并进行再制造。分别研究了集中式决策的情形和分散式决策下零售商信息分享和不分享的情形。研究发现,若政府在社会总福利目标中不考虑奖惩成本且回收难度较小时,零售商信息分享使社会总福利提高,反之,导致社会总福利降低;零售商信息分享总会使消费者剩余的期望值降低,但能够提高废旧产品的回收率。最后,针对零售商信息分享引起社会福利提高的情况设计了回收责任分担契约激励零售商分享信息。关键词:信息分享;奖惩机制;闭环供应链;社会福利;消费者剩余     

Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats

In this paper, we examine the manipulability properties of social decision rules which select a non-empty subset of the set of alternatives. Assuming that if an individual prefers x to y, then he prefers the outcome set {x, y} to {y}, and also {x} to {x, y}, we show that a wide class of scf's which allow ties even in pairwise choice violates one of the weakest notions of strategyproofness — a single individual can profitably misrepresent his preferences, even when he takes into account the possibility of countercoalitions. This class of scf's also violates exact consistency — no equilibrium situation gives the same outcome set as the ‘true profile’.     

Binariness and rational choice

The concept of numerical representability of preferences together with maximality is at the heart of the concept of rationality embodied in classical optimization models. The difficulty of representing social preferences arises from inherent intransitivities thrown up by democratic voting procedures and by non-binary choice rules which need to be adopted to cope with these intransitivities. An alternative (weaker) concept of representability is developed and it is shown that this concept can partially accommodate intransitivity and non-binariness. ‘Weak transitivity’ and ‘weak binaries’ conditions are provided and it is shown that these conditions are necessary and sufficient for ‘weak representability’. While the weak transitivity condition would be violated by social aggregation procedures, the non-binary functions used by social choice theorists do indeed satisfy the condition of ‘weak binariness’.     

纯交换经济环境中的双人贝叶斯机制研究

将Dutta和Sen(1994)关于不完全信息环境中二人贝叶斯执行问题扩展到纯交换经济环境中,建立了纯交换经济的双人贝叶斯机制模型,给出当偏好关系和初始禀赋都是不完全信息环境下,一个社会选择规则贝叶斯可执行的充分条件和必要条件.     

Systemic decision making in AHP: a Bayesian approach

Systemic decision making is a new approach for dealing with complex multiactor decision making problems in which the actors’ individual preferences on a fixed set of alternatives are incorporated in a holistic view in accordance with the “principle of tolerance”. The new approach integrates all the preferences, even if they are encapsulated in different individual theoretical models or approaches; the only requirement is that they must be expressed as some kind of probability distribution. In this paper, assuming the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is the multicriteria technique employed to rank alternatives, the authors present a new methodology based on a Bayesian analysis for dealing with AHP systemic decision making in a local context (a single criterion). The approach integrates the individual visions of reality into a collective one by means of a tolerance distribution, which is defined as the weighted geometric mean of the individual preferences expressed as probability distributions. A mathematical justification of this distribution, a study of its statistical properties and a Monte Carlo method for drawing samples are also provided. The paper further presents a number of decisional tools for the evaluation of the acceptance of the tolerance distribution, the construction of tolerance paths that increase representativeness and the extraction of the relevant knowledge of the subjacent multiactor decisional process from a cognitive perspective. Finally, the proposed methodology is applied to the AHP-multiplicative model with lognormal errors and a case study related to a real-life experience in local participatory budgets for the Zaragoza City Council (Spain).     

The natural environment and optimal population growth

This paper investigates the optimal growth of a population when resources conserved for recreation (or the natural environment) enter the social welfare function. If the CES welfare function and the Cobb-Douglass production function are assumed, the growth rate of a population should be determined as a weighted average of the growth rates of per capita income and of conserved resources per capita. In the long run, there should be a limit to the growth of a population. Examples of numerical solutions for optimal time paths of a population are also presented.