Robust optimal investment and reinsurance problem for a general insurance company under Heston model

In this paper, we study a robust optimal investment and reinsurance problem for a general insurance company which contains an insurer and a reinsurer. Assume that the claim process described by a Brownian motion with drift, the insurer can purchase proportional reinsurance from the reinsurer. Both the insurer and the reinsurer can invest in a financial market consisting of one risk-free asset and one risky asset whose price process is described by the Heston model. Besides, the general insurance company’s manager will search for a robust optimal investment and reinsurance strategy, since the general insurance company faces model uncertainty and its manager is ambiguity-averse in our assumption. The optimal decision is to maximize the minimal expected exponential utility of the weighted sum of the insurer’s and the reinsurer’s surplus processes. By using techniques of stochastic control theory, we give sufficient conditions under which the closed-form expressions for the robust optimal investment and reinsurance strategies and the corresponding value function are obtained.     

Reinsurance contract design when the insurer is ambiguity-averse

This paper investigates proportional and excess-loss reinsurance contracts in a continuous-time principal–agent framework, in which the insurer is the agent and the reinsurer is the principal. Insurance claims follow the classic Cramér–Lundberg process. The insurer believes that the claim intensity is uncertain and he chooses robust risk retention levels to maximize the penalty-dependent multiple-priors utility. The reinsurer designs reinsurance contracts subject to the insurer’s incentive compatibility constraints. The analytical expressions of the two robust reinsurance contracts are derived. Our results show that the robust reinsurance demand and price are greater than their respective standard values without model ambiguity, and increase as the insurer’s ambiguity aversion increases. Moreover, the reinsurer specifies a decreasing reinsurance price to induce increasing demand over time. Specifically, the price of excess-loss reinsurance is higher, relative to that of proportional reinsurance. Further, only if the insurer’s risk aversion is high or the reinsurer’s risk aversion is low, the insurer prefers the excess-loss reinsurance contract.     

保险公司和再保险公司之间的停止损失再保险策略选择博弈

本文在扩散逼近风险模型下考虑保险公司和再保险公司之间的停止损失再保险策略选择博弈问题.假设保险公司和再保险公司都以期望终端盈余效用增加作为购买停止损失再保险和接受承保的条件.在保险公司和再保险公司都具有指数效用函数条件下,运用动态规划原理,通过求解其对应的Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman方程,得到了三种博弈情形下保险公司和再保险公司之间的停止损失再保险策略和值函数的显示解,以及再保险合约能够成交时再保费满足的条件.结果显示,在适当的条件下,保险公司和再保险公司之间的停止再保险合约是可以成交的.最后,通过灵敏性分析给出了最优停止损失再保险策略和再保费,以及效用损益与模型主要参数之间的关系,并给出相应的经济分析.     

Dynamic risk-sharing game and reinsurance contract design

This paper studies the optimal risk-sharing between an insurer and a reinsurer. The insurer purchases reinsurance for risk-control and decides her retention level with an objective to minimize her ruin probability. The reinsurer has control over the reinsurance price and aims to maximize her expected discounted profits up to the time when the insurer goes bankrupt. In a stochastic differential game-theoretic framework, we determine the insurer’s optimal reinsurance strategy and specify the reinsurance contract by solving a system of coupled Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations. We obtain explicit solutions for the game problem when both the insurance and the reinsurance premiums are calculated according to the standard-deviation principle or the expected value principle, respectively. Our results show that, depending on the model parameters, the reinsurance contract is either provided with a peak price when the insurer has sufficient cash reserve and with a minimum price when otherwise, or is always provided with a peak price. We also perform some numerical analyses and provide economic interpretations for the results.     

On optimal reinsurance treaties in cooperative game under heterogeneous beliefs

In this paper, we study the optimal reinsurance policies as the result of a two-person cooperative game. We assume that both the insurer and the reinsurer are risk averse and expected-utility maximizers. In addition, we assume that they “agree to disagree” on the distribution of the underlying losses in the contract negotiation.In our analysis, we consider two scenarios. In the first one, the reinsurance premium is fully negotiable, whereas in the second one, the premium is determined by the reinsurer using the expected value premium principle. For both scenarios, we first derive the set of Pareto-optimal reinsurance contracts and then identify the reinsurance contract corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution as well as that corresponding to the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution.     

Optimal quota-share and stop-loss reinsurance from the perspectives of insurer and reinsurer

Reinsurance plays a vital role in the insurance activities. The insurer and the reinsurer, which have conflicting interests, compose the two parties of a reinsurance contract. In this paper, we extend the results achieved by Tan et al. (N Am Actuar J 13(4):459–482, 2009) to the case in which the perspectives of both the insurer and the reinsurer are considered. We study the optimal quota-share and stop-loss reinsurance models by minimizing the convex combination of the VaR risk measures of the insurer’s cost and the reinsurer’s cost. Furthermore, as many as 16 reinsurance premium principles are investigated. The results show that optimal quota-share and stop-loss reinsurance may or may not exist depending on the chosen principles. Moreover, we establish the sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of the nontrivial optimal reinsurance.     

Optimal reinsurance with regulatory initial capital and default risk

In a reinsurance contract, a reinsurer promises to pay the part of the loss faced by an insurer in exchange for receiving a reinsurance premium from the insurer. However, the reinsurer may fail to pay the promised amount when the promised amount exceeds the reinsurer’s solvency. As a seller of a reinsurance contract, the initial capital or reserve of a reinsurer should meet some regulatory requirements. We assume that the initial capital or reserve of a reinsurer is regulated by the value-at-risk (VaR) of its promised indemnity. When the promised indemnity exceeds the total of the reinsurer’s initial capital and the reinsurance premium, the reinsurer may fail to pay the promised amount or default may occur. In the presence of the regulatory initial capital and the counterparty default risk, we investigate optimal reinsurance designs from an insurer’s point of view and derive optimal reinsurance strategies that maximize the expected utility of an insurer’s terminal wealth or minimize the VaR of an insurer’s total retained risk. It turns out that optimal reinsurance strategies in the presence of the regulatory initial capital and the counterparty default risk are different both from optimal reinsurance strategies in the absence of the counterparty default risk and from optimal reinsurance strategies in the presence of the counterparty default risk but without the regulatory initial capital.     

A Bowley solution with limited ceded risk for a monopolistic reinsurer

Borch (1969) advocated that the study of optimal reinsurance design should take into consideration the conflicting interests of both an insurer and a reinsurer. Motivated by this and exploiting a Bowley solution (or Stackelberg equilibrium game), this paper proposes a two-step model that tackles an optimal risk transfer problem between the insurer and the reinsurer. From the insurer’s perspective, the first step of the model provisionally derives an optimal reinsurance policy for a given reinsurance premium while reflecting the reinsurer’s risk appetite. The reinsurer’s risk appetite is controlled by imposing upper limits on the first two moments of the coverage. Through a comparative analysis, the effect of the insurer’s initial wealth on the demand for reinsurance is then examined, when the insurer’s risk aversion and prudence are taken into account. Based on the insurer’s provisional strategy, the second step of the model determines the monopoly premium that maximizes the reinsurer’s expected profit while still satisfying the insurer’s incentive condition. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate our Bowley solution.     

Time-consistent investment-reinsurance strategies towards joint interests of the insurer and the reinsurer under CEV models

The present paper studies time-consistent solutions to an investment-reinsurance problem under a mean-variance framework.The paper is distinguished from other literature by taking into account the interests of both an insurer and a reinsurer jointly.The claim process of the insurer is governed by a Brownian motion with a drift.A proportional reinsurance treaty is considered and the premium is calculated according to the expected value principle.Both the insurer and the reinsurer are assumed to invest in a risky asset,which is distinct for each other and driven by a constant elasticity of variance model.The optimal decision is formulated on a weighted sum of the insurer’s and the reinsurer’s surplus processes.Upon a verification theorem,which is established with a formal proof for a more general problem,explicit solutions are obtained for the proposed investment-reinsurance model.Moreover,numerous mathematical analysis and numerical examples are provided to demonstrate those derived results as well as the economic implications behind.     

Optimal reinsurance under VaR and TVaR risk measures in the presence of reinsurer’s risk limit

In most studies on optimal reinsurance, little attention has been paid to controlling the reinsurer’s risk. However, real-world insurance markets always place a limit on coverage, otherwise the insurer will be subjected to under a heavy financial burden when the insured suffers a large unexpected covered loss. In this paper, we revisit the optimal reinsurance problem under the optimality criteria of VaR and TVaR risk measures when the constraints for the reinsurer’s risk exposure are presented. Two types of constraints are considered that have been proposed by Cummins and Mahul (2004) and Zhou et al. (2010), respectively. It is shown that two-layer reinsurance is always the optimal reinsurance policy under both VaR and TVaR risk measures and under both types of constraints. This implies that the two-layer reinsurance policy is more robust. Furthermore, the optimal quantity of ceded risk depends on the confidence level, the safety loading and the tolerance level, as well as on the relation between them.     

Optimal reinsurance under risk and uncertainty

This paper deals with the optimal reinsurance problem if both insurer and reinsurer are facing risk and uncertainty, though the classical uncertainty free case is also included. The insurer and reinsurer degrees of uncertainty do not have to be identical. The decision variable is not the retained (or ceded) risk, but its sensitivity with respect to the total claims. Thus, if one imposes strictly positive lower bounds for this variable, the reinsurer moral hazard is totally eliminated.Three main contributions seem to be reached. Firstly, necessary and sufficient optimality conditions are given in a very general setting. Secondly, the optimal contract is often a bang–bang solution, i.e., the sensitivity between the retained risk and the total claims saturates the imposed constraints. Thirdly, the optimal reinsurance problem is equivalent to other linear programming problem, despite the fact that risk, uncertainty, and many premium principles are not linear. This may be important because linear problems may be easily solved in practice, since there are very efficient algorithms.     

标准差准则下的最优再保险

本文关注的是在标准差准则下如何进行再保险, 使得保险公司和再保险公司的风险波动达到最小. 在容许合约类范围内得到了建立最优再保险合约的充分条件. 如果再保险公司的风险小于一个给定阈值, 我们找到了使保险公司的风险最小的最优再保险合约. 在这里, 保险公司可以采取三种最一般且有效的风险措施.     

Expected Shortfall风险度量下的最优再保险（英文）

为了避免由高理赔额造成的违约,保险公司通常通过签订再保合约将一部分风险转移给再保险公司.近年来对最优再保策略的研究着眼于最小化自留损失的方差,保险公司总风险的value-at-risk或conditional tail expectation.本文研究了在expected shortfall准则下的再保策略.我们给出了最优的增凸转移损失函数,并分别讨论了有无保费限制的情形.     

OPTIMAL REINSURANCE UNDER EXPECTED VALUE PRINCIPLE

The paper concerns the problem how to purchase the reinsurance in order to make the insurer and the reinsurance company＇s total risk to be least under the expected value principle. When the insurer and reinsurance company take arbitrary risk measures, sufficient con- ditions for optimality of reinsurance contract are given within the restricted class of admissible contracts. Further, the explicit forms of optimal reinsurance contract under several special risk measures are given, and the method to decide parameters as well.     

期望值原理下的最优再保险

The paper concerns the problem how to purchase the reinsurance in order to make the insurer and the reinsurance company's total risk to be least under the expected value principle. When the insurer and reinsurance company take arbitrary risk measures, sufficient conditions for optimality of reinsurance contract are given within the restricted class of admissible contracts. Further, the explicit forms of optimal reinsurance contract under several special risk measures are given, and the method to decide parameters as well.     

Stochastic Stackelberg differential reinsurance games under time-inconsistent mean–variance framework

We study optimal reinsurance in the framework of stochastic Stackelberg differential game, in which an insurer and a reinsurer are the two players, and more specifically are considered as the follower and the leader of the Stackelberg game, respectively. An optimal reinsurance policy is determined by the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game, consisting of an optimal reinsurance strategy chosen by the insurer and an optimal reinsurance premium strategy by the reinsurer. Both the insurer and the reinsurer aim to maximize their respective mean–variance cost functionals. To overcome the time-inconsistency issue in the game, we formulate the optimization problem of each player as an embedded game and solve it via a corresponding extended Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation. It is found that the Stackelberg equilibrium can be achieved by the pair of a variance reinsurance premium principle and a proportional reinsurance treaty, or that of an expected value reinsurance premium principle and an excess-of-loss reinsurance treaty. Moreover, the former optimal reinsurance policy is determined by a unique, model-free Stackelberg equilibrium; the latter one, though exists, may be non-unique and model-dependent, and depend on the tail behavior of the claim-size distribution to be more specific. Our numerical analysis provides further support for necessity of integrating the insurer and the reinsurer into a unified framework. In this regard, the stochastic Stackelberg differential reinsurance game proposed in this paper is a good candidate to achieve this goal.     

Concave distortion risk minimizing reinsurance design under adverse selection

This article makes use of the well-known Principal–Agent (multidimensional screening) model commonly used in economics to analyze a monopolistic reinsurance market in the presence of adverse selection, where the risk preference of each insurer is guided by its concave distortion risk measure of the terminal wealth position; while the reinsurer, under information asymmetry, aims to maximize its expected profit by designing an optimal policy provision (menu) of “shirt-fit” stop-loss reinsurance contracts for every insurer of either type of low or high risk. In particular, the most representative case of Tail Value-at-Risk (TVaR) is further explored in detail so as to unveil the underlying insight from economics perspective.     

Risk-adjusted Bowley reinsurance under distorted probabilities

In the seminal work of Chan and Gerber (1985), one of the earliest game theoretical approaches was proposed to model the interaction between the reinsurer and insurer; in particular, the optimal pricing density for the reinsurer and optimal ceded loss for the insurer were determined so that their corresponding expected utilities could be maximized. Over decades, their advocated Bowley solution (could be understood as Stackelberg equilibria) concept of equilibrium reinsurance strategy has not been revisited in the modern risk management framework. In this article, we attempt to fill this gap by extending their work to the setting of general premium principle for the reinsurer and distortion risk measure for the insurer.     

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??Motivated by[1] and [2], we study in this paper the optimal (from the insurer's point of view) reinsurance problem when risk is measured by a general risk measure, namely the GlueVaR distortion risk measures which is firstly proposed by [3].Suppose an insurer is exposed to the risk and decides to buy a reinsurance contract written on the total claim amounts basis, i.e. the reinsurer covers and the cedent covers . In addition, the insurer is obligated to compensate the reinsurer for undertaking the risk by paying the reinsurance premium, ( is the safety loading), under the expectation premium principle. Based on a technique used in [2], this paper derives the optimal ceded loss functions in a class of increasing convex ceded loss functions. It turns out that the optimal ceded loss function is of stop-loss type.