| 代理人在职消费对动态多任务激励契约的影响 |
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| 引用本文：刘新民1，孙红华2，李 芳1.代理人在职消费对动态多任务激励契约的影响[J].经济数学,2015,(4):54-58 |
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| 中文摘要:将代理人的在职消费行为引入到动态多任务委托代理框架中，构造了代理人在职消费行为下的两阶段多任务模型，分析了代理人在职消费行为对动态多任务激励契约的影响.研究结果表明：一是任务为两阶段时，无论代理人有无在职消费行为，代理人的努力程度随着时间均呈上升趋势，这就表明当委托人在设计契约时，如果委托人期望代理人在第一阶段的努力水平不低于第二阶段的努力水平，就需要适当提高第一阶段的业绩薪酬系数；二是代理人在职消费自利行为并不一定会提高自身的努力程度，需要依据在职消费行为对绩效的影响情形来具体分析；三是在两阶段内，代理人存在在职消费时，委托人可适当降低业绩薪酬系数. |
| 中文关键词:动态 多任务 在职消费 委托代理模型 |
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| Influences of On-Duty Consumption of Agent’s Behavior on Dynamic Incentives |
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| Abstract:Based on the dynamic principal-agent model, and by introducing on-duty consumption of agents into the multi-task and dynamic principal-agent framework, we set up dynamic incentives based on the agent's on-duty. We analyzed the influences of on-duty consumption of agents' behavior on the dynamic incentive. The analytical model results show that when the contract is divided into two stages, and if the principal would not dismiss the agent at the end of the first stage, no matter whether the agent has on-duty consumption or not, the agent's effort level shows an increasing trend over time. That is to say, if the principal expects the effort level of the agent in the second stage is not less than that in the first stage, he needs to appropriately increase the coefficient of performance in the first stage when he designs the contract. And on-duty consumption of agent does not necessarily improve his own effort, but we should analyze that according to the influence exerted on performance from on-duty consumption. In addition, when agent has on-duty consumption behavior, the principle could appropriately decrease the coefficient of performance pay. |
| keywords:dynamic multi-task on-duty consumption principal-agent model |
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