Collective Strategy Condensation: When Envy Splits Societies

Human societies are characterized by three constituent features, besides others. (A) Options, as for jobs and societal positions, differ with respect to their associated monetary and non-monetary payoffs. (B) Competition leads to reduced payoffs when individuals compete for the same option as others. (C) People care about how they are doing relatively to others. The latter trait—the propensity to compare one’s own success with that of others—expresses itself as envy. It is shown that the combination of (A)–(C) leads to spontaneous class stratification. Societies of agents split endogenously into two social classes, an upper and a lower class, when envy becomes relevant. A comprehensive analysis of the Nash equilibria characterizing a basic reference game is presented. Class separation is due to the condensation of the strategies of lower-class agents, which play an identical mixed strategy. Upper-class agents do not condense, following individualist pure strategies. The model and results are size-consistent, holding for arbitrary large numbers of agents and options. Analytic results are confirmed by extensive numerical simulations. An analogy to interacting confined classical particles is discussed.     

基于Android系统的斗地主游戏的设计与实现

随着智能手机的迅猛发展,Wi Fi的全民时代到来,手机网络游戏越来越得到人们的青睐.首先设计了基于Android系统的斗地主纸牌游戏的功能模块、类以及数据库,实现了客户端注册、登录、游戏房间选择、多人斗地主以及服务器端接收多个用户连接请求且管理用户信息功能,然后对该游戏中的关键技术进行了详细描述,最后展示了游戏的运行界面.测试效果表明,软件界面友好、操作便捷,能够满足手机用户对斗地主游戏的基本需求.     

从价格战到技术合作

产品价格下降在许多行业是一个长期的过程，价格战有利有弊。在合作基础上的竞争对行业的发展更有利，而技术合作尤为重要。     

On Quantum Team Games

Recently Liu and Simaan (2004) convex static multi-team classical games have been introduced. Here they are generalized to both nonconvex, dynamic and quantum games. Puu's incomplete information dynamical systems are modified and applied to Cournot team game. The replicator dynamics of the quantum prisoner's dilemma game is also studied.     

Maximum Shannon Entropy, Minimum Fisher Information, and an Elementary Game

We formulate an elementary statistical game which captures the essence of some fundamental quantum experiments such as photon polarization and spin measurement. We explore and compare the significance of the principle of maximum Shannon entropy and the principle of minimum Fisher information in solving such a game. The solution based on the principle of minimum Fisher information coincides with the solution based on an invariance principle, and provides an informational explanation of Malus' law for photon polarization. There is no solution based on the principle of maximum Shannon entropy. The result demonstrates the merits of Fisher information, and the demerits of Shannon entropy, in treating some fundamental quantum problems. It also provides a quantitative example in support of a general philosophy: Nature intends to hide Fisher information, while obeying some simple rules.     

Equilibrium in Queueing Systems with Complementary Products

We study a model of a queueing system with two complementary products/services. In our model, there is one M/M/1 system and another facility that provides instantaneous service. The two services are complementary and the customer has no benefit from obtaining just one of them. We investigate the model under various price structures and ownership assumptions.AMS subject classification: 90B22, 91A10The authors are equal in their contribution to this paper. This paper is submitted by the first author to the Tokyo Institute of Technology as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Ph.D. program in the Department of Value and Decision Sciences, and the order of names was chosen in compliance with program conditions. This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 237/02).     

浅谈古代奥运会与人文精神的积淀

奥林匹克运动会经历了2000多年的发展,如今已成为世界上规模最大,最具有感召力的体育盛会,是不同文化的友好交流与密切融合。同时,古代奥林匹克运动会的精神内涵也随之发展并超出了体育竞技的范畴,它的丰富内涵和它对于人类生活的重要性与日俱增,期间古代奥林匹克运动的人文精神也随之得到了继承和发展。因此,古代奥运会的人文精神也成为一个值得研究的重要课题。     

凸合成模糊对策的模糊稳定集

本建立了凸合成模糊对策的模型，并得到了凸合成模糊对策的模糊稳定集，可由子对策的模糊稳定集表达出来。从而解决了凸合成模糊对策的解的结构问题。     

An approach to deciding the observational equivalence of Algol-like languages

We prove that the observational equivalence of third-order finitary (i.e. recursion-free) Idealized Algol (IA) is decidable using Game Semantics. By modelling the state explicitly in our games, we show that the denotation of a term M of this fragment of IA is a compactly innocent strategy-with-state, i.e. the strategy is generated by a finite view function f_M. Given any such f_M, we construct a real-time deterministic pushdown automaton (DPDA) that recognizes the complete plays of the knowing-strategy denotation of M. Since such plays characterize observational equivalence, and there is an algorithm for deciding whether any two DPDAs recognize the same language, we obtain a procedure for deciding the observational equivalence of third-order finitary IA. Restricted to second-order terms, the DPDA representation cuts down to a deterministic finite automaton; thus our approach gives a new proof of Ghica and McCusker’s regular-expression characterization for this fragment. Our algorithmic representation of program meanings, which is compositional, provides a foundation for model-checking a wide range of behavioural properties of IA and other cognate programming languages. Another result concerns second-order IA with full recursion: we show that observational equivalence for this fragment is undecidable.     

On the Convenience to Form Coalitions or Partnerships in Simple Games

A partnership in a cooperative game is a coalition that possesses an internal structure and, simultaneously, behaves as an individual member. Forming partnerships leads to a modification of the original game which differs from the quotient game that arises when one or more coalitions are actually formed. In this paper, the Shapley value is used to discuss the convenience to form either coalitions or partnerships. To this end, the difference between the additive Shapley value of the partnership in the partnership game and the Shapley alliance value of the coalition, and also between the corresponding value of the internal and external players, are analysed. Simple games are especially considered. Research partially supported by Grant BFM 2003-01314 of the Science and Technology Spanish Ministry and the European Regional Development Fund.