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1.
Claudius Gros 《Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)》2021,23(2)
Human societies are characterized by three constituent features, besides others. (A) Options, as for jobs and societal positions, differ with respect to their associated monetary and non-monetary payoffs. (B) Competition leads to reduced payoffs when individuals compete for the same option as others. (C) People care about how they are doing relatively to others. The latter trait—the propensity to compare one’s own success with that of others—expresses itself as envy. It is shown that the combination of (A)–(C) leads to spontaneous class stratification. Societies of agents split endogenously into two social classes, an upper and a lower class, when envy becomes relevant. A comprehensive analysis of the Nash equilibria characterizing a basic reference game is presented. Class separation is due to the condensation of the strategies of lower-class agents, which play an identical mixed strategy. Upper-class agents do not condense, following individualist pure strategies. The model and results are size-consistent, holding for arbitrary large numbers of agents and options. Analytic results are confirmed by extensive numerical simulations. An analogy to interacting confined classical particles is discussed. 相似文献
2.
On Quantum Team Games 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
E. Ahmed M. F. Elettreby A. S. Hegazi 《International Journal of Theoretical Physics》2006,45(5):880-886
Recently Liu and Simaan (2004) convex static multi-team classical games have been introduced. Here they are generalized to both nonconvex, dynamic and quantum games. Puu's incomplete information dynamical systems are modified and applied to Cournot team game. The replicator dynamics of the quantum prisoner's dilemma game is also studied. 相似文献
3.
Shunlong Luo 《Foundations of Physics》2002,32(11):1757-1772
We formulate an elementary statistical game which captures the essence of some fundamental quantum experiments such as photon polarization and spin measurement. We explore and compare the significance of the principle of maximum Shannon entropy and the principle of minimum Fisher information in solving such a game. The solution based on the principle of minimum Fisher information coincides with the solution based on an invariance principle, and provides an informational explanation of Malus' law for photon polarization. There is no solution based on the principle of maximum Shannon entropy. The result demonstrates the merits of Fisher information, and the demerits of Shannon entropy, in treating some fundamental quantum problems. It also provides a quantitative example in support of a general philosophy: Nature intends to hide Fisher information, while obeying some simple rules. 相似文献
4.
We study a model of a queueing system with two complementary products/services. In our model, there is one M/M/1 system and another facility that provides instantaneous service. The two services are complementary and the customer has no benefit from obtaining just one of them. We investigate the model under various price structures and ownership assumptions.AMS subject classification: 90B22, 91A10The authors are equal in their contribution to this paper. This paper is submitted by the first author to the Tokyo Institute of Technology as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Ph.D. program in the Department of Value and Decision Sciences, and the order of names was chosen in compliance with program conditions. This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 237/02). 相似文献
5.
6.
C. -H. L. Ong 《Annals of Pure and Applied Logic》2004,130(1-3):125-171
We prove that the observational equivalence of third-order finitary (i.e. recursion-free) Idealized Algol (IA) is decidable using Game Semantics. By modelling the state explicitly in our games, we show that the denotation of a term M of this fragment of IA is a compactly innocent strategy-with-state, i.e. the strategy is generated by a finite view function fM. Given any such fM, we construct a real-time deterministic pushdown automaton (DPDA) that recognizes the complete plays of the knowing-strategy denotation of M. Since such plays characterize observational equivalence, and there is an algorithm for deciding whether any two DPDAs recognize the same language, we obtain a procedure for deciding the observational equivalence of third-order finitary IA. Restricted to second-order terms, the DPDA representation cuts down to a deterministic finite automaton; thus our approach gives a new proof of Ghica and McCusker’s regular-expression characterization for this fragment. Our algorithmic representation of program meanings, which is compositional, provides a foundation for model-checking a wide range of behavioural properties of IA and other cognate programming languages. Another result concerns second-order IA with full recursion: we show that observational equivalence for this fragment is undecidable. 相似文献
7.
Francesc Carreras M. Dolors Llongueras Antonio Magaña 《Annals of Operations Research》2005,137(1):67-89
A partnership in a cooperative game is a coalition that possesses an internal structure and, simultaneously, behaves as an
individual member. Forming partnerships leads to a modification of the original game which differs from the quotient game
that arises when one or more coalitions are actually formed.
In this paper, the Shapley value is used to discuss the convenience to form either coalitions or partnerships. To this end,
the difference between the additive Shapley value of the partnership in the partnership game and the Shapley alliance value
of the coalition, and also between the corresponding value of the internal and external players, are analysed. Simple games
are especially considered.
Research partially supported by Grant BFM 2003-01314 of the Science and Technology Spanish Ministry and the European Regional
Development Fund. 相似文献
8.
本文首先提出逆(反)对策这一新问题,给出了数学模型;探讨了“奇门遁甲”预测理论(术)中的数学问题;通过系统分析“专门遁甲”预测过程,可知它的预测过程隐含着一个特殊的逆(反)对策问题;最后指出逆(反)对策问题的广泛存在并给出案例分析. 相似文献
9.
Marion SCHEEPERS 《数学学报(英文版)》2007,23(7):1153-1162
We show that a set of real numbers is a Sierpinski set if, and only if, it satisfies a selection property similar to the familiar Menger property. 相似文献
10.
Nobuyuki Hanaki 《Complexity》2004,9(5):41-50
This article seeks to ascertain whether the strategy‐learning model of Hanaki, Sethi, Erev, and Peterhansl (2003) better accounts for observed behavior than do the various action‐learning models. It does so by measuring the goodness‐of‐fit of the models' predictions against published experimental results for such games as Coordination, Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chicken. The fit is measured via the mean squared deviation (MSD) between the observed behavior and the one predicted by the model. The results show that, for Chicken, the strategy‐learning model fits the observed data much better than do the action‐learning models. The best action‐learning model, on the other hand, fits the observed data well in Coordination. Overall, the strength of the strategy‐learning model is best shown in games where alternations between the two stage‐game Nash equilibria are often observed in the laboratory experiments. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 9: 41–50, 2004 相似文献