Collective Strategy Condensation: When Envy Splits Societies

Human societies are characterized by three constituent features, besides others. (A) Options, as for jobs and societal positions, differ with respect to their associated monetary and non-monetary payoffs. (B) Competition leads to reduced payoffs when individuals compete for the same option as others. (C) People care about how they are doing relatively to others. The latter trait—the propensity to compare one’s own success with that of others—expresses itself as envy. It is shown that the combination of (A)–(C) leads to spontaneous class stratification. Societies of agents split endogenously into two social classes, an upper and a lower class, when envy becomes relevant. A comprehensive analysis of the Nash equilibria characterizing a basic reference game is presented. Class separation is due to the condensation of the strategies of lower-class agents, which play an identical mixed strategy. Upper-class agents do not condense, following individualist pure strategies. The model and results are size-consistent, holding for arbitrary large numbers of agents and options. Analytic results are confirmed by extensive numerical simulations. An analogy to interacting confined classical particles is discussed.     

The effects of resource limitation and consensual incentives on cooperation

Exploring the evolution of cooperation has been one of the most challenging topics and attracted increasing attention in various realms. Hereby, we institute an analytic model where the relationship between the common benefits and contributions is the typical saturation nonlinearity. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation with and without consensual incentives respectively. The population always evolves to full defection when the incentives are absent. Cooperation, however, can be promoted by consensual incentives when the degree of cooperators' preferences for incentives is great. There exists an intermediate amount of resources at which the positive effect of consensual incentives on cooperation is minimized. Furthermore, there is a U-shape relationship between the degree of cooperators' preference for an incentive and the evolution of cooperation. A greater basin of full cooperation can be induced when the cooperators' preference for reward is more pronounced than that for punishment.     

油水两液相一维非等温渗流的传递分析

在求解油水两液相非等温渗流的温度场、压力场基础上,以驱动功、驱动功率、驱动阻力、驱动速率为特征参数,对该过程进行(火用)传递分析。数值模拟的结果表明:含水通过降低油的相对渗透率、从而增大驱动阻力、减小驱动功率, 最终导致原油产量降低。     

On Quantum Team Games

Recently Liu and Simaan (2004) convex static multi-team classical games have been introduced. Here they are generalized to both nonconvex, dynamic and quantum games. Puu's incomplete information dynamical systems are modified and applied to Cournot team game. The replicator dynamics of the quantum prisoner's dilemma game is also studied.     

Maximum Shannon Entropy, Minimum Fisher Information, and an Elementary Game

We formulate an elementary statistical game which captures the essence of some fundamental quantum experiments such as photon polarization and spin measurement. We explore and compare the significance of the principle of maximum Shannon entropy and the principle of minimum Fisher information in solving such a game. The solution based on the principle of minimum Fisher information coincides with the solution based on an invariance principle, and provides an informational explanation of Malus' law for photon polarization. There is no solution based on the principle of maximum Shannon entropy. The result demonstrates the merits of Fisher information, and the demerits of Shannon entropy, in treating some fundamental quantum problems. It also provides a quantitative example in support of a general philosophy: Nature intends to hide Fisher information, while obeying some simple rules.     

Equilibrium in Queueing Systems with Complementary Products

We study a model of a queueing system with two complementary products/services. In our model, there is one M/M/1 system and another facility that provides instantaneous service. The two services are complementary and the customer has no benefit from obtaining just one of them. We investigate the model under various price structures and ownership assumptions.AMS subject classification: 90B22, 91A10The authors are equal in their contribution to this paper. This paper is submitted by the first author to the Tokyo Institute of Technology as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Ph.D. program in the Department of Value and Decision Sciences, and the order of names was chosen in compliance with program conditions. This research was supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 237/02).     

凸合成模糊对策的模糊稳定集

本建立了凸合成模糊对策的模型，并得到了凸合成模糊对策的模糊稳定集，可由子对策的模糊稳定集表达出来。从而解决了凸合成模糊对策的解的结构问题。     

组织合作中关系专用性投资最优水平分析

本在以往研究的基础上对关系专用投资的价值创造功能作了进一步的讨论，分析了其创造准租金收入的机理和一般表示，在此基础上结合以往交易成本经济学对关系专用性投资的认识以及其作为沉没成本的特征，从效用最大化的角度建立了两个成员的联盟中关系专用性投资的决策模型，分析了关系专用性投资创造准租的具体特征对投资水平的影响。     

An approach to deciding the observational equivalence of Algol-like languages

We prove that the observational equivalence of third-order finitary (i.e. recursion-free) Idealized Algol (IA) is decidable using Game Semantics. By modelling the state explicitly in our games, we show that the denotation of a term M of this fragment of IA is a compactly innocent strategy-with-state, i.e. the strategy is generated by a finite view function f_M. Given any such f_M, we construct a real-time deterministic pushdown automaton (DPDA) that recognizes the complete plays of the knowing-strategy denotation of M. Since such plays characterize observational equivalence, and there is an algorithm for deciding whether any two DPDAs recognize the same language, we obtain a procedure for deciding the observational equivalence of third-order finitary IA. Restricted to second-order terms, the DPDA representation cuts down to a deterministic finite automaton; thus our approach gives a new proof of Ghica and McCusker’s regular-expression characterization for this fragment. Our algorithmic representation of program meanings, which is compositional, provides a foundation for model-checking a wide range of behavioural properties of IA and other cognate programming languages. Another result concerns second-order IA with full recursion: we show that observational equivalence for this fragment is undecidable.     

On the Convenience to Form Coalitions or Partnerships in Simple Games

A partnership in a cooperative game is a coalition that possesses an internal structure and, simultaneously, behaves as an individual member. Forming partnerships leads to a modification of the original game which differs from the quotient game that arises when one or more coalitions are actually formed. In this paper, the Shapley value is used to discuss the convenience to form either coalitions or partnerships. To this end, the difference between the additive Shapley value of the partnership in the partnership game and the Shapley alliance value of the coalition, and also between the corresponding value of the internal and external players, are analysed. Simple games are especially considered. Research partially supported by Grant BFM 2003-01314 of the Science and Technology Spanish Ministry and the European Regional Development Fund.