考虑品牌差异的双渠道供应链减排与低碳宣传策略

针对双渠道供应链低碳减排、低碳宣传与品牌策略问题,构建微分博弈模型,运用汉密尔顿-雅可比-贝尔曼方程分别求得集中决策和Stackelberg博弈下的低碳减排投入、低碳宣传投入和低碳宣传分担率。研究发现:集中决策情形下产品的减排量始终高于Stackelberg博弈情形下的减排量;产品品牌差异化程度与制造商所承担零售商低碳宣传成本的比例呈正相关;供应链成员的最优低碳宣传策略除了与品牌差异程度相关,还取决于供应链成员在不同渠道边际利润的相对大小;存在一个低碳宣传成本分担率能够实现制造商和零售商协调。并用数值算例验证了本文的相关结论。     

需求信息不对称下多渠道供应链的协调定价

针对由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两层供应链,其中制造商拥有网络直销渠道和传统零售渠道组成的多渠道问题,运用stackelberg博弈分别进行了制造商和零售商需求信息不对称时二者集中控制和分散控制时的最优定价分析,结果表明分散控制会降低供应链的总体效率,继而为了提高多渠道供应链的效率,通过数量折扣模型对多渠道供应链进行协调定价,最后进行了算例验证及有效性分析,结果表明数量折扣模型能使多渠道供应链中的制造商和传统零售商达到双赢,它是合理有效的。     

产能约束对闭环供应链回收渠道选择的影响

在制造商存在产能约束下,建立了再制造闭环供应链回收渠道决策的Stackelberg博弈模型,得出了三种回收渠道下的回收率、零售价以及制造商、零售商和供应链的利润,分析了制造商的生产能力对回收渠道决策的影响。研究表明:存在产能约束时,制造商回收渠道中的回收率总是最高的,这与无产能约束时零售商回收渠道中回收率最高的情况明显不同;同时,若废旧产品回收转移支付价格较低,制造商会选择自己回收,此时的零售价最低,制造商、零售商和供应链利润最高;若回收转移支付价格较高,制造商会选择零售商回收,此时的零售价最低,制造商和供应链利润最高。     

基于有信息委托人视角的创意转化契约设计研究

为了形式化一个有信息的委托人在创意的转化过程中,与代理人缔约时所面临的信号显示问题,以创意的特性为基础,通过建立Stackelberg信号博弈模型,证明了创意转化契约分离均衡的存在性,并分析了知识产权保护强度和产业成熟度对均衡契约的影响。研究还发现,当同时存在委托人的逆向选择和代理人的道德风险时,分离均衡契约使得代理人的努力水平会产生向下的扭曲。     

Cooperation in the spatial public goods game with the second-order reputation evaluation

The existence of reputation can significantly promote the level of cooperation within the human population. In the recent years, most of the researches were based on binary image score or first-order evaluation standard. In this paper, we propose a second-order reputation evaluation model, in which the individual's image score will change not only in accordance with his own strategy, but also the reputation value of neighbors. Individuals try to enhance their reputation to cooperate with the surrounding high-reputation individuals, and then becomes an influential individual in the population. The existence of this mechanism renders the individuals who at the edge of the clusters formed by the cooperators to rapidly accumulate their reputation values through the adoption of cooperative strategy, and then the cooperative strategy can be spread widely and rapidly in the whole population. Through extensive numerical simulations, it is clearly indicated that the population cooperation behavior will be obviously improved when the individual's influence factor becomes smaller or the reputation step length increases. The current results are further conducive to understanding the emergence of cooperation in many real world systems.     

Mean-field approximations of fixation time distributions of evolutionary game dynamics on graphs

The mean fixation time is often not accurate for describing the timescales of fixation probabilities of evolutionary games taking place on complex networks. We simulate the game dynamics on top of complex network topologies and approximate the fixation time distributions using a mean-field approach. We assume that there are two absorbing states. Numerically, we show that the mean fixation time is sufficient in characterizing the evolutionary timescales when network structures are close to the well-mixing condition. In contrast, the mean fixation time shows large inaccuracies when networks become sparse. The approximation accuracy is determined by the network structure, and hence by the suitability of the mean-field approach. The numerical results show good agreement with the theoretical predictions.     

Integrating the environmental factor into the strategy updating rule to promote cooperation in evolutionary games

Many previous studies have shown that the environment plays an important role for social individuals. In this paper, we integrate the environmental factor, which is defined as the average payoff of all a player's neighbours, with the standard Fermi updating rule by introducing a tunable parameter, ω. It is found that the level of cooperation increases remarkably, and that the cooperators can better resist the invasion of defection with an increase in ω. This interesting phenomenon is then explained from a microscopic view. In addition, the universality of this mechanism is also proved with the help of the small-world network and the random regular graph. This work may be helpful in understanding cooperation behaviour in species from unicellular organisms up to human beings.     

三方非对称进化博弈行为分析

随着政府涉入领域以及社会合作谈判领域的增多,三方非对称进化博弈越来越多地出现在现实生活中.但目前国内外对该类型的进化博弈研究甚少,这显然不利于正确地解释和预测该类型的博弈行为.基于此,运用进化博弈论中的“复制动态”思想,对三方非对称的2×2×2进化博弈进行了渐进稳定性分析,完整地给出了其定性行为的等价定量分类和各参与主体不同情况下的稳定性策略,并且用三维立体图演示了不同策略组合的渐进趋势,从而为研究现实生活中该类型的博弈行为提供了一种理论依据.     

内生网络环境下具有异质连接费用的局部策略互动

考察内生网络环境下局中人之间的局部策略互动, 网络中的局中人只与直接邻居进行协同对策. 网络生成的过程中, 建立连接的费用是异质的~(具有两种水平), 与采取有效行动的局中人建立连接时执行高水平费用, 与采取风险占优行动的局中人建立连接时执行低水平费用. 在异质连接费用的情形下, 首次较为完整地给出了均衡网络的结构特性和局中人的行动选择, 并分析了费用参数对均衡结果的影响.     

基于多期有限理性的可再生资源寡头博弈模型与分析

本文讨论多期有限理性条件下可再生资源开发的寡头博弈模型。在每个经济时期以实现多个相邻时期的总贴现利润最大化为目的而得到双寡头决策者资源开发的最优策略组合,并以各期最优策略组合构建资源开发决策的动力系统。通过对系统的动力学分析,讨论了系统中各参数对系统的稳定性与稳定状态的作用与影响,并给出了相应的经济解释。分析了反馈控制系统的稳定性。最后通过对系统的数值模拟,分析了各参数的取值变化与系统稳定速度之间的关系。本文通过系统的稳定性分析获得的主要结论是,资源市场竞争的稳定与可持续发展与决策者注重后期经济利益的决策理性密切相关。