三方非对称进化博弈行为分析

随着政府涉入领域以及社会合作谈判领域的增多，三方非对称进化博弈越来越多地出现在现实生活中.但目前国内外对该类型的进化博弈研究甚少，这显然不利于正确地解释和预测该类型的博弈行为.基于此，运用进化博弈论中的“复制动态”思想，对三方非对称的2×2×2进化博弈进行了渐进稳定性分析，完整地给出了其定性行为的等价定量分类和各参与主体不同情况下的稳定性策略，并且用三维立体图演示了不同策略组合的渐进趋势，从而为研究现实生活中该类型的博弈行为提供了一种理论依据.

A behavior analysis of evolutionary game under three asymmetric parties

With the increase of the fields that the government involves and social cooperation negotiating, there are more and more evolutionary games under three asymmetric parties. But there is little research about this kind of game at home and abroad. This is clearly not conductive to properly explain and predict real-life behaviors of three asymmetric evolutionary game. Because of this, based on the strategic adjustment process, this paper establishes the dynamic equations of 2 X 2 X 2 asymmetric evolutionary game and classifies qualitative property to analyse behaviors of the three asymmetric parties. We give stable strategies of the three parties under different circumstances. At the same time, we use three-dimensional figures to show the results. This paper has a certain significance to analyse the game behaviors of three asymmetric parties.