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21.
This paper studies a supply chain consisting of two suppliers and one retailer in a spot market, where the retailer uses the
newsvendor solution as its purchase policy, and suppliers compete for the retailer’s purchase. Since each supplier’s bidding
strategy affects the other’s profit, a game theory approach is used to identify optimal bidding strategies. We prove the existence
and uniqueness of a Nash solution. It is also shown that the competition between the supplier leads to a lower market clearing
price, and as a result, the retailer benefits from it. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of the obtained results by
deriving optimal bidding strategies for power generator plants in the deregulated California energy market.
Supported in part by RGC (Hong Kong) Competitive Earmarked Research Grants (CUHK4167/04E and CUHK4239/03E), a Distinguished
Young Investigator Grant from the National Natural Sciences Foundation of China, and a grant from Hundred Talents Program
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. 相似文献
22.
本在Glover—Klingman算法及最小费用支撑树对策的基础上,讨论了最小费用k度限制树对策问题.利用威胁、旁支付理论制订了两种规则,并利用优超、策略等价理论分别给出了在这两种规则下最小费用k度限制树对策核心中的解,从而证明了在这两种规则下其核心非空. 相似文献
23.
24.
Noninferior Nash Strategies for Multi-Team Systems 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper is concerned with the optimization of systems that are controlled by several teams of decision makers. The decision makers within each team cooperate for the benefit of their team. On the other hand, the teams compete among themselves in order to achieve an objective that relates to the overall performance of the system. An approach that merges concepts from team theory and game theory for dealing with such systems and a solution called the noninferior Nash strategy are introduced. This multi-team solution provides a new framework for analyzing hierarchically controlled systems so as to address complicated coordination problems among the decision makers. The properties of the noninferior Nash solution in static multi-team systems are investigated and necessary conditions for its existence are derived. Analytical expressions for the noninferior Nash strategies are derived for a class of linear-quadratic static multi-team games. In order to deal with the issue of nonuniqueness of the solution, the concept of a noninferior Nash strategy with a team leader is introduced. Several examples are presented to illustrate the results. 相似文献
25.
We first note that Gentzen's proof-reduction for his consistency proof of PA can be directly interpreted as moves of Kirby-Paris' Hydra Game, which implies a direct independence proof of the game (Section 1 and Appendix). Buchholz's Hydra Game for labeled hydras is known to be much stronger than PA. However, we show that the one-dimensional version of Buchholz's Game can be exactly identified to Kirby-Paris' Game (which is two-dimensional but without labels), by a simple and natural interpretation (Section 2). Jervell proposed another type of a combinatorial game, by abstracting Gentzen's proof-reductions and showed that his game is independent of PA. We show (Section 3) that this Jervell's game is actually much stronger than PA, by showing that the critical ordinal of Jervell's game is φω (0) (while that of PA or of Kirby-Paris' Game is φ1 (0) = ?0) in the Veblen hierarchy of ordinals. 相似文献
26.
Perfect information two-person zero-sum markov games with imprecise transition probabilities 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Hyeong Soo Chang 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》2006,64(2):335-351
Based on an extension of the controlled Markov set-chain model by Kurano et al. (in J Appl Prob 35:293–302, 1998) into competitive two-player game setting, we provide a model of perfect information two-person zero-sum Markov games with imprecise transition probabilities. We define an equilibrium value for the games formulated with the model in terms of a partial order and then establish the existence of an equilibrium policy pair that achieves the equilibrium value. We further analyze finite-approximation error bounds obtained from a value iteration-type algorithm and discuss some applications of the model. 相似文献
27.
本文针对从图的k-边覆盖问题引出的合作对策模型,利用线性规划对偶理论得到了其核心非空的一个充分条件和构造核心分配的多项式时间算法,并将这一结果推广到了一般的k-集合覆盖对策模型中. 相似文献
28.
Noncooperative games are used to demonstrate that, while free riding is always an option, the “tragedy of the commons” is not inevitable. When the decision to cooperate or free ride is considered in a dynamic setting, there is no intermediate case where some cooperate and others free ride. The game is only stabilized in either full cooperation or full defection. The important factor in obtaining a cooperative outcome is the critical number of players that decide to cooperate. The concept of commitment is used to demonstrate the necessary and sufficient conditions for full cooperation. Although the analysis is based on a shared water resource, it can be extended to other natural resources with common costs and private benefits, especially in the cases where there are no international authorities or treaties that internalize the externalities involved in privatizing the resource. 相似文献
29.
《Operations Research Letters》2022,50(4):407-414
In this study, the existing game theoretical framework is extended to strategic queuing in search of solutions for a two-population game in observable double-ended queuing systems with zero matching times. We show that multiple Nash equilibria and one unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exist in this game. 相似文献
30.
《Operations Research Letters》2022,50(5):470-474
An independent set game is a cooperative game dealing with profit sharing in the maximum independent set problem. A population monotonic allocation scheme is a rule specifying how to share the profit of each coalition among its participants such that every participant is better off when the coalition expands. In this paper, we provide a necessary and sufficient characterization for independent set games admitting population monotonic allocation schemes. Moreover, our characterization can be verified efficiently. 相似文献