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A two-population game in observable double-ended queuing systems |
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| Institution: | 1. Graduate School of Science and Technology, University of Tsukuba, 305-8573 Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan;2. Faculty of Engineering, Information and Systems, University of Tsukuba, 305-8573 Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan |
| Abstract: | In this study, the existing game theoretical framework is extended to strategic queuing in search of solutions for a two-population game in observable double-ended queuing systems with zero matching times. We show that multiple Nash equilibria and one unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exist in this game. |
| Keywords: | Strategic queuing Game theory Two-population game Nash equilibrium Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium |
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