On the cooperation of recycling operations

This paper addresses two important issues that may affect the operations efficiency in the recycling industry. First, the industry contains many small-scale and inefficient recycling firms, especially in developing countries. Second, the output from recycling a waste product often yields multiple recycled products that cannot all be sold efficiently by a single firm. To address these two issues, this paper examines how different firms can cooperate in their recycling and pricing decisions using cooperative game theory. Recycling operations under both joint and individual productions with different cost structures are considered. Decisions include the quantity of waste product to recycle and the price at which to sell each recycled product on each firm’s market. These decisions can be made jointly by multiple cooperating firms to maximize total profit. We design allocation schemes for maximized total profit to encourage cooperation among all firms. Managerial insights are provided from both environmental and economic perspectives.     

On the core of cost-revenue games: Minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues

In this paper, we analyze cost sharing problems arising from a general service by explicitly taking into account the generated revenues. To this cost-revenue sharing problem, we associate a cooperative game with transferable utility, called cost-revenue game. By considering cooperation among the agents using the general service, the value of a coalition is defined as the maximum net revenues that the coalition may obtain by means of cooperation. As a result, a coalition may profit from not allowing all its members to get the service that generates the revenues. We focus on the study of the core of cost-revenue games. Under the assumption that cooperation among the members of the grand coalition grants the use of the service under consideration to all its members, it is shown that a cost-revenue game has a nonempty core for any vector of revenues if, and only if, the dual game of the cost game has a large core. Using this result, we investigate minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues. We show that if every connection cost can take only two values (low or high cost), then, the corresponding minimum cost spanning tree game with revenues has a nonempty core. Furthermore, we provide an example of a minimum cost spanning tree game with revenues with an empty core where every connection cost can take only one of three values (low, medium, or high cost).     

Computing approximate Nash equilibria in general network revenue management games

Computing optimal capacity allocations in network revenue management is computationally hard. The problem of computing exact Nash equilibria in non-zero-sum games is computationally hard, too. We present a fast heuristic that, in case it cannot converge to an exact Nash equilibrium, computes an approximation to it in general network revenue management problems under competition. We also investigate the question whether it is worth taking competition into account when making (network) capacity allocation decisions. Computational results show that the payoffs in the approximate equilibria are very close to those in exact ones. Taking competition into account never leads to a lower revenue than ignoring competition, no matter what the competitor does. Since we apply linear continuous models, computation time is very short.     

时滞系统在博弈中的应用研究

演化博弈理论解决策略均衡问题是目前比较认可的好方法.对于博弈方的经验行为,还未曾研究.本文以非对称2×2的博弈问题为研究对象,建立起带有时滞的博弈系统,通过动力学相关知识,分别研究了两类系统下博弈参与者策略的稳定状态.数值模拟分析了延时给决策带来的影响.实验表明,时滞作用不改变策略的稳定状态,改变的仅是达到稳态的速率.     

基于微分变分不等式的多商品流网络动态模型

针对由多个制造商和多个零售商构成并且具有多商品流的供应链网络,建立了制造商、零售商之间从事微分Nash博弈的供应链网络动态模型.首先,在介绍微分变分不等式定义的基础上,利用微分变分不等式的方法建立了制造商、零售商以及供应链网络的均衡条件.然后,在正则条件下分析了供应链网络动态模型解的存在性条件.最后,利用数值算例验证了模型的合理性.     

Op en Lo op Saddle Point on Linear Quadratic Sto chastic Differential Games

In this paper, we deal with one kind of two-player zero-sum linear quadratic stochastic differential game problem. We give the existence of an open loop saddle point if and only if the lower and upper values exist.     

整治非法煤矿的博弈论分析

通过建立博弈模型，分析事故频发的原因，并提出相应对策．指出设立举报奖金，消除矿工举报的后顾之忧，降低监督成本从而增加监督频率，加大惩罚力度是减少事故的关键．     

双边配给问题的Shapley解及其在博物馆通票问题中的应用

双边配给问题描述了现实生活中一类带有二部图结构的稀缺资源配置问题, 例如, 在自然灾害期间救援物资的配给; 电力和天然气等自然资源按需分配; 高校引进人才调配等。本文通过求解线性规划, 并从联盟边际贡献的角度出发定义了双边配给问题的一个Shapley解。之后, 通过合作对策模型和解的公理化方法说明新解的合理性。首先, 建立双边配给问题的合作对策模型, 论证了新解与双边配给合作对策的Shapley值一致; 其次, 证明了Shapley解是唯一满足优先一致性的有效配给方案。最后, 将Shapley解应用于博物馆通票问题的研究, 探讨了博物馆合作制定通票后所得单票和通票收益的分配方式。     

团队生产中的博弈模型与道德风险研究

首先根据团队生产在产出函数的特点,建立了由二人组成的团队生产模型;接着,在分析了团队生产的博弈过程后,求得团队成员努力投入的N ash均衡;最后,着重研究了两种证实团队生产中存在道德风险的方法.