关键词广告支付模式的研究

关键词广告是主要用于搜索引擎的一种广告销售机制.所谓关键词既指搜索用户在搜索框内输入的检索词,也指机器程序从用户浏览的网页内容中抓取的词.广告主的广告依据关键词触发而展现在相应网页上.对搜索引擎来说,选择广告的支付模式是销售机制的核心命题.在互联网发展的实践中出现了许多支付模式,比如按展现付费(Pay-Per-Impression),接点击付费(Pay-Per-Click),按呼叫付费(Pay-Per-Call)和按销量付费(Pay-Per-Sale)等.如果实现这些支付模式的条件都具备,那么哪一种付费方式对搜索引擎是最有利的?试图回答这个问题.主要结论是对搜索引擎来讲,按点击付费是最优或近似最优的支付模式.     

On a cooperative advertising model for a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer

, , ,  and  recently studied a game-theoretic model for cooperative advertising in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. However, the sales-volume (demand) function considered in this model can become negative for some values of the decision variables, and in fact, this does happen for the proposed Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium solutions. Yue et al. (2006) acknowledge the negativity problem and suggest two constraints to fix it; however, they do not incorporate these constraints into their mathematical analysis. In this paper, we show that the results obtained by analyzing the advertising model under the constraints suggested by Yue et al. can differ significantly from those obtained in the previous papers.     

Pricing and two-tier advertising with one manufacturer and one retailer

This paper considers the pricing decisions and two-tier advertising levels between one manufacturer and one retailer where customer demand depends on the retail price and advertisement by a manufacturer and a retailer. We solve a Stackelberg game with the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the follower. With price sensitive customer demand and a linear wholesale contract, we obtain the optimal decisions by the manufacturer and the optimal responses by the retailer. Our results show that cost sharing of local advertising does not work well, it is better for the manufacturer to advertise nationally and offer the retailer a lower wholesale price.     

On Controlled Linear Diffusions with Delay in a Model of Optimal Advertising under Uncertainty with Memory Effects

We consider a class of dynamic advertising problems under uncertainty in the presence of carryover and distributed forgetting effects, generalizing the classical model of Nerlove and Arrow (Economica 29:129–142, 1962). In particular, we allow the dynamics of the product goodwill to depend on its past values, as well as previous advertising levels. Building on previous work (Gozzi and Marinelli in Lect. Notes Pure Appl. Math., vol. 245, pp. 133–148, 2006), the optimal advertising model is formulated as an infinite-dimensional stochastic control problem. We obtain (partial) regularity as well as approximation results for the corresponding value function. Under specific structural assumptions, we study the effects of delays on the value function and optimal strategy. In the absence of carryover effects, since the value function and the optimal advertising policy can be characterized in terms of the solution of the associated HJB equation, we obtain sharper characterizations of the optimal policy.     

供应链互补产品广告投入和捆绑销售联合决策研究

以一个制造商和一个零售商的供应链为研究对象,制造商生产两种互补产品,零售商可选择分开或捆绑两种销售策略。考虑互补品的负交叉弹性和广告外部性的特点,构建基于溢出效应的需求模型,运用博弈论的方法,求解零售商采取分开和捆绑两种销售策略时的均衡结果。通过比较不同销售策略下的均衡结果及利润关系,探讨在分散式和集中式两种情况下,零售商的最优广告投入和捆绑销售的联合决策问题。最后,通过数值算例,讨论产品互补程度和广告成本系数对决策结果的影响。研究结果表明,无论是在分散式还是集中式决策下,当产品互补程度较高或广告成本系数低时,分开销售是占优策略而广告费用较高;当产品互补程度较低且广告成本系数高时,捆绑销售是占优策略且广告费用较低。     

网络广告点击率预估的特征学习及技术研究进展

大数据时代有效预估网络广告点击率,对企业精准营销和提高投资回报率具有至关重要的作用。对网络广告点击率预估的特征学习及技术研究进行了综述,从原始数据特点及解决方法、点击率预估的特征学习、点击率预估模型构建、评价指标选取等方面,分析了网络广告点击率预估的国内外研究现状。点击率预估可应用于互联网广告投放、推荐系统等多个领域,具有较高的研究价值。     

Optimal advertising policy with the contagion model

This paper considers an optimal control problem for the dynamics of a contagion model, the optimal control being the rate of advertising expenditure that maximizes the present value of net profit streams over an infinite horizon. By using a Green's theorem approach, it is shown that there are multiple optimal stationary equilibria and that the optimal path from any given initial condition is a nearest feasible path to one of these equilibria.This work was partially supported by the National Research Council of Canada, Grant No. A4619.     

Optimal Inter-Organization Control of Collaborative Advertising with Myopic and Far-Sighted Behaviors

This paper investigates the optimal inter-organization control of collaborative advertising considering the myopic and far-sighted behaviors. Taking a two-echelon supply chain as an example, four kinds of differential game models including myopic Stackelberg game, far-sighted Stackelberg game, myopic cooperative game and far-sighted cooperative game are studied. The results show that the optimal advertising efforts of both manufacturer and retailer in the myopic situation decrease with time. But they remain constant in the far-sighted situation. The Pareto improvement applies to both game players from the non-cooperative game to the cooperative game. The numerical analyses are conducted to further investigate the theoretical results and to guide the inter-organization control of collaborative advertising in practice.     

Feedback Competitive Advertising Strategies with a General Objective Function

We introduce a general objective function, which incorporates competitive situations, such as conservative, punitive, and predatory advertising. Linking together the particular situations into a two-parameter family of max–min problems, and using the Lanchester model to describe the dynamics of the market, a bilinear-quadratic differential game is obtained. For this game, we find saddle-point feedback time-invariant advertising strategies and show when these strategies are Nash equilibrium strategies. In an empirical application involving duopolistic competition in the cola market, we find evidence of a punitive motivation for the advertising strategies.     

不同决策模式下的双渠道供应链合作广告博弈分析

本文研究了双渠道供应链中非合作广告模式、合作广告模式和战略联盟模式下的合作广告问题,给出了不同决策模式下的均衡解。对比分析发现:战略联盟模式中品牌广告和零售商广告投入水平最高,网络广告投入水平最低且零售渠道的产品需求最高。合作广告模式和战略联盟模式中的系统收益与广告比率负相关,与产品网络适应度正相关。