考虑互惠公平的创新顾客激励契约研究

基于公平偏好理论的互惠公平,从创新顾客的互惠偏好程度、激励契约类型与激励效果的关系入手,构建创新顾客参与企业创新活动的激励模型。通过模型求解和分析,探讨激励契约的外部性和互惠关系对于激励效果的影响;此外,进一步分析如何联合经济激励和心理激励,降低企业获得创新顾客高努力投入的成本;最后,通过仿真实验,验证模型分析结果。研究发现:当创新顾客之间出现互惠关系时,最优激励契约取决于创新顾客心理偏好与风险态度之间的相互作用:当创新顾客的风险规避程度较低时,最优激励契约为相对绩效契约;当创新顾客的风险规避程度较高时,最优激励契约为团队报酬契约。     

考虑损失规避和补货策略的VMI供应链协调

大量实证研究表明补货可以降低缺货损失,同时企业的损失规避行为也影响其决策问题,无论是补货策略还是损失规避行为最终都可以影响供应链协调状态,但现有研究大多仅考虑含有损失规避的供应链协调问题,忽视了补货策略的影响。本文则是在考虑供应商采取补货策略的基础上,针对由一个损失规避型供应商和一个风险中性型零售商组成的两级VMI供应链中,采用了心理账户分离的方法来刻画供应商的损失规避行为,并分别构建了风险分散契约、期权契约和补贴契约下的供应链协调模型,进而探讨了供应商的损失规避行为对供应链协调状态的影响。研究表明：上述三类协调契约均可使供应链达到协调状态以及实现Pareto改进;相对于期权契约和补贴契约,供应商更倾向于选择风险分散契约来协调供应链;一旦供应商的损失规避程度过高,期权契约和补贴契约则将无法用于协调供应链。研究所得结果有助于丰富VMI供应链协调管理方法。     

心理账户、损失厌恶与行为资产配置实证研究

基于前景理论和三参照点理论,建立了单心理账户和三心理账户下的线性损失厌恶行为投资组合模型,并利用中证基金指数数据构建了不同市场状态下的行为投资组合,实证研究不同损失厌恶系数、不同参照点、不同心理账户资金配置条件下模型的最优资产配置策略和投资组合绩效,研究发现线性损失厌恶模型更关注下侧损失,损失厌恶系数影响资产配置,注重安全性的投资者偏好低风险资产,而寻求实现抱负水平的投资者更偏好高收益资产。     

基于巨额损失波动性的最优投资决策研究

近年来伴随着金融市场广度与深度的不断拓展,频发的金融风险对世界经济及金融市场造成了巨大损失(如美国次贷危机),学者和投资者越来越关注规避小概率巨额风险的最优投资决策及有潜力风险资产遴选方法的研究.文章就此开展了如下研究:首先以损失超过VaR部分的条件期望CVaR作为投资者愿意承担风险的上限,改进投资预算约束为非紧约束,提出了基于巨额损失波动性的投资组合模型.数值试验验证了模型具有良好的收敛性,即使在生成较少数量的情景下也能快速收敛;当投资者对最低期望收益率要求不高时,不必全额投入预算资金就能满足投资者对预期收益的要求;随着投资者对最低期望收益率要求的提高,更多预算资金被投入可能带来更高收益的风险资产,资金预算约束逐渐趋于紧约束;模型给出的最优投资决策在样本外各滚动窗口测试中均实现了较高收益,但发生巨额损失的波动程度却显著降低,达到了控制小概率极端风险的目的.其次,结合常规基本面分析法和聚类分析技术,提出了风险资产的遴选方法.该方法适用于跨市场跨行业不同品种间风险资产的筛选,可兼顾同一类别内资产的同质性及不同类别资产间的异质性,以此达到分散化解风险的目的.实证研究表明,该方法遴选出的"少量"风险资产在各项评价指标上具有明显的优势,聚类技术的引入大大降低了投资者选择资产的难度.     

辽宁省农户参与农业保险意愿的实证研究

辽宁省位于中国的东北地区,主要生产粮食和饲料.对辽宁省农户的保险意愿调查问卷进行了统计分析.结果表明:性别、受教育程度、收入、灾害损失和对保险的了解程度对农户在农业保险意愿上有影响.女性相对于男性,更不愿意参加农业保险;教育程度高和贫穷的农户不愿意参保.以往受灾损失大的农户也不愿意参保,这样,如果政府不能合理的设定保险品种和保险价格可能会出现逆向选择问题.     

基本养老保险缴费心理活动维度的实证研究:个人心理账户视角

本文从心理账户理论视角,通过问卷调查,运用非集计模型,对个人基本养老保险缴费心理活动维度进行了实证研究。研究结果表明,受教育程度、非常规的额外收入、经营性收入、安全型保障账户和风险型存储账户是影响缴费的关键性因素,进而提出引导设立特定缴费心理账户、增强缴费制度弹性,改变缴费者的选择框架, 提升缴费遵从度。     

情绪对股票投资收益及后续投资决策的影响

金融学视角的研究使用市场变量代表投资者情绪,未能触及情绪本质.从心理学视角出发,使用行为金融实验方法,研究股票投资者的真实情绪对收益率及后续决策风险偏好的影响.结果发现:1)股价单边下跌时,产生适度消极情绪的个体收益最高.2)对于后续盈利情境的决策,前期产生积极情绪的个体倾向于规避风险,产生消极情绪的个体倾向于寻求风险;对于后续亏损情境的决策,个体均表现为寻求风险.3)股价单边上涨或下跌时,个体最容易出现的具体情绪分别是"倍受鼓舞"、"内疚"等.     

资金约束下基于CVaR的供应链协调性研究与融资策略选择

在零售商的资金约束下,供应商愿意提供贸易信用融资或者信用担保下的银行贷款。在考虑双方均为风险规避型的情况下采用CVaR风险度量方法建立了双方以及供应链的风险收益值模型,给出了两种融资模式下的供应链协调条件,最优订货量以及批发价格,并且研究了银行贷款利率对供应链协调以及供应商融资方式选择的影响。结果表明实现供应链协调的条件取决于生产成本、银行利率以及双方的风险规避程度,不同的银行利率会导致实现供应链协调的条件不同,供应商将根据双方风险规避程度选择提供给零售商的融资方式。     

顾客策略行为下基于联合促销努力的风险规避供应链协调模型

本文在考虑顾客策略行为情形下,利用条件风险度量准则建立了带有联合促销努力供应链协调模型,研究了风险规避对销售商和供应商决策行为的影响,得到了如下研究结论:(1)集中决策情形,价格承诺策略既可以激励供应商提高生产量,还能够有效降低顾客策略行为对其产生的负面影响。(2)分散决策情形,销售商风险规避度增大,销售商的订购量将增加,供应商的销售努力也将增加;供应商风险规避度增大,销售商的订购量将减小,供应商的销售努力也将减小;无论供应商和销售商的风险规避如何变化,销售商的销售努力不变。(3)利用回购和成本分担组成的混合契约可以实现供应链完美协调。     

区域品牌过度使用与投入不足的风险防范及规避

区域品牌作为一种公共物品，同其他公共物品一样具有非竞争性和非排他性的性质，现有理论和研究表明，这种性质决定了区域品牌具有“公共地悲剧”风险，这种风险表现为过度使用.但通过构建博弈模型，对比模型的纳什均衡解和帕累托最优解，可以发现区域品牌化过程中的“公共地悲剧”风险不仅表现为过度使用，也表现为投入不足，即具有双重性.并通过对这种双重性的内在机理进行分析，提出有效防范和规避“公共地悲剧”风险的政策建议.     

Effects of asymmetric knowledge spillovers on the stability of horizontal and vertical R&D cooperation

In order to investigate the role of asymmetric spillovers in the stability of R&D cooperation, this paper distinguishes two different types of cooperative partners, and uses a game theory approach to reveal the relationship between asymmetric spillovers and R&D investment in the horizontally and vertically related R&D cooperation. In the horizontal R&D cooperation, higher incoming spillovers and lower outgoing spillovers induce firms to invest on R&D efforts as agreed. However, it is the contradiction between horizontal firms’ attitudes towards asymmetric spillovers that leads to the inherent instability of the cooperation. In the vertical R&D cooperation, our results question the usually held opinion about the effects of asymmetric spillovers on the decision of R&D investment. The incoming spillovers are less important in the innovation process for vertically related R&D cooperation. A firm tends to under-invest on the arranged level of R&D efforts when its incoming spillovers increase. Our results also show that efficient mechanisms to restrain firms’ non-cooperative behavior are essential to improve the stability of horizontal and vertical R&D cooperation.     

Real R&;D options with time-to-learn and learning-by-doing

We model R&D efforts to enhance the value of a product or technology before final development. Such efforts may be directed towards improving quality, adding new features, or adopting technological innovations. They are implemented as optional, costly and interacting control actions expected to enhance value but with uncertain outcome. We examine the interesting issues of the optimal timing of R&D, the impact of lags in the realization of the R&D outcome, and the choice between accelerated versus staged (sequential) R&D. These issues are also especially interesting since the history of decisions affects future decisions and the distributions of asset prices and induces path-dependency. We show that the existence of optional R&D efforts enhances the investment option value significantly. The impact of a dividend-like payout rate or of project volatility on optimal R&D decisions may be different with R&D timing flexibility than without. The attractiveness of sequential strategies is enhanced in the presence of learning-by-doing and decreasing marginal reversibility of capital effects.     

Risk sharing in the supplier relations for the Taiwanese automotive industry

This study attempts to develop a supplier's risk sharing contract to gain an understanding of risk sharing for the automotive industry in Taiwan. The existing research has examined revenue-sharing contracts between retailers and manufacturers. However, the study of suppliers’ risk-sharing contracts between manufacturers and suppliers is neglected. This paper first employs a double moral hazard framework to obtain an optimal contract, and then uses the derived model to establish research hypotheses. The empirical analysis shows that manufacturers offer suppliers a type of supplier's risk sharing contract while maintaining long-term relationships with suppliers. The results also support the hypotheses that manufacturers absorb more risk when the suppliers are more uncertainty, more risk aversion and lower moral hazard, and suggest that manufacturers would be willing to absorb more risk as they deepen their involvement in the technological development of suppliers.     

Climate change and optimal energy technology R&D policy

Public policy response to global climate change presents a classic problem of decision making under uncertainty. Theoretical work has shown that explicitly accounting for uncertainty and learning in climate change can have a large impact on optimal policy, especially technology policy. However, theory also shows that the specific impacts of uncertainty are ambiguous. In this paper, we provide a framework that combines economics and decision analysis to implement probabilistic data on energy technology research and development (R&D) policy in response to global climate change. We find that, given a budget constraint, the composition of the optimal R&D portfolio is highly diversified and robust to risk in climate damages. The overall optimal investment into technical change, however, does depend (in a non-monotonic way) on the risk in climate damages. Finally, we show that in order to properly value R&D, abatement must be included as a recourse decision.     

Construction of Nonlinear Stabilizer for Trajectories of Economic Growth

A dynamic model of optimization of R&D intensity is studied for analyzing the effect of the spillover technology assimilation on techno-economic growth. The research focuses on the issue of a reasonable balance in the R&D investment policy between the indigenous technology stock and exogenous technology flow. On the basis of the concavity properties of the Hamiltonian, a nonlinear stabilizer sustaining proportional techno-economic growth is constructed. Trends of optimal R&D intensity are examined depending on the values of the model macroeconomic parameters and the feedback variables. Econometric analysis shows that additional investments and restructuring of these sources for knowledge absorption could have the effect of increasing returns and provide a strong leverage for reaching qualitatively higher levels of sales, technology development, and consumption index. The research was sponsored by the SIMOT Program of the Japanese Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. A.M. Tarasyev was supported by the Russian Fund for Basic Research, Grants 05-01-00601, 05-01-08034, Russian Fund for Humanities, Grant RFH 05-02-02118a, and by the Program for the Sponsorship of Leading Scientific Schools, Grant NSCH-791.2003.1.     

R&;D Equilibrium Strategies with Surfers

A typical assumption in the game-theoretic literature on research and development (R&D) is that all firms belonging to the industry under investigation pursue R&D activities. In this paper, we assume that the industry is composed of two groups; the first (the investors) is made of firms that have R&D facilities and are involved in this type of activity. The second group corresponds to firms that are inactive in R&D (the surfers). The latter group benefits from its competitors’ R&D efforts, thanks to involuntary spillovers. This division of the industry is in line with actual practice, where indeed not all firms are engaged in costly and risky R&D. We adopt a two-stage game formalism where, in the first stage investors decide on their levels of investment in R&D, and in the second stage all firms compete à la Cournot in the product market. We characterize and analyze the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Research supported by NSERC, Canada. F. Ben Abdelaziz is on leave at The College of Engineering, American University of Sharjah, UAE.     

Dynamic Model of R&D,Spillovers, and Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria

Using an infinite-horizon two-player differential game, we derive and compare Bertrand and Cournot equilibria for a differentiated duopoly engaging in the process of R&D competition. The main findings of this study are as follows. First, Bertrand competition is more efficient if either R&D productivity is low or products are very different. Second, Cournot competition is more efficient provided that R&D productivity is high, products are close substitutes, and spillovers are not close to zero. This last result is different from what has been obtained in the literature. Hence, this shows that considering a dynamic model and more general investment costs does have an impact on the efficiency results.     

基于公私不同风险偏好的PPP项目政府补偿机制研究

本文在考虑双方风险偏好差异的基础上,围绕PPP项目补偿问题构建了公私双方的Stackelberg博弈模型,从集中决策和分散决策协调的角度研究了PPP项目的补偿机制。研究表明,在公私双方存在风险厌恶时,直接补贴契约无法诱导私人投资者做出符合整体最优的决策。因此,本文设计了一种基于政府部分承担建设投资的混合补偿契约改进前补贴模式。分析表明,当建设投资分担比例合适时,混合补偿契约可以协调风险厌恶下的PPP补偿博弈的分散决策和集中决策,实现Pareto改进。最后,通过数值分析进一步研究了补偿契约的影响因素和适用范围。     

A model of R&D valuation and the design of research incentives

We develop a real options model of R&D valuation that takes into account the uncertainty in the quality (or efficacy) of the research output, the time and cost to completion, and the market demand for the R&D output. The model is then applied to study the problem of pharmaceutical under-investment in R&D for vaccines to treat diseases affecting the developing regions of the world. To address this issue, world organizations and private foundations are willing to sponsor vaccine R&D, but there is no consensus on how to administer the sponsorship effectively. Different research incentive contracts are examined using our valuation model. Their effectiveness is measured in the following five dimensions: expected cost to the sponsor, probability of development success, consumer surplus generated, expected number of successful vaccinations and expected cost per person successfully vaccinated. We find that, in general, purchase commitment plans (pull subsidies) are more effective than cost subsidy plans (push subsidies). Moreover, we find that a hybrid subsidy plan constructed from a purchase commitment combined with a sponsor research cost-sharing subsidy is the most effective.     

A generalized real option pricing method of R&D investments: jump diffusion and external competition

ABSTRACT

Numerous studies have assessed Research and Development (R&D) investment using the real option pricing approach. This paper proposes a more general real option pricing method that both considers the specificity of R&D investment (such as uncertainty) and the R&D investment opportunity of a business in a market environment with external competitors. Specifically, we adopt a jump diffusion model to evaluate R&D investments that incorporate the uncertainties of these activities. The model values a pioneer's R&D investment opportunity allowing the chance that competitors may enter the market and the project value may vary with time. By construction and analysis of the model, we then analyse the optimal timing to realize profit on an investment. Overall, this model should facilitate a more comprehensive evaluation for R&D investments.