凸合成模糊对策的模糊稳定集

本建立了凸合成模糊对策的模型，并得到了凸合成模糊对策的模糊稳定集，可由子对策的模糊稳定集表达出来。从而解决了凸合成模糊对策的解的结构问题。     

参数优化的最优性及在控制问题中的一个应用

在Banach空间中,给出了含参数的单值映射的不变类凸,拟不变类凸和伪不变类凸的概念.在这类较弱凸性条件下,提出了参数优化问题弱有效解的几个最优性充分条件.作为应用,研究了一类状态约束最优控制问题的弱最优控制.     

凸对策核仁的非空性及合成凸对策核仁的单调性

本文给出了核仁与核及最小核心之间的关系 ,且证明了凸对策核仁的存在性和唯一性 ,证明了凸对策的合成对策仍是凸对策 .最后 ,我们讨论了合成凸对策的核仁不满足单调性 .     

集合函数多目标规划的一阶最优性条件

在文（１）－（４）的基础上，本文通过引入集团函数的伪凸，严格伪凸，拟凸，严格拟凸等新概念，给出了集合函数多目标规划问题有效解的一阶充分条件，弱有效解的阶必要条件，弱有交解的一阶必要条件以及强有效解的一阶充分条件。     

锥凸对称向量拟均衡问题解集的通有稳定性

在拓扑向量空间中,利用Ky Fan截口定理得到一个锥凸向量拟均衡问题弱Pareto解的存在性结果.作为该结果的应用,得到了一个对称向量拟均衡问题在支付映射为锥凸条件下弱Pareto解的存在性定理.该定理在较弱的条件下回答了Fu在文献[1]中提出的第二个问题,即在支付映射为锥凸且连续的条件下对称向量拟均衡问题的弱Pareto解是否存在.最后在赋范线性空间中研究了锥凸对称向量拟均衡问题弱Pareto解集的通有稳定性.     

非常极凸空间

本文使用非常极凸的定义，证明了非常极凸和非常光滑是互为对偶空间且严格介于弱k凸和非常凸之间的空间，最后得到了非常极凸的一些特征．     

D-η-半预不变真拟凸多目标优化的最优性刻画

首先,举例验证了三种D-η-半预不变真拟凸映射的存在性;然后,在D-η-半严格(严格)半预不变真拟凸性下,得出了多目标优化问题的局部有效解为全局有效解,局部弱有效解为全局弱有效解,并举例验证了所得结果;最后,在D-η-严格半预不变真拟凸性下,建立了多目标优化问题的全局弱有效解和局部弱有效解的唯一性的刻画。     

D-η-半预不变真拟凸多目标优化的最优性刻画

首先,举例验证了三种D-η-半预不变真拟凸映射的存在性;然后,在D-η-半严格(严格)半预不变真拟凸性下,得出了多目标优化问题的局部有效解为全局有效解,局部弱有效解为全局弱有效解,并举例验证了所得结果;最后,在D-η-严格半预不变真拟凸性下,建立了多目标优化问题的全局弱有效解和局部弱有效解的唯一性的刻画。     

集值优化问题的强有效解与Kuhn—Tucker鞍点

首先在局部凸Hausdorff拓扑向量空间中定义了集值优化问题的Kuhn—Tucker鞍点，在近似锥一次类凸集值映射下，讨论了集值优化问题的强有效解与Kuhn—Tucker鞍点之间的关系．     

向量值映射D-η-预不变真拟凸的性质

引入了向量值映射的D-η- 预不变真拟凸等概念,在下D-半连续和上D-半连续条件下分别得到了向量值映射的D-η- 预不变真拟凸的等价命题,并讨论了向量值映射的D-η- 预不变真拟凸、D-η- 严格预不变真拟凸、D-η- 半严格预不变真拟凸的关系,证明了在一定条件下,向量优化问题(VP)的局部弱有效解一定是(VP)的全局弱有效解,这些结果推广了前人所得的相应结果。     

Limit Consistent Solutions in Noncooperative Games

Strong and limit consistency in finite noncooperative games are studied. A solution is called strongly consistent if it is both consistent and conversely consistent (Ref. 1). We provide sufficient conditions on one-person behavior such that a strongly consistent solution is nonempty. We introduce limit consistency for normal form games and extensive form games. Roughly, this means that the solution can be approximated by strongly consistent solutions. We then show that the perfect and proper equilibrium correspondences in normal form games, as well as the weakly perfect and sequential equilibrium correspondences for extensive form games, are limit consistent.     

Polytopes of special classes of the balanced transferable utility games

Under study are the polytopes of (0, 1)-normalized convex and 1-convex (dual simplex) n-person TU-games and monotonic big boss games.We solve the characterization problems of the extreme points of the polytopes of 1-convex games, symmetric convex games, and big boss games symmetric with respect to the coalition of powerless agents. For the remaining polytopes, some subsets of extreme points are described.     

Maximal Element Theorems with Applications to Generalized Games and Systems of Generalized Vector Quasi-Equilibrium Problems in <Emphasis Type="Italic">G</Emphasis>-Convex Spaces

By applying the maximal element theorems on product of G-convex spaces due to the first author, some equilibrium existence theorems for generalized games with fuzzy constraint correspondences are proved in G-convex spaces. As applications, some existence theorems of solutions for the system of generalized vector quasiequilibrium problem are established in noncompact product of G-convex spaces. Our results improve and generalize some recent results in the literature to product of G-convex spaces.The authors thank the referees for valuable comments and suggestionsThe research of this author was supported by the National Science Foundation of China, Sichuan Education Department.The research of this author was supported by the National Science Council of the Republic of China.     

Solutions for some bargaining games under the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory,part II: Analysis of specific bargaining games

Part II of the paper (for Part I see Harsanyi (1982)) describes the actual solutions the Harsanyi-Selten solution theory provides for some important classes of bargaining games, such as unanimity games; trade between one seller and several potential buyers; and two-person bargaining games with incomplete information on one side or on both sides. It also discusses some concepts and theorems useful in computing the solution; and explains how our concept of risk dominance enables us to analyze game situations in terms of some intuitively very compelling probabilistic (subjective-probability) considerations disallowed by classical game theory.     

A dynamic transfer scheme deriving from the dual similar associated game

Dynamic process is an approach to cooperative games, and it can be defined as that which leads the players to a solution for cooperative games. Hwang et al. (2005) adopted Hamiache’s associated game (2001) to provide a dynamic process leading to the Shapley value. In this paper, we propose a dynamic transfer scheme on the basis of the dual similar associated game, to lead to any solution satisfying both the inessential game property and continuity, starting from an arbitrary efficient payoff vector.     

A note on two-person zero-sum communicating stochastic games

For undiscounted two-person zero-sum communicating stochastic games with finite state and action spaces, a solution procedure is proposed that exploits the communication property, i.e., working with irreducible games over restricted strategy spaces. The proposed procedure gives the value of the communicating game with an arbitrarily small error when the value is independent of the initial state.     

具有联盟结构的position值

position值是图对策中著名的分支有效解, 该值充分体现了图的边在合作中的贡献, 因而也可作为网络中心性的一种测度方法。本文基于van den Brink等提出的具有联盟结构与图结构的合作对策, 将position值推广到具有联盟结构的图对策上, 提出了具有联盟结构的position值, 该值可以作为受优先联盟约束的网络中心性的一种测度方法。本文首先证明了具有联盟结构的position值可以由分割分支有效性和平衡边贡献性所唯一刻画。其次, 以跨国天然气管道网的收益分配为例, 对这个值与其他值做了比较分析。     

Qualitative analysis of secured outcome regions for two-target games

Qualitative (game of kind) outcomes of two-target games are analyzed in this paper, under both the zero-sum and nonzero-sum preference ordering of outcomes by the players. The outcome regions of each player are defined from a security standpoint. The secured draw and mutual-kill regions of a player depend explicitly on his preference ordering of outcomes and should be constructed separately for each player, especially in a nonzero-sum game. General guidelines are presented for identifying the secured outcome regions of players in a class of two-target games that satisfy an Isaacs-like condition, in terms of the qualitative solutions of the two underlying single-target pursuit-evasion games. A construction has been proposed for obtaining the qualitative solution of a large class of two-target games. Illustrative examples are included.This work was done while the first author was a Research Associate in the Department of Electrical Engineering at the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, and was financially supported by the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Delhi, India.     

A note on the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games

For 2-convex n-person cooperative TU games, the nucleolus is determined as some type of constrained equal award rule. Its proof is based on Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley’s geometrical characterization for the intersection of the prekernel with the core. Pairwise bargaining ranges within the core are required to be in equilibrium. This system of non-linear equations is solved and its unique solution agrees with the nucleolus.