A supply chain model with direct and retail channels

We study a dual channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells to a retailer as well as to consumers directly. Consumers choose the purchase channel based on price and service qualities. The manufacturer decides the price of the direct channel and the retailer decides both price and order quantity. We develop conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer share the market in equilibrium. We show that the difference in marginal costs of the two channels plays an important role in determining the existence of dual channels in equilibrium. We also show that demand variability has a major influence on the equilibrium prices and on the manufacturer’s motivation for opening a direct channel. In the case that the manufacturer and the retailer coordinate and follow a centralized decision maker, we show that adding a direct channel will increase the overall profit. Our numerical results show that an increase in retailer’s service quality may increase the manufacturer’s profit in dual channel and a larger range of consumer service sensitivity may benefit both parties in the dual channel. Our results suggest that the manufacturer is likely to be better off in the dual channel than in the single channel when the retailer’s marginal cost is high and the wholesale price, consumer valuation and the demand variability are low.     

Pricing and advertisement in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain

We use a game theoretical approach to study pricing and advertisement decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain when price discounts are offered by both the manufacturer and retailer. When the manufacturer is the leader of the game, we obtained Stackelberg equilibrium with manufacturer’s local allowance, national brand name investment, manufacturer’s preferred price discount, retailer’s price discount, and local advertising expense. For the special case of two-stage equilibrium when the manufacturer’s price discount is exogenous, we found that the retailer is willing to increase local advertising expense if the manufacturer increases local advertising allowance and provides deeper price discount, or if the manufacturer decreases its brand name investment. When both the manufacturer and retailer have power, Nash equilibrium in a competition game is obtained. The comparison between the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium shows that the manufacturer always prefers Stackelberg equilibrium, but there is no definitive conclusion for the retailer. The bargaining power can be used to determine the profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Once the profit sharing is determined, we suggest a simple contract to help the manufacturer and retailer obtain their desired profit sharing.     

不同权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链的影响研究

在一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链中, 制造商拥有线下传统渠道及线上直销双渠道。首先根据消费者剩余理论, 构建了制造商双渠道需求函数;接着分别构建了两类Stackelberg博弈及Nash博弈三种权力结构下制造商和零售商的利润模型并对模型进行了求解;最后分析了三种不同权力结构对制造商双渠道供应链的影响。研究发现:制造商线上直销渠道价格不受三种博弈权力结构的影响;线下传统渠道零售价格、需求, 线上直销渠道需求及制造商双渠道供应链总利润不受两类Stackelberg博弈权力结构的影响;线下传统渠道零售价格及线上直销渠道需求在Nash博弈权力结构下最小, 而线下传统渠道需求及供应链总利润在Nash博弈权力结构下最大;制造商批发价格、利润及零售商利润对三种博弈权力结构较敏感, 随供应链成员自身博弈权力地位的下降而逐渐降低。     

Pricing policies for substitutable products in a supply chain with Internet and traditional channels

This study considers pricing policies in a supply chain with one manufacturer, who sells a product to an independent retailer and directly to consumers through an Internet channel. In addition to the manufacturer’s product, the retailer sells a substitute product produced by another manufacturer. Given the wholesale prices of the two substitute products, the manufacturer decides the retail price of the Internet channel, and the retailer decides the retail prices of the two substitute products. Both the manufacturer and the retailer choose their own decision variables to maximize their respective profits. This work formulates the price competition, using the settings of Nash and Stackelberg games, and derives the corresponding existence and uniqueness conditions for equilibrium solutions. A sensitivity analysis of an equilibrium solution is then conducted for the model parameters, and the profits are compared for two game settings. The findings show that improving brand loyalty is profitable for both of the manufacturer and retailer, and that an increased service value may alleviate the threat of the Internet channel for the retailer and increase the manufacturer’s profit. The study also derives some conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer mutually prefer the Stackelberg game. Based on these results, this study proposes an appropriate cooperation strategy for the manufacturer and retailer.     

Launching new products through exclusive sales channels

When launching a new product, a manufacturer usually sells it through competing retailers under non-exclusive arrangements. Recently, many new products (cellphones, electronics, toys, etc.) are sold through a single sales channel via an exclusive arrangement. In this paper we present two separate models that examine these two arrangements. Each model is based on a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer acts as the leader by setting the wholesale price and the retailers act as the followers by choosing their retail prices. For each model, we solve the Stackelberg game by determining the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and each retailer’s optimal retail price in equilibrium. Then we examine the conditions under which the manufacturer should sell the new product through an exclusive retailer. In addition, we examine the impact of postponing the wholesale price decision and the impact of demand uncertainty on the manufacturer’s optimal profit under both arrangements.     

考虑零售商销售努力的制造商入侵策略研究

渠道入侵正逐渐成为企业开拓市场,实现多渠道销售的重要策略。在考虑零售商销售努力的前提下,研究了制造商渠道入侵策略。构建了四种Stackelberg博弈模型:不入侵和无销售努力、入侵和无销售努力、不入侵和有销售努力、入侵和有销售努力。研究结果表明,线上直销渠道与线下零售渠道之间的不对称替代水平越高,越不利于制造商入侵;在制造商入侵的情况下,零售商销售努力促使制造商降低批发价格;渠道入侵成本较大且零售商销售努力投资效率高的前提下,销售努力可以有效缓解制造商入侵带来的负面影响;渠道入侵降低了零售商销售努力的动机。     

双渠道模式下制造商线上定制策略研究

本文针对制造商在传统零售渠道和线上网络渠道同时销售标准产品的情况下,是否应该开放线上定制策略的相关问题进行分析。首先通过圆形市场模型完成市场划分;其次,在制造商不开放线上定制策略和开放线上定制策略两种情况下分别构建制造商和零售商利润最大化模型,得到了两种情况下的市场均衡结果。通过分析和比较两种情况下制造商和零售商的最优决策结果发现,当标准产品的边际生产成本较大且开放线上定制策略的成本较小时,制造商应该开放线上定制策略;制造商开放线上定制策略后,会使标准产品的批发价格和零售价格增加,并削弱零售商的利润;定制产品的生产成本越高,制造商开放定制产品的动机越小;消费者对标准产品的适应成本越高,制造商开放定制产品的动机越大。     

Quality improvement vs. advertising support: Which strategy works better for a manufacturer?

We consider a marketing channel with a single manufacturer and a single retailer, where both advertising and quality improvement contribute to the build-up of goodwill. In a non-coop scenario, the retailer controls the advertising efforts while the manufacturer controls the quality improvements and wholesale price. Although improving quality positively contributes to goodwill, it also increases the production cost, thereby reducing the manufacturer’s profit. In a coop scenario, the manufacturer supports the retailer’s advertising while decreasing his investments in quality. We investigate the conditions under which a coop program is beneficial when such a trade-off occurs. Our results demonstrate that only when advertising significantly contributes to goodwill the manufacturer has an incentive to cooperate and a coop program turns out to be Pareto-improving. Conversely, the retailer is always better off with a coop program. Moreover, the channel is operational- and marketing-driven when quality effectiveness is high independent of advertising effectiveness or when both quality and advertising effectiveness are large. In all other cases, the channel is marketing-driven.     

不同渠道偏好和运营成本下双渠道闭环供应链定价决策研究

本文以消费者对传统零售渠道和网络直销渠道的不同偏好和不同渠道运营成本为基础,研究零售商销售新产品并回收废旧产品、制造商开辟网络直销渠道的双渠道闭环供应链中成员的定价决策问题。建立三种不同市场权力结构下的定价博弈模型,用逆向归纳法得到模型的最优解,并用解析分析和数值分析得到消费者的渠道偏好程度和渠道运营成本对定价决策和利润的影响。研究表明:最优直销价格随网络直销渠道偏好程度的增加而上升,最优零售价格随网络直销渠道偏好程度的增加而下降;网络直销渠道运营成本增加对零售商有利但不利于制造商;传统渠道运营成本的增加对所有成员都不利。     

Analyzing online B2B exchange markets: Asymmetric cost and incomplete information

This research applies the discriminating auction to analyze the online B2B exchange market in which a single buyer requests multiple items and several suppliers having equal capacity and asymmetric cost submit bids to compete for buyer demand. In the present model, we examine the impact of asymmetric cost and incomplete information on the participants in the market. Given the complete cost information, each supplier randomizes its price and the lower bound of the price range is determined by the highest marginal cost. In addition, the supplier with a lower marginal cost has a larger considered pricing space but ultimately has a smaller equilibrium one than others with higher marginal costs. When each supplier’s marginal cost is private information, the lowest possible price is determined by the number of suppliers and the buyer’s reservation price. Comparing these two market settings, we find whether IT is beneficial to buyers or suppliers depends on the scale of the bid process and the highest marginal cost. When the number of suppliers and the difference between the highest marginal cost and the buyer’s reservation price are sufficiently large, each supplier can gain a higher profit if the marginal costs are private information. On the contrary, when the highest marginal cost approaches the buyer’s reservation price, complete cost information benefits the suppliers.     

Wholesale pricing and evolutionarily stable strategies of retailers with imperfectly observable objective

This paper develops a one-population (indirect) evolutionary game model of a supply chain with one manufacturer/supplier and many (a sufficiently large number of) retailers to study how the retailer’s marketing objective depends on the wholesale price, its observability, the error probability of the observed result on the rival’s preference, the market scale and the retailer’s bargaining power. This paper also presents an algorithm for computing the optimal wholesale price of the manufacturer. We find that the profit (revenue) maximization behavior is an evolutionarily stable marketing strategy if the wholesale price is sufficiently high (low). Given an appropriate wholesale price, the revenue maximization behavior coexists with the profit maximization behavior in the retailers’ population. The larger the market scale, the stronger the motivation of the retailer to take profit maximization behavior due to a higher wholesale price. The cross effects of the retailer’s reservation payoff and the other factors should be considered in the decision process.     

A dynamic model for advertising and pricing competition between national and store brands

We study the relationship between the pricing and advertising decisions in a channel where a national brand is competing with a private label. We consider a differential game that incorporates the carryover effects of brand advertising over time for both the manufacturer and the retailer and we account for the complementary and competitive roles of advertising. Analysis of the obtained equilibrium Markov strategies shows that the relationship between advertising and pricing decisions in the channel depends mainly on the nature of the advertising effects. In particular, the manufacturer reacts to higher competitive retailer’s advertising levels by offering price concessions and limiting his advertising expenditures. The retailer’s optimal reaction to competitive advertising effects in the channel depends on two factors: (1) the price competition level between the store and the national brands and (2) the strength of the competitive advertising effects. For example, in case of intense price competition between the two brands combined with a strong manufacturer’s competitive advertising effect, the retailer should lower both the store and the national brands’ prices as a reaction to higher manufacturer’s advertising levels. For the retailer, the main advantage from boosting his competitive advertising investments seems to be driven by increased revenues from the private label. The retailer should however limit his investments in advertising if the latter generates considerable competitive effects on the national brand’s sales.     

权力结构影响下考虑预售的双渠道供应链决策研究

针对存在预售且通过网络与传统渠道销售的现实状况,基于消费者剩余理论和博弈论,构建不同权力结构下的双渠道供应链博弈模型:制造商主导的Stackelberg、权力对等的Vertical Nash和零售商主导的Stackelberg。比较三种权力结构下各成员最优策略及绩效,分析关键因素的敏感性,检验模型的鲁棒性。研究发现:三种博弈下各权力主体的最优策略及绩效均受渠道替代程度、单位生产成本等关键因素影响。渠道替代程度越高,制定的双渠道价格越高;消费者对价格更敏感,预售市场需求呈现向现售市场转移的趋势。     

双渠道供应链中的价格决策与服务决策研究

在集中式和分散式决策条件下,应用两阶段优化技术和Stackelberg博弈的理论与方法,对一个制造商与一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链,重点考虑了制造商在网络渠道的服务决策,建立了利润最大化模型,得到了最优的价格策略和服务策略,研究表明,网络渠道的服务水平对制造商和零售商的价格决策有着重要影响,而且消费者对网络直销渠道的偏好对制造商和零售商价格决策和服务决策会产生很大影响．     

Demand forecast sharing in a dual-channel supply chain

We assess the benefits of sharing demand forecast information in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain, consisting of a traditional retail channel and a direct channel. The demand is a linear function of price with a Gaussian primary demand (i.e., zero-price market potential). Both the manufacturer and the retailer set their price based on their forecast of the primary demand. In this setting, we investigate the value of sharing demand forecasts. We analyze the ‘make-to-order’ scenario, in which prices are set before and production takes place after the primary demand is known, and the ‘make-to-stock’ scenario, in which production takes place and prices are set before the primary demand is known. We also compare the supply chain performance with and without the direct channel under some assumptions (production cost is zero, and each demand function has the same slope of price). We find that the direct channel has a negative impact on the retailer’s performance, and, under some conditions, the manufacturer and the whole supply chain are better off. Our research extends and complements prior research that has investigated only the inventory and replenishment-related benefits of information sharing.     

Inventory competition and allocation in a multi-channel distribution system

Consider a supply chain involving one manufacturer and one independent retailer. The manufacturer distributes her product to the end consumer through the independent retailer as well as through her direct channel. Each of the two channels faces a stochastic demand. If one channel is out of stock, a fraction of the unsatisfied customers visit the other channel, which induces inventory competition between the channels. Under the scenario described above, will the manufacturer ever undercut the retailer’s order when the capacity is infinite? What are the equilibria of the game? How does a capacity constraint affect the equilibrium outcome? What is the optimal inventory allocation strategy for the manufacturer? Using a game theoretic model we seek answers to the above questions. Both the capacitated and the infinite capacity games are considered. We establish the necessary condition for a manufacturer to undercut a retailer’s order and show that a manufacturer may deny the retailer of inventory even when the capacity is ample. We show that there can be an equilibrium in the capacitated game where a manufacturer might not use the entire capacity and still deny a retailer inventory. We also show that a mild capacity constraint may make both parties better off and thereby increase the total supply chain profit. We develop a simple yet practical contract called the reverse revenue sharing contract and show that along with a fixed franchise fee this contract can coordinates our decentralized supply chain.     

产能约束对闭环供应链回收渠道选择的影响

在制造商存在产能约束下,建立了再制造闭环供应链回收渠道决策的Stackelberg博弈模型,得出了三种回收渠道下的回收率、零售价以及制造商、零售商和供应链的利润,分析了制造商的生产能力对回收渠道决策的影响。研究表明:存在产能约束时,制造商回收渠道中的回收率总是最高的,这与无产能约束时零售商回收渠道中回收率最高的情况明显不同;同时,若废旧产品回收转移支付价格较低,制造商会选择自己回收,此时的零售价最低,制造商、零售商和供应链利润最高;若回收转移支付价格较高,制造商会选择零售商回收,此时的零售价最低,制造商和供应链利润最高。     

考虑消费者退货的双渠道订货量决策研究

在考虑消费者退货下,构建由制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链模型,研究了双方的订货量决策问题,并分析不同策略以及决策顺序对均衡结果和制造商开通直销渠道的影响。研究发现:在单渠道中,提供退款保证可提高订货量、制造商和零售商利润。当直销成本较大时,制造商将不开通直销渠道;提供退款保证有利于制造商开通直销渠道。在双渠道中,提供退款保证能够提高直销量、总订货量和制造商利润;直销量、总订货量、制造商利润和总利润都随直销成本递减;在顺序决策下,制造商利润和总利润更高。     

Price and lead time decisions in dual-channel supply chains

Manufacturers today are increasingly adopting a dual channel to sell their products, i.e., the traditional retail channel and an online direct channel. Empirical studies have shown that service quality (we focus on the delivery lead time of the direct channel) even goes beyond product price as one of the major factors influencing consumer acceptance of the direct channel. Delivery lead time has significant effects on demand, profit, and pricing strategy. However, there is scant literature addressing the decision on the promised delivery lead time of a direct channel and its impact on the manufacturer’s and retailer’s pricing decisions. To fill this gap, we examine the optimal decisions of delivery lead time and prices in a centralized and a decentralized dual-channel supply chain using the two-stage optimization technique and Stackelberg game, and analyze the impacts of delivery lead time and customer acceptance of a direct channel on the manufacturer’s and retailer’s pricing behaviours. We analytically show that delivery lead time strongly influences the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s pricing strategies and profits. Our numerical studies reveal that the difference between the demand transfer ratios in the two channels with respect to delivery lead time and direct sale price, customer acceptance of the direct channel, and product type have great effects on the lead time and pricing decisions.     

消费者公平偏好对制造商开通直销渠道的影响研究

研究了消费者公平偏好对制造商开通直销渠道的影响,并分析消费者公平偏好对制造商和零售商的最优决策、制造商开通直销渠道意愿、零售商利润、以及消费者剩余等的影响。最后通过算例分析消费者公平偏好对制造商开通直销渠道意愿的影响。研究发现:不存在消费者公平偏好时,制造商仅在直销成本较小时开通直销渠道;当直销成本较大时,制造商不应开通直销渠道。然而,消费者公平偏好会降低制造商开通直销渠道的意愿;即使无直销成本,若消费者公平偏好较大,制造商也可能不会开通直销渠道。