考虑公平偏好的供应链最优信用期和定价策略研究

论文将公平偏好引入商业信用供应链的运作中,研究公平偏好如何影响供应链的商业信用和定价策略。论文在三种情况下,即仅供应商关注公平,仅零售商关注公平和双方均关注公平,运用Stackelberg博弈分析了供应商的最优商业信用期及零售商的最优零售价格。研究发现,当零售商具有公平偏好时,零售价格与其公平偏好程度无关;零售商的公平偏好程度越大,供应商提供的商业信用期限越长。当仅供应商具有公平偏好时,供应商的公平偏好程度越大,零售商的零售价格越大,供应商提供的商业信用期限越短;当双方都具有公平偏好时,零售商的零售价格关于双方偏好均为增函数;供应商的商业信用期限为自身偏好系数的增函数,为零售商偏好系数的减函数。供应链成员的效用为自身偏好系数的增函数,对方偏好系数的减函数;双方具有公平偏好时,供应链利润小于无公平偏好时的供应链利润。     

Channel coordination under two-level trade credits and demand uncertainty

This study considers a decentralized supply chain where a retailer has an opportunity to order a product from a supplier prior to the sales season to satisfy uncertain demand. The retailer provides trade credit to end customers and makes credit period and order quantity decisions to maximize profits. The end demand is both random and credit period-dependent. On the basis of the newsvendor model, this paper focuses on channel coordination when a retailer provides trade credit to end customers. When the supplier also provides trade credit to the retailer, we show that the traditional trade credit contract cannot coordinate the channel. Four composite contracts based on trade credit (trade credit cost sharing with buy back or quantity flexibility; modified trade credit with buy back or quantity flexibility) are provided to induce the retailer to make decisions while optimizing the channel profit. This paper shows that the retailer provides a longer credit period to its customers and orders a larger quantity from the supplier under the composite contracts. With these contracts, the profit sharing between both parties depends on the wholesale price (Pareto improvement) for the fixed retail price and the purchasing cost.     

The optimal order and payment policies for deteriorating items in discount cash flows analysis under the alternatives of conditionally permissible delay in payments and cash discount

This study investigates a deteriorating inventory problem in which the supplier simultaneously offers the retailer either a conditionally permissible delay in payments or a cash discount. In the case of a conditionally permissible delay, if the retailer orders more than a predetermined quantity, then he/she has a grace period to make the full payment. Otherwise, he/she must pay the payment for goods of certain proportion first while receiving the goods and has a grace period to pay off the rest. As to a cash discount, if the retailer pays for the entire amount of the order within a certain short period, then he/she will receive a cash discount from the supplier. In additions, from a financial standpoint, all cash outflows related to the inventory control that occur at different points of time have different values. Hence, it is necessary to take account of the factor of time value of monetary when drafting the replenishment policy. In a word, this paper uses an alternate approach-discount cash flow (DCF) analysis to establish an inventory problem for deteriorating items in which the supplier provides the retailer either a conditionally permissible delay or a cash discount. We then study the necessary and sufficient conditions for finding the optimal solution. Furthermore, we establish several theoretical results to obtain the solution that provides the smallest present value of all future cash flows. Finally, several numerical examples are given to illustrate the results and obtain some managerial insights.     

基于随机市场需求的供应链融资模式研究

传统供应链融资模型大都在线性市场需求情形下分析零售商的商业信用、债权融资等内外部融资模式。本文同时了考虑零售商的股权融资、债权融资以及商业信用融资模式, 并引入随机市场需求因素, 针对一个供应商和两个具有资金约束零售商组成的两级供应链, 分析债权股权融资比例、商业信用等因素对零售商融资策略的影响, 并构建基于随机市场需求的融资模型;进一步, 利用数值示例和敏感性分析对此融资模型进行深入探讨。研究发现:当债权融资比例小于某临界值时, 零售商债权融资比例与订购量正相关, 反之债权融资比例与订购量负相关;对于一个服从均匀分布函数的随机市场需求而言, 若供应链采用外部融资模式, 那么随着其债权融资比例的增大, 利润将逐渐增加;若零售商采用商业信用融资模式, 那么其融资利率与利润负相关。相关研究结论对于供应链上中小企业融资模式的选择具有重要理论指导意义和实际引用价值。     

Production and payment policies for an imperfect manufacturing system with discount cash flows analysis in fuzzy random environments

ABSTRACT

This paper considers an imperfect manufacturing system with credit policies in fuzzy random environments. The supplier simultaneously offers the retailer either a permissible delay in payments or a cash discount and retailer in turn provides its customer a permissible delay period. We used an alternate approach – discount cash flow analysis to establish an inventory problem. It is assumed that the elapsed time until the machine shifts from ‘in-control’ state to ‘out-of-control’ state is characterized as a fuzzy random variable. As a function of this parameter, the profit function is also a random fuzzy variable. Based on the credibility measure of fuzzy event, the model with fuzzy random elapsed time can be transformed into a crisp model . We establish several theoretical results to obtain the solution that provides the largest present value of all future cash flows. Finally, numerical example is given to illustrate the results and obtain some managerial insights.     

An incentive-compatible solution for trade credit term incorporating default risk

This paper studies the optimal trade credit term decision in an extended economic ordering quantity (EOQ) framework that incorporates a default risk component. A principal-agent bilevel programming model with costs minimization objectives is set up to derive the incentive-compatible credit term. The supplier determines the credit term as the leader in the first level programming, by balancing her/his financing capacity with the retailer’s default risk, order behavior and cost shifting. At the second level, the retailer makes decisions on ordering and payment time by reacting on the term offered by the supplier. A first order condition solution procedure is derived for the bilevel programming when credit term is confined within the practically feasible interval. Two key results are obtained – the condition to derive incentive-compatible credit term, and an equation system to derive threshold default risk criterion filtering retailers suitable for credit granting. Numerical experiments show that the capital cost of the supplier is the most important factor determining the credit term. Default risk acts like a filtering criterion for selecting retailers suitable for credit granting. Empirical evidence supporting our theoretical considerations is obtained by estimating three panel econometric models, using a dataset from China’s listed companies.     

风险时收益共享-贸易信贷契约下多个竞争零售商的供应链协调

在供应商向多个零售商提供贸易信贷的环境下,本文考虑了零售商存在违约风险和他们之间存在竞争时的供应链协调问题。研究表明,在比例分配市场需求下,多个竞争的零售商之间存在唯一的纳什均衡订购量,以及零售商违约风险的提高和他们之间竞争增强都会增加均衡订购量。当零售商之间的竞争较弱时,贸易信贷将无法协调供应链。为此,本文使用了收益分享与贸易信贷相结合的机制以协调供应链,且分析了零售商的违约风险和他们之间的竞争对协调契约参数的影响。当零售商的竞争强度一定时,批发价和风险溢价都随着零售商违约风险的提高而增大,而收益分享比例随着违约风险的提高而减小;当零售商的违约风险一定时,批发价和风险溢价都随着零售商之间竞争强度的提高而增大,而收益分享比例随着竞争强度的增强而减小。进一步的研究发现,零售商的违约风险越高以及他们之间竞争越激烈对零售商越不利,而对供应商越有利。最后,结合数值实验验证了收益共享-贸易信贷契约的有效性。     

基于质押贷款下的库存管理问题的研究

库存决策不仅受需求、运输费用、储存费用的影响,而且企业本身的资金状况也会限制企业实施库存管理.以报童模型为原型,讨论了企业存在道德风险的情况下,以仓单质押方式融资的企业的库存管理决策.假设企业是风险中性的并且商品的储存费用不小于商品的处理价格.研究发现,只有质押库存比较小的企业才会用掉所有的贷款限额.并且随着贷款价值比的增加,企业有可能保留部分资金,而使用贷款增加库存.     

考虑零售商促销策略的供应链融资及运营策略研究

当零售商的促销策略影响商品市场需求时,本文将促销分摊决策嵌入到经典报童模型,在银行信用与商业信用两种不同的融资模式下,对供应商及供应链整体的利润进行分析。研究发现:当零售商的行为对市场需求有影响时,商业信用在一定程度上减少了供应链的融资成本,增加了供应链的利润;核心企业的融资策略与自身成本及促销分摊策略有关;商业信用对供应链资本配置及零售商的激励,受供应商生产成本及激励策略的影响;商业信用在一定程度上减少了双重边际化效应。     

Consignment contracts with retail competition

Consignment contracts have been widely employed in many industries. Under such contracts, items are sold at a retailer’s but the supplier retains the full ownership of the inventory until purchased by consumers; the supplier collects payment from the retailer based on actual units sold. We investigate how competition among retailers influences the supply chain decisions and profits under different consignment arrangements, namely a consignment price contract and a consignment contract with revenue share. First, we investigate how these two consignment contracts and a price only contract compare from the perspective of each supply chain partner. We find that the retailers benefit more from a consignment price contract than from a consignment contract with revenue share or a price only contract, regardless of the level of retailer differentiation. The supplier’s most beneficial contact, however, critically depends upon the level of retailer differentiation: a consignment contract with revenue share is preferable for the supplier if retailer differentiation is strong; otherwise a consignment price contract is preferable. Second, we study how retailer differentiation affects the profits of all supply chain partners. We find that less retailer differentiation improves the supplier’s profit for both types of consignment contract. Moreover, less retailer differentiation improves profits of the retailers in a consignment price contract, but not necessarily in a consignment contract with revenue share.     

基于M-CVaR和生产资金约束的供应链协调研究

本文针对供应商面临生产资金约束的情况,在需求随机条件下研究了由一个风险中性零售商和一个具有风险偏好的供应商组成的二级供应链的协调问题。文章在零售商享有批发价折扣的提前支付和供应商银行信贷两种融资方式下,分别建立了零售商的最优决策模型以及基于M-CVaR测度工具的供应链整体订购决策模型,并给出了采用两种不同融资模式时零售商和供应链整体的最优订购量以及供应链的协调条件,分析了供应商的风险偏好对供应链整体最优决策及协调条件的影响。最后通过算例验证了文章的主要结论。研究表明,当提前支付价格折扣大于临界值时,零售商会选择提前支付货款;提前支付模式下供应链整体的最优订购量大于银行信贷模式;随着供应商的风险偏好由风险规避向风险喜好转变,供应链整体的最优订购量逐渐增大。     

基于信用支付和现金折扣的变质物品库存模型

本文在供应商提供给零售商定期信用支付和现金折扣情况下,研究了零售商的变质物品最优库存问题。基于信用支付和现金折扣的两种支付条件下,分四种情况建立库存模型,并给出了寻求变质物品最优订购周期和最优付款时间的有效算法。最后,给出算例以及最优解,以说明本模型及求解过程。     

基于模糊加值信息的供应链协调均衡研究

研究由一个供应商和两个零售商组成的供应链共享信息均衡问题。两个零售商具有不同的私有成本信息。当零售商不公开此成本信息时,其他的零售商和供应商只能推断出该信息的模糊分布。不同市场需求参数下,使零售商和供应商均达到最大利润的局势也有所不同。为了使供应链上的供应商和零售商达到双赢,分析了各同均衡策略存在的前提条件。     

具有服务水平的差异产品供应链网络均衡模型研究

顾客服务水平已成为当今企业获取较高市场占有率的重要手段。本文考虑了由多个供应商和多个零售商组成的供应链网络模型,通过制造商和零售商提供的服务水平,零售商的订货满足率以及零售价格等因素较为贴切的刻画消费者的选择偏好,利用变分不等式方法分析了制造商、零售商,需求市场以及整个供应链网络均衡条件,并给出了经济解释。最后,通过算例验证了模型的合理性。     

Channel coordination in a consignment contract

With the emergence of virtual market places, consignment selling has been thriving at an unprecedented pace. It has been shown in the literature that inefficiency exists in a decentralized consignment channel with a single revenue share agreement. In our study, we analyze contracts observed in practice that contain bonus or side payment terms, and examine whether they can promote better coordination between the supplier and the retailer. We found that no multi-tier Bonus system can fully coordinate the consignment channel. However, fine adjustments of bonus parameters can bring the channel close to full coordination. Additionally, we found revenue sharing with side payment contracts not only fully coordinate the channel, but they can also be customized to meet the needs of small, medium and large suppliers for extra retailer services such as warehousing and transportation. Managerial insights on how to design the contracts from the supplier, retailer and channel perspectives are discussed in the paper.     

Determination of the optimal trade credit policy: a supplier-Stackelberg model

This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain, where one supplier sells through a retailer a product with a stable market demand. We focus on how the supplier induces the retailer through trade credit to order more to reduce his/her own inventory-related cost. Under a ‘supplier-Stackelberg’ setting, we provide the supplier with the method of determining two trade credit scenarios: unconditional and conditional trade credit. We show that the unconditional trade credit scenario is always beneficial to the retailer but harmful to the supplier in most situations, while the conditional trade credit scenario is always beneficial to both parties. In addition, we specify the conditions under which the provision of unconditional trade credit is beneficial to the supplier. The three insights obtained in this paper are the following: (i) When the retailer’s per-unit opportunity cost is less than his/her per-unit opportunity gain, unconditional trade credit can induce the retailer to order less instead of more. (ii) If the supplier offers the retailer unconditional trade credit, the length of trade credit offered will have an upper bound. (iii) A well-designed conditional trade credit policy can realize a win-win outcome but also enables the supplier to occupy all the savings in the channel's cost incurred by trade credit, but any unconditional trade credit policy does not.     

存货质押融资模式下的供应链协调

针对供应商、零售商和银行组成的供应链金融系统,研究了存货质押融资模式下的供应链协调。零售商作为中小企业,资金有限,需要向银行申请贷款,然而零售商信用较低难以获得融资。供应商作为供应链的核心企业,采用含有回购价格和回购比例的回购契约为零售商提供担保,使得零售商融资得以实现。分析了不确定需求下供应链金融系统,供应链以及零售商的最优决策,给出了融资情况下供应链协调的条件,指出了在供应链协调情况下批发价格和回购策略对供应链收益分配的影响,说明了回购的作用:一方面使零售商易于获得银行融资,另一方面使供应链协调得以实现,指出了质押率、贷款利率和零售商自有资金等参数对最优决策的影响。数值算例验证了理论分析结果。     

Coordinated stocking,clearance sales,and return policies for a supply chain

The results of a study of inter-organizational coordination effect in inventory control, return, and clearance sales policies for a distribution channel consisting of a supplier, a retailer, and a Discount Sales Outlet (DSO) are reported here. We first study the retailer–DSO coordination issues. The products are initially sold in a retail outlet. After the selling season, the leftovers are moved to a DSO for a permanent clearance sale. When the retailer and the DSO coordinate, they share information on the demand forecast and jointly decide the stocking, markdown sales, and return policies to maximize mutual profit. In the absence of coordination, the demand information is not shared by the two parties, and the decisions are decentralized to optimize the individual party’s objective function. For the supplier–retailer–DSO cooperation issue, two models are considered: namely, the Joint Optimal Model (JOM) and the Individual Optimal Model (IOM), respectively. In the IOM, the stocking, markdown sales, and return policies are individually designed by the retailer–DSO, while the supplier independently sets the terms of the return policy. We compare this approach with the JOM, in which the supplier–retailer–DSO jointly designs a mutually beneficial plan so as to maximize the supply chain joint profit. Optimal coordination policies are analyzed, and the factors that make coordination an effective approach are studied.     

Direct selling by suppliers improves system-wide information flow

Consider a bilateral monopoly selling to a market with uncertain demand. The retailer has access to a demand signal. The supplier can add a direct channel, which grants it market access as well. The supplier and the retailer can acquire signals from each other with payments. We show that direct selling by the supplier improves information flow to realize system-wide information transparency, which has mixed effects on the profits for the retailer and the system.     

商业信用额度下易腐品最优订货策略

运作实践中,供应商不仅会给予零售商延期付款待遇以刺激其订购量,同时也会为信用期内零售商的应付账款设置上限值(即商业信用额度),从而规避零售商的应付账款对其造成的资金机会成本和违约风险。鉴于此,本文基于商业信用额度构建了零售商关于易腐品的订购决策模型。通过分析零售商资金机会成本的不同形式,可以得到零售商关于易腐品五种不同的成本函数表达式。结合数学证明可以得到零售商五种目标函数的性质,以及在商业信用额度条款下零售商最优的订购决策。算例表明供应商可以通过设置一个合理的商业信用额度条款将零售商的订购量和信用期内的应付账款控制在一个合适范围。同时商业信用额度条款有助于缓解供应商的营运资金压力,但会在一定程度上增加零售商的运营成本。