局中人具有偏好关系的区间合作对策问题

针对传统的区间合作对策存在的问题,利用中心三角模糊数定义区间数的偏好关系,建立了局中人对收益有偏好关系的区间合作对策模型.定义了有相同偏好关系的区间合作对策的λ-区间核心,讨论了λ-区间核心非空的充要条件以及该区间核心的求解方法,并证明了λ-区间核心与(1-λ)截对策的区间核心之间存在双射关系.此外,对有不同偏好关系的区间合作对策进行了探讨.最后,通过一个收益分配的算例说明了该模型的适用性与该区间核心的可行性.     

三元区间支付合作对策的核心解

基于三元区间数,提出三元区间支付合作对策理论,利用三元区间数的运算及序关系,建立了三元区间支付合作对策模型和具有偏好标准的三元区间支付合作对策模型,研究相应模型的几类核心解,如区间核心、区间优超核心及q-区间核心等,讨论了各相关核心解之间的关系,并加以证明.最后通过实例分析,验证了三元区间支付合作对策理论,具有一定的参考价值与现实意义,是对模糊支付合作对策理论的不断完善.     

区间值合作对策的广义区间Shapley值

研究区间Shapley值通常对区间值合作对策的特征函数有较多约束,本文研究没有这些约束条件的区间值合作对策,以拓展区间Shapley值的适用范围。首先,本文指出广义H-差在减法与加法运算中存在的问题,进而提出了一种改进的广义H-差,称为扩展的广义H-差。然后,基于扩展的广义H-差,定义了区间值合作对策的广义区间Shapley值,并用区间有效性、区间对称性、区间哑元性和区间可加性等四条公理刻画了该广义区间Shapley值。同时,证明了该值的存在性与唯一性,而且得到了该值的一些性质。研究表明,任意的区间值合作对策的广义区间Shapley值都存在。最后,以算例说明该广义区间Shapley值的可行性与实用性。     

具有受限支付的合作博弈研究

n人合作博弈(N,υ)中的解是一个支付向量,用来将该合作博弈的收益值υ(N)公平合理地分配给参与合作的每个参与者.核心是研究最多的解概念之一.在考虑到合作博弈(N,υ)的收益值υ(N)不完全用来分配的情况时,本文推广了传统合作博弈的分配和核心等概念,称之为广义分配和广义核心,建立了广义核心的一些基本结果.     

区间支付图对策上的平均树解

结合图对策和具有区间支付的模糊合作对策理论,引入区间支付图对策,提出区间平均树解,此解可以看做是经典图对策中平均树解的推广,并通过算例说明区间平均树解的应用性.分析了区间平均树解的相对分支有效性.当区间支付图对策满足严格超可加性时,每个局中人参加联盟得到的收益不小于其单干所得支付.最后,讨论了经典平均树解与区间平均树解之间的关系.     

拟阵上合作对策的单调解

本文主要介绍了拟阵上的合作对策Shapley解的结构,并利用强单调性、交换性、概率有效性等三条公理刻画了拟阵上合作对策Shapley解的唯-性.同时讨论了本文的三条公理与Bilbao等人的四条 公理的等价性.最后给出拟阵上合作对策核心的定义及其结构.     

基于满意度的三角模糊数型创业团队多人收益分配合作对策

针对创业团队当期收益分配研究不足以及已有研究成果无法有效解决三角模糊数型创业团队多人收益分配合作对策,在介绍三角模糊数(区间型数据集)及模糊排序指标基本知识的基础上,提出了三角模糊数型创业团队多人收益分配合作对策及区间值核心解概念和基于满意度的三角模糊数型创业团队多人收益分配合作对策求解方法,并用一个算例加以说明,最后得出本研究结论.     

连续区间策略下二人零和对策问题研究

考虑连续区间策略下的二人零和对策问题,研究其均衡策略的存在性。首先分析了完全信息下的二人零和对策问题,证明了该问题均衡策略的存在性并给出求解方法。然后进一步研究了收益函数不确定的不完全信息二人零和对策问题,在各局中人都认为对方是风险厌恶型的假设下,分析该类对策纯策略均衡的存在性,并通过研究纯策略均衡存在的充要条件给出判断并寻找纯策略均衡解的方法。最后给出一个数值算例,验证本文所提出方法的可行性。     

基于概率区间的信念均衡

本文用概率区间描述对策中的策略不确定性,放弃共同知识假设,考虑了基于概率区间的不确定性对策模型的信念均衡问题,提出了一种新的信念均衡概念,并证明了其存在性及合理性.     

具有区间支付的宗派对策

在区间不确定环境下,针对具有否决权的成员与其他成员之间的合作,建立了具有区间支付的宗派对策。在区间核心中,非宗派成员得到的区间分配不能超过他对大联盟的边际贡献。给出了完全区间宗派对策的等价条件。当相应的区间减法可行时,完全区间宗派对策的区间核心中的分配可以通过两种单调区间分配方案扩张得到。算例验证了模型的有效性。     

Some results on cooperative interval games

Uncertainty is a daily presence in the real world. It affects our decision-making and may have influence on cooperation. On many occasions, uncertainty is so severe that we can only predict some upper and lower bounds for the outcome of our actions, i.e. payoffs lie in some intervals. A suitable game theoretic model to support decision-making in collaborative situations with interval data is that of cooperative interval games. Solution concepts that associate with each cooperative interval game sets of interval allocations with appealing properties provide a natural way to capture the uncertainty of coalition values into the players’ payoffs. In this paper, the relations between some set-valued solution concepts using interval payoffs, namely the interval core, the interval dominance core, the square interval dominance core and the interval stable sets for cooperative interval games, are studied. It is shown that the interval core is the unique stable set on the class of convex interval games.     

Core Solutions in Vector-Valued Games

In this paper, we analyze core solution concepts for vector-valued cooperative games. In these games, the worth of a coalition is given by a vector rather than by a scalar. Thus, the classical concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined; the important principles of individual and collective rationality must be accommodated; moreover, the sense given to the domination relationship gives rise to two different theories. Although different, we show the areas which they share. This analysis permits us to propose a common solution concept that is analogous to the core for scalar cooperative games.     

残缺区间合作博弈及其在农地污染治理中的应用

针对联盟收益值部分未知的区间合作博弈,定义了残缺区间合作博弈的相关概念。基于合作博弈的超可加性,建立了联盟区间收益值的一致性验证模型。通过构造正、负理想分配及其与收益分配向量之间的偏差,给出了残缺区间合作博弈的区间Ideal-Shapley值求解模型,分析了区间Ideal-Shapley值的合理性与存在性。利用上述模型求解农地污染联合治理的节约成本分摊策略,验证了区间Ideal-Shapley值求解模型的有效性。     

基于Choquet积分形式的模糊联盟核心

在具有联盟结构的合作对策中,针对局中人以某种程度参与到合作中的情况,研究了模糊联盟结构的合作对策的收益分配问题。首先,定义了具有模糊联盟结构的合作对策及相关概念。其次,定义了Choquet积分形式的模糊联盟核心,提出了该核心与联盟核心之间的关系,对于强凸联盟对策,证明Choquet积分形式的模糊Owen值属于其所对应的模糊联盟核心。最后通过算例,对该分配模型的可行性进行分析。     

Predicting stable configurations of coalitions in cooperative games and exchange economies

Uniform competitive solutions are stable configurations of proposals predicting coalition formation and effective payoffs. Such “solutions” exist for almost all properly defined cooperative games and, therefore, can be proposed as substitute of the core. The new existence results obtained in the present paper concern also the case when the coalitional function of a game has empty values. All concepts and results are implemented in the competitive analysis of the exchange economies. Received: July 1997/Final version: February 2000     

具有区间联盟值n人对策的Shapley值

本文提出了一类具有区间联盟收益值n人对策的Shapley值.利用区间数运算有关理论,通过建立公理化体系,对具有区间联盟收益值n人对策的Shapley值进行深入研究,证明了这类n人对策Shapley值存在性与唯一性,并给出了此Shapley值的具体表达式及一些性质.最后通过一个算例检验了其有效性与正确性.     

Fuzzy extensions of bargaining sets and their existence in cooperative fuzzy games

Recently, the concept of classical bargaining set given by Aumann and Maschler in 1964 has been extended to fuzzy bargaining set. In this paper, we give a modification to correct some weakness of this extension. We also extend the concept of the Mas-Colell's bargaining set (the other major type of bargaining sets) to its corresponding fuzzy bargaining set. Our main effort is to prove existence theorems for these two types of fuzzy bargaining sets. We will also give necessary and sufficient conditions for these bargaining sets to coincide with the Aubin Core in a continuous superadditive cooperative fuzzy game which has a crisp maximal coalition of maximum excess at each payoff vector. We show that both Aumann-Maschler and Mas-Colell fuzzy bargaining sets of a continuous convex cooperative fuzzy game coincide with its Aubin core.     

Potential functions for finding stable coalition structures

The existence of a Nash-stable coalition structure in cooperative games with the Aumann–Dreze value is investigated. Using the framework of potential functions, it is proved that such a coalition structure exists in any cooperative game. In addition, a similar result is established for some linear values of the game, in particular, the Banzhaf value. For a cooperative game with vector payments, a type of stability based on maximizing the guaranteed payoffs of all players is proposed.     

On some families of cooperative fuzzy games

In a fuzzy cooperative game the players may choose to partially participate in a coalition. A fuzzy coalition consists of a group of participating players along with their participation level. The characteristic function of a fuzzy game specifies the worth of each such coalition. This paper introduces well-known properties of classical cooperative games to the theory of fuzzy games, and studies their interrelations. It deals with convex games, exact games, games with a large core, extendable games and games with a stable core.