命中次数随机时毁伤时间分布与格斗获胜概率的研究

文章研究了一对一随机格斗中一类最具有一般性的模型——格斗双方带有搜索系统并且毁伤对方所需命中次数随机的格斗模型 .文章从研究条件随机过程入手 ,导出了格斗方毁伤对方所需时间的分布与相应的特征函数表达形式 ,也求出了计算获胜概率的公式     

MATADOR: An Analytic Model of a Stochastic Tank Due

By constructing an analytic model of a stochastic tank duel, this paper provides a means for evaluating a number of key performance characteristics of duelling tanks. The model explicitly represents target detection and the time taken to acquire a target and fire, or reload and fire. Additionally, tacticalmanoeuvre and kill probabilities are included. The probability of each possible outcome of such a duel is derived as output from the model.     

一类多对一随机格斗的获胜概率

本研究多对一搜索型随机格斗模型，求出了计算格斗双方各自获胜概率的实用公式。     

Teraoka-type two-person nonzero-sum silent duel

The paper discusses a silent nonzero-sum duel between two players each of whom has a single bullet. The duel is terminated at a random time in [0, 1] given by a cumulative distribution function. It is shown that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium under a wide range of possible payoff values for simultaneous firing. This contrasts with a very similar game considered by Teraoka for which there are many Nash equilibria.This work was carried out while the second author was visiting the University of Southampton on a Postdoctoral Fellowship of The Royal Society of London.     

毁伤目标时间与格斗持续时间的PH表示与特性

本文研究毁伤目标所需时间与格斗持续时间的概率分布．在射击时间间隔服从PH分布的假设下,文章导出了不考虑发现目标因素和考虑该因素二种情况下,毁伤目标时间的PH表示与特性及格斗持续时间的PH表示．最后,文章用二个实例给出了毁伤目标时间概率分布的具体求法．     

一类多对多随机格斗的获胜概率

为了计算出多对多随机格斗的获胜概率,首先推导出多对多随机格斗的状态转移速率,然后应用拉普拉斯变换的性质,分别计算出在不带搜索和带搜索两种情形下,三对二随机格斗中双方各自获胜概率的实用公式.     

When Lanchester met Richardson,the outcome was stalemate: A parable for mathematical models of insurgency

Many authors have used dynamical systems to model asymmetric war. We explore this approach more broadly, first returning to the prototypical models such as Richardson’s arms race, Lanchester’s attrition models and Deitchman’s guerrilla model. We investigate combinations of these and their generalizations, understanding how they relate to assumptions about asymmetric conflict. Our main result is that the typical long-term outcome is neither annihilation nor escalation but a stable fixed point, a stalemate. The state cannot defeat the insurgency by force alone, but must alter the underlying parameters. We show how our models relate to or subsume other recent models. This paper is a self-contained introduction to 2D continuous dynamical models of war, and we intend that, by laying bare their assumptions, it should enable the reader to critically evaluate such models and serve as a reminder of their limitations.     

需多发命中时毁伤时间的分布与特征

本研究带有搜索系统并且毁伤目标需要多发命中的格斗模型,并利用更新方程导出了毁伤目标所需时间的分布密度与特征函数。最后,章用实例说明了计算过程。     

On some games of timing of mixed type

The paper considers a zero-sum, two-person game of timing on [0, 1] in which Players 1 and 2 behave as in the so-called discrete-fire duel and non-discrete fire duel, respectively. Player 1 is in possession of one action. Accuracy functions of the players are continuous and nondecreasing, from [0, 1] onto [0, 1]. The game is analysed in three versions and the form of optimal strategies for the players is found.     

Silent-noisy marksmanship contest with random termination

We consider a marksmanship contest in which Player I has one silent bullet, whereas Player II has one noisy bullet, the first contestant to hit his target wins, and the contest is to be terminated at a random timeT with cdfH(t). The model is a silent-noisy version of our previous paper (Ref. 8), and an extension of silent-noisy duel to nonzero-sum games of timing under an uncertain environment. It is shown that the uncertainty on the termination of the contest has influence on the equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium values, but the silent player has no advantages over the noisy one, in such a nonzero-sum model.The author thanks Professor M. Sakaguchi, Osaka University, who contributed to the research on mathematical decision-making problems and expresses appreciation for his continuous encouragement and guidance. The author also thanks Professor G. Kimeldorf, The University of Texas at Dallas, who invited the author to his university. Finally, the author expresses appreciation to Professors K. Sugahara and W. Fukui, Himeji Institute of Technology, for their encouragement and support.     

Bits or shots in combat? The generalized Deitchman model of guerrilla warfare

We generalize Deitchman’s guerrilla warfare model to account for trade-off between intelligence (‘bits’) and firepower (‘shots’). Intelligent targeting leads to aimed fire; absence of intelligence leads to unaimed fire, dependent on targets’ density. We propose a new Lanchester-type model that mixes aimed and unaimed fire, the balance between these being determined by quality of information. We derive the model’s conserved quantity, and use it to analyze the trade-off between investments in intelligence and in firepower—for example, in counterinsurgency operations.     

Two-noisy-versus-one-silent duel with equal accuracy functions

This paper deals with the two-noisy-versus-one-silent duel which is still open, as pointed out by Styszyński (Ref. 1). Player I has a noisy gun with two bullets, and player II has a silent gun with one bullet. Each player fires his bullets aiming at his opponent at any time in [0, 1]. The accuracy function (the probability that one player hits his opponent if he fires at timet) isp(t)=t for each player. If player I hits player II, without being hit himself before, the payoff of the duel is +1; if player I is hit by player II, without hitting player II before, the payoff is taken to be ?1. In this paper, we determine the optimal strategies and the value of the game. The strategy for player II depends explicitly on the firing moment of player I's first shot.     

Noisy duel with uncertain existence of the shot

The purpose of this paper is to discuss a noisy duel defined on the unit square in which both duelists have an uncertain knowledge about the existence of the shot fitted to their gun. This game ist solved as a two person zero-sum game under uncertainty.     

我国劳动力老化对劳动生产率的影响研究

人口老龄化对经济的直接影响体现为劳动力老化对劳动生产率的影响.本文在基于标准C-D生产函数的计量经济模型框架下,采用省级面板数据和固定效应估计方法,深入探究全国以及不同区域劳动力老化对劳动生产率的影响.实证结果显示,我国劳动力老化对劳动生产率有显著的消极影响,且沿海地区劳动力老化对劳动生产率的消极影响比非沿海地区更强烈.要缓解劳动力力老化对劳动生产率的消极影响,可以从以下三个方面入手:首先,稳定低生育水平,适当放宽人口政策;其次,大力发展教育事业,特别是对老年劳动力的教育和培训;第三,合理引导人口流动,实现地区间劳动力年龄结构的优势互补.     

一类搜索型随机格斗的获胜概率研究

把随机过程分析引入Lanchester方程就形成了随机格斗理论.运用随机格斗理论研究了潜艇协同隐蔽攻击水面舰艇编队获胜概率的数学模型,利用状态转移图和Laplace变换的性质推导出了2对2搜索型随机格斗中双方的获胜概率公式,并结合潜艇协同隐蔽攻击水面舰艇的实际,计算分析了格斗双方的获胜概率.利用这一公式可以得到概率上的精确解,能够被用来定量评估潜艇协同隐蔽攻击水面舰艇编队的作战效能.     

Two-target game model of an air combat with fire-and-forget all-aspect missiles

An air combat duel between similar aggressive fighter aircraft, both equipped with the same type of guided missiles, is formulated as a two-target differential game using the dynamic model of the game of two identical cars. Each of the identical target sets represents the effective firing envelope of an all-aspect fire-and-forget air-to-air missile. The firing range limits depend on the target aspect angle and are approximated by analytical functions. The maximum range, computed by taking into account the optimal missile avoidance maneuver of the target, determines the no-escape firing envelope. The solution consists of the decomposition of the game space into four regions: the respective winning zones of the two opponents, the draw zone, and the region where the game terminates by a mutual kill. The solution provides a new insight for future air combat analysis.This paper is based on the first author's D.Sc. Thesis. The research was supported by NASA Cooperative Agreement NCCW-4.     

On a noisy-silent-versus-silent duel with equal accuracy functions

This paper deals with the noisy-silent-versus-silent duel with equal accuracy functions. Player I has a gun with two bullets and player II has a gun with one bullet. The first bullet of player I is noisy, the second bullet of player I is silent, and the bullet of player II is silent. Each player can fire their bullets at any time in [0, 1] aiming at his opponent. The accuracy function ist for both players. If player I hits player II, not being hit himself before, the payoff of the duel is +1; if player I is hit by player II, not hitting player II before, the payoff is –1. The optimal strategies and the value of the game are obtained. Although optimal strategies in past works concerning games of timing does not depend on the firing moments of the players, the optimal strategy obtained for player II depends explicitly on the firing moment of player I's noisy bullet.     

On the noisy-silent versus silent-noisy duel with equal accuracy functions

This paper deals with the noisy-silent versus silent-noisy duel with equal accuracy functions. Each of player I and player II has a gun with two bullets and he can fire his bullets at any time in [0, 1] aiming at his opponent. The first bullet of player I and the second bullet of player II are noisy, and the second bullet of player I and the first bullet of player II are silent. It is assumed that both players have equal accuracy functions. If player I hits player II, not being hit himself before, the payoff of the duel is +1; if player I is hit by player II, not hitting player II before, the payoff is ?1. The value of the game and the optimal strategies are obtained. We find that the firing time of the silent bullet by player II's optimal strategy depends directly on the firing time of player I's noisy bullet.     

Shield versus sword resource distribution in K-round duels

The paper considers optimal resource distribution between offense and defense in a duel. In each round of the duel two actors exchange attacks distributing the offense resources equally across K rounds. The offense resources are expendable (e.g. missiles), whereas the defense resources are not expendable (e.g. bunkers). The outcomes of each round are determined by a contest success functions which depend on the offensive and defensive resources. The game ends when at least one target is destroyed or after K rounds. We show that when each actor maximizes its own survivability, then both actors allocate all their resources defensively. Conversely, when each actor minimizes the survivability of the other actor, then both actors allocate all their resources offensively. We then consider two cases of battle for a single target in which one of the actors minimizes the survivability of its counterpart whereas the counterpart maximizes its own survivability. It is shown that in these two cases the minmax survivabilities of the two actors are the same, and the sum of their resource fractions allocated to offense is equal to 1. However, their resource distributions are different. In the symmetric situation when the actors are equally resourceful and the two contest intensities are equal, then the actor that fights for the destruction of its counterpart allocates more resources to offense. We demonstrate a methodology of game analysis by illustrating how the resources, contest intensities and number of rounds in the duels impact the survivabilities and resource distributions.     

A comparative evaluation of alternative models of the term structure of interest rates

In the paper alternative models of the term structure of interest rates are classified in two different approaches: the no-arbitrage and the general equilibrium approach. It is maintained that the general equilibrium approach is superior on a theoretical ground for two main reasons: first, relevant variables, such as the spot interest rate and the interest risk-premium, are endogenous; second, the relationship between the real and the financial side of the economy becomes a clear and important element in the understanding of the term structure. As regards the applications, however, the advantages of the general equilibrium over the no-arbitrage approach are not so clear: the major role in the empiricil performance of alternative models is played by their ability to capture volatility. At the current state of the literature, there is no model that outperforms others, in particular on the empirical side.