共查询到17条相似文献,搜索用时 109 毫秒
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逻辑系统G3在非均匀概率空间下命题的真度理论 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
在离散概率测度空间下定义了三值逻辑(p,q,r)测度,并相应地定义了命题逻辑系统中公式的真度概念;在三值逻辑(1/6.1/3.1/2)测度和(1/7.2/7.4/7)测度下证明了命题逻辑系统G3中全体公式的真度值之集在[0.1]上是稠密的,并给出真度的表达式;利用真度定义公式的相似度和一种伪距离,为—般离散概率空间下三值命题的近似推理理论提供一种可能的框架. 相似文献
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利用势为3的非均匀概率空间的无穷乘积在三值标准序列逻辑系统中引入了公式的概率真度概念,证明了全体公式的概率真度值之集在[0,1]中没有孤立点;利用概率真度定义了概率相似度和伪距离,进而建立了概率逻辑度量空间,证明了该空间中没有孤立点,为三值命题的近似推理理论提供了一种可能的框架. 相似文献
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利用概率空间的无穷乘积,在经典二值命题逻辑中引入了公式的Γ-随机真度概念以及公式间的Γ-相似度概念.进而导出了全体公式集上的一种伪距离,建立了逻辑度量空间.最后提出了基于Γ-随机真度的三种不同的近似推理模式,并且证明了这三种近似推理模式之间是相互等价的. 相似文献
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在二值命题逻辑中引入了公式的Г蕴涵真度,证明了全体有限理论的蕴涵真度值在[0,1]中稠密。在Г蕴涵真度的基础上,定义了公式间的Г蕴涵相似度及伪距离。最后讨论了基于Г蕴涵真度的三种近似推理模式,得出了这三种近似推理模式之间是等价的结论。 相似文献
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多值逻辑系统中公式的μ-真度理论 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
通过在n值和模糊值命题逻辑系统的全体赋值集Ω上定义概率测度μ,定义了任一命题公式A在两种逻辑系统中统一的μ-真度,研究了公式的μ-真度的基本性质及对应的推理规则,定义了两公式间的三种μ-相似度和伪度量,建立了较广泛意义上的逻辑度量空间,指出当概率测度μ为均匀概率测度时为计量逻辑学中的逻辑度量空间,最后提出理论的μ-发散度并得到理论的μ-发散度的计算公式. 相似文献
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利用Godel n值命题逻辑赋值域上概率的无穷乘积,在Godeln值命题逻辑系统中引入命题公式的随机真度和不可靠度概念。证明在Godeln值逻辑系统中,一个有效推理结论的不可靠度不超过各前提的不可靠度与其必要度的乘积之和。通过不可靠度在全体公式集上建立伪距离,给出基于伪距离和不可靠度的两种近似推理模式。 相似文献
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二值命题逻辑中的三种Γ近似推理模式及其等价性 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
在二值命题逻辑中引入了公式的Γ蕴涵真度,证明了全体有限理论的蕴涵真度值在[0,1]中稠密.在Γ蕴涵真度的基础上,定义了公式间的Γ蕴涵相似度及伪距离.最后讨论了基于Γ蕴涵真度的三种近似推理模式,得出了这三种近似推理模式之间是等价的结论. 相似文献
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Theory of truth degrees of propositions in two-valued logic 总被引:20,自引:0,他引:20
By means of infinite product of evenly distributed probabilistic spaces of cardinal 2 this paper introduces the concepts of
truth degrees of formulas and similarity degrees among formulas, and a pseudo-metric on the set of formulas is derived therefrom,
this offers a possible framework for developing an approximate reasoning theory of propositions in two-valued logic. 相似文献
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《International Journal of Approximate Reasoning》2014,55(5):1164-1184
An integrated approach to truth-gaps and epistemic uncertainty is described, based on probability distributions defined over a set of three-valued truth models. This combines the explicit representation of borderline cases with both semantic and stochastic uncertainty, in order to define measures of subjective belief in vague propositions. Within this framework we investigate bridges between probability theory and fuzziness in a propositional logic setting. In particular, when the underlying truth model is from Kleene's three-valued logic then we provide a complete characterisation of compositional min–max fuzzy truth degrees. For classical and supervaluationist truth models we find partial bridges, with min and max combination rules only recoverable on a fragment of the language. Across all of these different types of truth valuations, min–max operators are resultant in those cases in which there is only uncertainty about the relative sharpness or vagueness of the interpretation of the language. 相似文献
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The paper presents generalizations of results on so-called Horn logic, well-known in universal algebra, to the setting of
fuzzy logic. The theories we consider consist of formulas which are implications between identities (equations) with premises
weighted by truth degrees. We adopt Pavelka style: theories are fuzzy sets of formulas and we consider degrees of provability
of formulas from theories. Our basic structure of truth degrees is a complete residuated lattice. We derive a Pavelka-style
completeness theorem (degree of provability equals degree of truth) from which we get some particular cases by imposing restrictions
on the formulas under consideration. As a particular case, we obtain completeness of fuzzy equational logic. 相似文献
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以真度为基础,给出二值命题逻辑系统中基于前提信息的相似度和伪距离的概念以及伪距离的真度表示式,对二值命题逻辑中具有前提信息的近似推理问题进行讨论. 相似文献
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According to actualism, modal reality is constructed out of valuations (combinations of truth values for all propositions). According to possibilism, modal reality consists in a set of possible worlds, conceived as independent objects that assign truth values to propositions. According to possibilism, accounts of modal reality can intelligibly disagree with each other even if they agree on which valuations are contained in modal reality. According to actualism, these disagreements (possibilist disagreements) are completely unintelligible. An essentially actualist semantics for modal propositional logic specifies which sets of valuations are compatible with the meanings of the truth-functional connectives and modal operators without drawing on formal resources that would enable us to represent possibilist disagreements. The paper discusses the availability of an essentially actualist semantics for modal propositional logic. I argue that the standard Kripkean semantics is not essentially actualist and that other extant approaches also fail to provide a satisfactory essentially actualist semantics. I end by describing an essentialist actualist semantics for modal propositional logic. 相似文献