共查询到19条相似文献,搜索用时 515 毫秒
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主要是对多选择合作对策中核心概念的扩展研究,称之为最大限定核心.首先,依据经典对策下核心的概念,针对多选择合作对策中参与者不参与和以最高水平参与联盟合作的情形,给出了多选择合作对策中最大限定核心的定义.然后,介绍了多选择对策中最大限定核心是非空的充要条件是该多选择对策是弱均衡对策.最后,构造了基于最大限定核心的简约对策,并应用1人合理性、弱个体合理性、一致性和逆一致性对其进行公理化. 相似文献
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本文主要研究模糊合作对策的核心,讨论了核心的限制非空性,个体合理性,递归对策性,逆递归对策,超可加性,反单调性,模性等性质.最后用限制非空性,个体合理性,递归对策性和超可加性等公理刻画了核心,证明了核心存在的唯一性。 相似文献
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研究模糊二人非合作对策的简单Berge均衡的存在性.基于Zimmermann处理模糊多目标线性规划的观点和Zhukovskii提出的简单Berge均衡概念,定义了模糊二人非合作对策的简单Berge均衡并借助于Ky Fan不等式证明其存在性. 相似文献
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基于概率区间的信念均衡 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
本文用概率区间描述对策中的策略不确定性,放弃共同知识假设,考虑了基于概率区间的不确定性对策模型的信念均衡问题,提出了一种新的信念均衡概念,并证明了其存在性及合理性. 相似文献
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本文首先定义了理性函数,构造了有限理性模型,研究了有限理性下种群博弈NTU核的稳定性;其次,又进一步定义了种群博弈另一种合作均衡即强均衡的概念,并且采用类似的方法研究了有限理性下该强均衡的稳定性.研究结果表明:在我们所构造的有限理性模型框架下,对大多数的种群博弈(在Baire分类意义下)其NTU核和强均衡都是稳定的. 相似文献
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研究了有非对称性和负传递性偏好的无限策略对策,提出了N-M稳定集和正则对策的概念,其中N-M稳定集是将合作对策中由Von Neumann 和Morgenstern给出的相应概念引入到策略对策中的.所谓正则对策是指其Nash均衡集中每条链关于一致偏好总有上界的无限策略对策.证明了每个正则对策都有唯一N-M稳定集. 此结果及其应用例子说明正则对策N-M稳定集的概念对于策略对策的纯Nash均衡的精炼起着重要作用. 相似文献
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This note extends the solution concept of the core for cooperative games to multi-choice games. We propose an extension of
the theorem of Bondareva (Problemy Kybernetiki 10:119–139, 1963) and Shapley (Nav Res Logist Q 14:453–460, 1967) to multi-choice games. Also, we introduce a notion of reduced games for multi-choice games and provide an axiomatization
of the core on multi-choice games by means of corresponding notion of consistency and its converse. 相似文献
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This note extends the solution concept of the core for traditional transferable-utility (TU) games to multi-choice TU games,
which we name the unit-level-core. It turns out that the unit-level-core of a multi-choice TU game is a “replicated subset”
of the core of a corresponding “replicated” TU game. We propose an extension of the theorem of Bondareva (Probl Kybern 10:119–139,
1963) and Shapley (Nav Res Logist Q 14:453–460, 1967) to multi-choice games. Also, we introduce the reduced games for multi-choice
TU games and provide an axiomatization of the unit-level-core on multi-choice TU games by means of consistency and its converse. 相似文献
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A. van den Nouweland S. Tijs J. Potters J. Zarzuelo 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》1995,41(3):289-311
A multi-choice game is a generalization of a cooperative game in which each player has several activity levels. Cooperative games form a subclass of the class of multi-choice games.This paper extends some solution concepts for cooperative games to multi-choice games. In particular, the notions of core, dominance core and Weber set are extended. Relations between cores and dominance cores and between cores and Weber sets are extensively studied. A class of flow games is introduced and relations with non-negative games with non-empty cores are investigated. 相似文献
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《Optimization》2012,61(2):225-238
In this article we construct a procedure to define the egalitarian solutions in the context of multi-choice non-transferable utility (NTU) games. Also, we show that in the presence of other weak axioms the egalitarian solutions are the only monotonic ones. 相似文献
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In this paper, we study the core of two-sided, one-to-one matching problems. First, in a model in which agents have strict preferences over their potential mates and are allowed to remain single, we characterize the core as the unique solution that satisfies individual rationality, Pareto optimality, gender fairness, consistency, and converse consistency. Next, in a model that relaxes the constraint that agents have strict preferences over their potential mates, we show that no solution exists that satisfies Pareto optimality, anonymity, and converse consistency. In this full domain, we characterize the core by individual rationality, weak Pareto optimality, monotonicity, gender fairness, consistency, and converse consistency. 相似文献
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The consistency principle for games in strategic form 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We start with giving an axiomatic characterization of the Nash equilibrium (NE) correspondence in terms of consistency, converse consistency, and one-person rationality. Then axiomatizations are given of the strong NE correspondence, the coalition-proof NE correspondence and the semi-strong NE. In all these characterizations consistency and suitable variants of converse consistency play a role. Finally, the dominant NE correspondence is characterized. We also indicate how to generalize our results to Bayesian and extensive games. 相似文献
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Fioravante Patrone Graziano Pieri Stef Tijs Anna Torre 《International Journal of Game Theory》1998,27(2):191-200
Nash equilibria for strategic games were characterized by Peleg and Tijs (1996) as those solutions satisfying the properties
of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality.
There are other solutions, like the ɛ-Nash equilibria, which enjoy nice properties and appear to be interesting substitutes
for Nash equilibria when their existence cannot be guaranteed. They can be characterized using an appropriate substitute of
one-person rationality. More generally, we introduce the class of “personalized” Nash equilibria and we prove that it contains
all of the solutions characterized by consistency and converse consistency.
Received January 1996/Final version December 1996 相似文献
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In this paper, we consider market situations with two corners. One corner consists of a group of powerful agents with yes-or-no
choices and clan behavior. The other corner consists of non-powerful agents with multi-choices regarding the extent at which
cooperation with the clan can be achieved. Multi-choice clan games arise from such market situations. The focus is on the
analysis of the core of multi-choice clan games. Several characterizations of multi-choice clan games by the shape of the
core are given, and the connection between the convexity of a multi-choice clan game and the stability of its core is studied.
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Yu-Hsien Liao 《4OR: A Quarterly Journal of Operations Research》2010,8(1):71-85
We extend the reduced games introduced by Davis and Maschler (Naval Res Log Q 12:223–259, 1965) and Moulin (J Econ Theory
36:120–148, 1985) to multi-choice non-transferable utility games and define two related properties of consistency. We also
show that the core proposed by Hwang and Li (Math Methods Oper Res 61:33–40, 2005) violates these two consistency properties.
In order to investigate how seriously it violates these two consistency properties, we provide consistent extensions and consistent subsolutions of the core. 相似文献