共查询到18条相似文献,搜索用时 62 毫秒
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本文提出了集合对策的两类定量边缘解,并给出了两类解的公理化特征:有效性、对称性、哑元性、Banzhaf总和性和传递性.这两类解分别与TU-对策的Banzhaf权力指数和Shapley-Shubik权力指数类似.同时,本文将Shapley解与Banzzhaf解扩展到k-维欧氏空间. 相似文献
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格上合作对策的Banzhaf值 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
本文介绍了格上的合作对策,并给出了格上合作对策的Banzhaf解,同时利用线性性,哑元性,单调性,对称性,不变性和2-有效性等六条公理完成了对Banzhaf值的唯一性刻画.在证明唯一性的过程中,利用了一个同构变换,将格上多选择合作对策映射到经典合作对策来进行研究. 相似文献
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拟阵上合作对策的单调解 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
本文主要介绍了拟阵上的合作对策Shapley解的结构,并利用强单调性、交换性、概率有效性等三条公理刻画了拟阵上合作对策Shapley解的唯-性.同时讨论了本文的三条公理与Bilbao等人的四条 公理的等价性.最后给出拟阵上合作对策核心的定义及其结构. 相似文献
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带随机跳跃的线性二次非零和微分对策问题 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
对于一类以布朗运动和泊松过程为噪声源的正倒向随机微分方程,在单调性假设下,给出了解的存在性和唯一性的结果.然后将这些结果应用于带随机跳跃的线性二次非零和微分对策问题之中,由上述正倒向随机微分方程的解得到了开环Nash均衡点的显式形式. 相似文献
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利用基于集合Ph,e上的一类混合单调算子不动点定理,研究了一类Riemann Liouville分数阶微分方程两点边值问题,获得了这类方程在集合Ph,e中解的存在性与唯一性,并用一组单调迭代序列逼近了该方程的唯一非平凡解.最后,利用一个实例验证了主要结论. 相似文献
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本文提出了一类特殊的n人合作对策模型─—弱1—凸对策,研究了弱1—凸对策的解的性质,并证明弱1—凸对策的解满足所有常见的公理化特征. 相似文献
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本文应用调和分析的方法研究了一类非线性Sehrodinger方程Cauchy问题整体自相似解的存在唯—性. 相似文献
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韦忠礼 《应用泛函分析学报》2011,13(3):274-284
第一部分,介绍分数阶导数的定义和著名的Mittag—Leffler函数的性质.第二部分,利用单调迭代方法给出了具有2序列Riemann—Liouville分数阶导数微分方程初值问题解的存在性和唯一性.第三部分,利用上下解方法和Schauder不动点定理给出了具有2序列Riemann—Liouville分数阶导数微分方程周期边值问题解的存在性.第四部分,利用Leray—Schauder不动点定理和Banach压缩映像原理建立了具有n序列Riemann—Liouville分数阶导数微分方程初值问题解的存在性、唯一性和解对初值的连续依赖性.第五部分,利用锥上的不动点定理给出了具有Caputo分数阶导数微分方程边值问题,在超线性(次线性)条件下C310,11正解存在的充分必要条件.最后一部分,通过建立比较定理和利用单调迭代方法给出了具有Caputo分数阶导数脉冲微分方程周期边值问题最大解和最小解的存在性. 相似文献
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研究拓扑向量空间上弱广义向量拟似变分不等式解的存在性问题.与Khaliq和Rashid等在单调或伪单调假设条件下,利用KKM定理证明解的存在性不同,在集值映射是非空凸值映射并且有开下截口的条件下,利用Fan-Browder不动点原理证明解的存在性. 相似文献
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A Coalitional Power Value for Set Games 总被引:5,自引:0,他引:5
HaoSun Sheng-guiZhang Xue-liangLi 《应用数学学报(英文版)》2003,19(3):417-424
We propose the concept of a coalitional power value for set games, and present its axiomatic characterization of global efficiency, equal treatment property and coalitional power monotonicity. The coalitional power value is a generalization of the marginalistic value introduced by Aarts et al. 相似文献
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In this paper we characterize a value, called a marginalistic value, for monotonic set games, which can be considered to be the analog of the Shapley value for TU-games. For this characterization we use a modification of the strong monotonicity axiom of Young, but the proof is rather different from his. 相似文献
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Concerning the solution theory for set games, the paper focuses on a family of values, each of which allocates to any player some type of marginalistic contribution with respect to any coalition containing the player. For any value of the relevant family, an axiomatization is given by means of three properties, namely one type of an efficiency property, the equal treatment property and one type of a monotonicity property. We present one proof technique which is based on the decomposition of any arbitrary set game into a union of simple set games, the value of which are much easier to determine. A simple set game is associated with an arbitrary, but fixed item of the universe. 相似文献
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For cooperative games with transferable utility, convexity has turned out to be an important and widely applicable concept.
Convexity can be defined in a number of ways, each having its own specific attractions. Basically, these definitions fall
into two categories, namely those based on a supermodular interpretation and those based on a marginalistic interpretation.
For games with nontransferable utility, however, the literature mainly focuses on two kinds of convexity, ordinal and cardinal
convexity, which both extend the supermodular interpretation. In this paper, we analyse three types of convexity for NTU games
that generalise the marginalistic interpretation of convexity.
Received: December 2000 相似文献
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Albrecht Irle 《Mathematical Methods of Operations Research》1995,42(3):345-359
We consider two-person zero-sum games of stopping: two players sequentially observe a stochastic process with infinite time horizon. Player I selects a stopping time and player II picks the distribution of the process. The pay-off is given by the expected value of the stopped process. Results of Irle (1990) on existence of value and equivalence of randomization for such games with finite time horizon, where the set of strategies for player II is dominated in the measure-theoretical sense, are extended to the infinite time case. Furthermore we treat such games when the set of strategies for player II is not dominated. A counterexample shows that even in the finite time case such games may not have a value. Then a sufficient condition for the existence of value is given which applies to prophet-type games. 相似文献