考虑横向公平偏好的项目团队成员知识共享激励研究

现有知识共享激励研究大都建立在理性经济人假设基础上,而在现实经济活动中,这一假设存在较大局限性。本文将传统个体激励和团队激励相分离的激励模式转化为整合激励模式,运用博弈模型构建了基于横向公平偏好的知识共享激励模型,并对模型进行检验与数据模拟,结果表明:项目团队成员知识共享个体激励和团队激励均衡状态下,个体激励和团队激励对成员的知识共享努力水平具有互补性。知识共享风险成本较低(高)情形下,个体激励与横向公平偏好负相关(呈倒U型关系),团队激励与横向公平偏好正相关(呈U型关系)。     

The Evolution of Fairness in the Ultimatum Game

The article presents a model on the evolution of strategies in the Ultimatum game. In particular, the model considers the effect of role turnover and interaction structure. Past experimental studies showed that subjects behave more fairly than would be predicted by classical game theory. The goal of this model is to illuminate how fairness emerges in evolution when role turnover and preferential association are in effect. Simulation shows that evolution towards strategies of fairness is plausible. Some empirical implications are also discussed.     

Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory

In this paper I analyze a repeated coordination game between a bounded memory player and a fully rational player. A bounded memory player is a player who is subject to imperfect recall, but, conditional on this constraint, acts optimally every point in time given her beliefs over the actual history of the game. I show that the results contrast with the ones in the finite automata literature. In particular, a result denoted the “tyranny of the weak” in Gilboa and Samet (Games Econ Behav 1: 213–221, 1989) is no longer present here.     

Strategic risk and response time across games

Experimental data for two types of bargaining games are used to study the role of strategic risk in the decision making process that takes place when subjects play a game only once. The bargaining games are the ultimatum game (UG) and the yes-or-no game (YNG). Strategic risk in a game stems from the effect on one player’s payoff of the behavior of other players. In the UG this risk is high, while it is nearly absent in the YNG. In studying the decision making process of subjects we use the time elapsed before a choice is made (response time) as a proxy for amount of thought or introspection. We find that response times are on average larger in the UG than in the YNG, indicating a positive correlation between strategic risk and introspection. In both games the behavior of subjects with large response times is more dispersed than that of subjects with small response times. In the UG larger response time is associated with less generous and thus riskier behavior, while it is associated with more generous behavior in the YNG.     

Non-cooperative two-person games in biology: A classification

This article compares evolutionary equilibrium notions with solution concepts in rational game theory. Both static and dynamic evolutionary game theory are treated. The methods employed by dynamic theory, so-called “game dynamics”, could be discovered to be relevant for rational game theory also.     

Envy-free rights assignments and self-oriented preferences

Very recently a new solution to Sen's “Impossibility of a Paretian liberal” has been suggested where the focus is on the rights assignments per se (Austen-Smith, 1979). It was shown that the concept of fairness, when applied to rights, admits the existence of social decision functions which satisfy Sen's original conditions. Unfortunately this result collapses when individuals have rights over more than one pair of alternatives.In order to obtain possibility results for this more general case the present paper proposes to restrict individuals' preference orderings. It is proved that envy-free collective choice rules exist if individual preferences are self-oriented and if, in addition, people attach primary importance to their own private sphere alternatives. These restrictions are quite severe, but they may be justified if one values the absence of envy in rights allocations very highly.     

考虑公平偏好的供应链最优信用期和定价策略研究

论文将公平偏好引入商业信用供应链的运作中,研究公平偏好如何影响供应链的商业信用和定价策略。论文在三种情况下,即仅供应商关注公平,仅零售商关注公平和双方均关注公平,运用Stackelberg博弈分析了供应商的最优商业信用期及零售商的最优零售价格。研究发现,当零售商具有公平偏好时,零售价格与其公平偏好程度无关;零售商的公平偏好程度越大,供应商提供的商业信用期限越长。当仅供应商具有公平偏好时,供应商的公平偏好程度越大,零售商的零售价格越大,供应商提供的商业信用期限越短;当双方都具有公平偏好时,零售商的零售价格关于双方偏好均为增函数;供应商的商业信用期限为自身偏好系数的增函数,为零售商偏好系数的减函数。供应链成员的效用为自身偏好系数的增函数,对方偏好系数的减函数;双方具有公平偏好时,供应链利润小于无公平偏好时的供应链利润。     

On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game

This paper presents two characterizations of the core on the domain of all NTU games. One is based on consistency with respect to “complement-reduced game” and converse consistency with respect to “max-reduced game”. The other is based on consistency with respect to “max-reduced game” and weak converse consistency with respect to “complement-reduced game”. Besides, we introduce an alternative definition of individual rationality, we name conditional individual rationality, which is compatible with non-emptiness. We discuss axiomatic characterizations involving conditional individual rationality for the core.     

公平偏好下基于回购契约的供应链协调模型

在报童模型的基础上,以一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链为研究背景,把公平关切引入到回购契约的研究中,并根据Nash讨价还价博弈思想建立公平偏好框架,通过建立效用函数模型,研究了公平关切对回购契约的影响．研究发现,公平关切不会影响回购契约的协调性,公平关切程度也不会影响零售商的最优订购量,进而可以得出,即使供应商在不知道零售商对公平偏好的程度下,依然可以通过制定合适的批发价格和回购价格来做出使自己效用最大化的最优决策．另外,通过灵敏度分析发现,在公平关切时,零售商的最优订购量会随着产品单位生产成本的增加而增加．     

政府协调下群体性突发事件的演化博弈分析及应用

在群体性突发事件应急处置过程中,政府处置不当会使得事态扩大,甚至由非利益直接相关者转变为矛盾冲突方。本文将政府部门视为社会矛盾的调解者,运用演化博弈理论分析了政府作为利益协调者在群体性突发事件中的重要作用,并结合对公平因素的考虑,详细分析了一些主要参数对决策行为的影响。结果表明,政府提早介入、公平的利益再分配以及适当的惩罚措施有助于减少群体性突发事件。最后,通过分析案例“重庆市出租车罢工事件”的发展演化历程及政府的协调作用,说明了本文模型的适用性。     

The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain

We study the problem of assigning objects to a set of agents. We focus on probabilistic solutions that only take agents’ preferences over objects as input. Importantly, agents may be indifferent among several objects. The “extended serial correspondence” is proposed by Katta and Sethuraman (J Econ Theory 131:231–250, 2006) to solve this problem. As a follow-up to Liu and Pycia (Ordinal efficiency, fairness, and incentives in large markets. Mimeo, 2012) who introduce the notion of profiles with “full support”, we work with two interesting classes of preference profiles: profiles that (i) have rich support on a partition or (ii) are single-peaked with rich support on a partition. For each profile in these classes, an assignment matrix is selected by the extended serial correspondence if and only if it is sd-efficient and sd envy-free. We also provide an asymptotic result.     

分权竞争、协同意愿与城市群建设:考虑公平偏好的委托代理解释

互惠合作机制缺失和信息不对称影响了地方政府的区域协调投入,不利于城市群建设和经济高质量发展。在委托代理模型中引入公平偏好的基础上,重点讨论协作意愿和信息条件对努力水平的影响。发现公平偏好和信息条件都对代理人的努力水平产生影响,且代理人之间的信息分布更重要。地方政府努力水平依赖于相邻城市的协同意愿,满足公平偏好中的“互惠”行为;且信息对称情形下的努力水平均高于不对称情形。改善信息分布和引导公平偏好,有利于提高地方政府的区域协同投入而改善整体产出水平。城市群建设和区域协调发展需要健全的协调机制,以增强不同区域地方政府的互信水平和互惠机制,降低、消除区域间信息不对称情形,通过互惠性合作和投入提升区域经济效率、促进经济高质量发展。     

基于风险偏好和公平偏好的PPP项目政府补偿机制研究

本文在综合考虑社会资本风险偏好和公平偏好的基础上,构建了政府与社会资本之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了社会资本风险偏好和公平偏好影响下PPP项目政府补偿机制的最优设计。研究表明:社会资本的最优投资水平随风险规避度的增高而降低,随公平偏好程度的增高而增高;政府补偿机制的最优设计应是在考虑单期风险及公平溢价成本的基础上,估计单期期望运营收益的高低,进而协调年建设成本补偿及运营期补偿系数两者的相对关系,设计最优的年建设成本补偿和运营期补偿系数。     

公平偏好下基于批发价契约的供应链 协调研究

文中基于Nash讨价还价博弈思想建立公平偏好框架,构建公平偏好效用体系,以此为基础对采用批发价契约的报童模型展开行为研究,采用数理模型和数值分析方法分析了零售商和供应商的公平偏好行为对零售商和供应链系统最优订货量的影响,即零售商和供应商同时关注公平时,零售商和供应链系统的最优订货量趋于保守;并发现零售商和供应链系统的最优订货量随零售商的公平偏好程度增加而递减,但随着供应商公平偏好程度增加而递增,且供应链系统最优订货量变化趋势比零售商明显．然后,在此基础上分析比较得到,无论供应商和零售商是否偏好公平,批发价契约都不能实现供应链协调．最后,对批发价、零售价、供应商生产成本、零售商缺货成本和供应商缺货成本进行敏感度分析．     

Robust Multiple Objective Game Theory

In this paper, we propose a distribution-free model instead of considering a particular distribution for multiple objective games with incomplete information. We assume that each player does not know the exact value of the uncertain payoff parameters, but only knows that they belong to an uncertainty set. In our model, the players use a robust optimization approach for each of their objective to contend with payoff uncertainty. To formulate such a game, named “robust multiple objective games” here, we introduce three kinds of robust equilibrium under different preference structures. Then, by using a scalarization method and an existing result on the solutions for the generalized quasi-vector equilibrium problems, we obtain the existence of these robust equilibria. Finally, we give an example to illustrate our model and the existence theorems. Our results are new and fill the gap in the game theory literature.     

Capturing preferences for inequality aversion in decision support

We investigate the situation where there is interest in ranking distributions (of income, of wealth, of health, of service levels) across a population, in which individuals are considered preferentially indistinguishable and where there is some limited information about social preferences. We use a natural dominance relation, generalised Lorenz dominance, used in welfare comparisons in economic theory. In some settings there may be additional information about preferences (for example, if there is policy statement that one distribution is preferred to another) and any dominance relation should respect such preferences. However, characterising this sort of conditional dominance relation (specifically, dominance with respect to the set of all symmetric increasing quasiconcave functions in line with given preference information) turns out to be computationally challenging. This challenge comes about because, through the assumption of symmetry, any one preference statement (“I prefer giving $100 to Jane and $110 to John over giving $150 to Jane and $90 to John”) implies a large number of other preference statements (“I prefer giving $110 to Jane and $100 to John over giving $150 to Jane and $90 to John”; “I prefer giving $100 to Jane and $110 to John over giving $90 to Jane and $150 to John”). We present theoretical results that help deal with these challenges and present tractable linear programming formulations for testing whether dominance holds between any given pair of distributions. We also propose an interactive decision support procedure for ranking a given set of distributions and demonstrate its performance through computational testing.     

Intervening duality and bargaining with a farmer–landowner example

In a 1995 paper in this journal I introduced the intervening duality idea and showed how it could be used to analyse a simple matching pennies game in which each of two players anticipated a gain from a single toss of a “fair” coin. This paper generalises that earlier analysis and results. Firstly it introduces more general production related classes of cases in which individuals may seek to gain by making themselves dual to the duals of an intervening specification of production plans, strategies and payoffs. Secondly, through this explicitly economic context, the paper introduces and analyses issues pertaining to framing (e.g. with reference to choices of production of crops vs. “setaside”), bargaining and learning.     

A model of concept formation

At first we model the way an intelligence “I” constructs statements from phrases, and then how “I” interlocks these statements to form a string of statements to attain a concept. These strings of statements are called progressions. That is, starting with an initial stimulating relation between two phrases, we study how “I” forms the first statement of the progression and continues from this first statement to form the remaining statements in these progressions to construct a concept. We assume that “I” retains the progressions that it has constructed. Then we show how these retained progressions provide “I” with a platform to incrementally constructs more and more sophisticated conceptual structures. The reason for the construction of these conceptual structures is to achieve additional concepts. Choice plays a very important role in the progression and concept formation. We show that as “I” forms new concepts, it enriches its conceptual structure and makes further concepts attainable. This incremental attainment of concepts is a way in which we humans learn, and this paper studies the attainability of concepts from previously attained concepts. We also study the ability of “I” to apply its progressions and also the ability of “I” to electively manipulate its conceptual structure to achieve new concepts. Application and elective manipulation requires of “I” ingenuity and insight. We also show that as “I” attains new concepts, the conceptual structures change and circumstances arise where unanticipated conceptual discoveries are attainable. As the conceptual structure of “I” is developed, the logical and structural relationships between concepts embedded in this structure also develop. These relationships help “I” understand concepts in the context of other concepts and help “I₁” communicate to another “I₂” information and concept structures. The conceptual structures formed by “I” give rise to a directed web of statement paths which is called a convolution web. The convolution web provides “I” with the paths along which it can reason and obtain new concepts and alternative ways to attain a given concept.This paper is an extension of the ideas introduced in [1]. It is written to be self-contained and the required background is supplied as needed.     

Preference intensity and cardinality

Beyond its mathematization, preference intensity is a relevant concept, more general than cardinal representable preference, and an according axiomatic definition is introduced, dispensing with the Archimedean assumption. Given a preference intensity, a uniform space (generating the order topology of the induced preference) is associated to it. If the preference intensity is representable, this uniformity is semimetrizable. A “uniqueness” result for preference intensities leads naturally to the hypothesis of compactness. Through the uniformity corresponding to the preference intensity, compactness can be characterized.     

具有公平偏好成员的两阶段供应链分析

本论文分析具有公平偏好零售商与制造商组成的供应链,在制造商作为Stackelberg博弈的领导者提供批发价格合同给零售商时,零售商如何确定最优的订货量而制造商如何确定最优的批发价格.当需求满足均匀分布时,研究发现存在均衡的最优订货量以及最优批发价格.本论文也分析了需求分布参数对均衡最优解的影响.最后,通过数值计算对供应链的绩效如何随公平偏好参数变化的问题进行了研究.并且说明公平偏好是零售商获取其对供应链利润分配的一种手段.