状态空间分析在减少工程保险逆向选择中的应用

利用状态空间图首先分析了工程保险市场中逆向选择现象的产生的原因,其次进行了通过保单设计和对投保人进行风险分类以减少逆向选择现象发生的状态空间分析,比较而言,对投保人进行风险分类更加有效,最后得出可以委托监理工程师提供风险分类技术服务的结论.     

投保人异质性风险偏好下指数保险市场均衡的动态演化分析

兼具道德风险与逆向选择免疫性和即刻赔付双重优势的指数保险逐渐成为巨灾风险管理的重要工具,但目前多处于试点阶段,市场均衡演化规律仍不明确。本文构建了指数保险市场中保险公司、投保人和政府的三方演化博弈模型,同时,考虑投保人面对损失与收益的不同风险态度,引入异质性风险偏好设计了投保人决策函数,进而分析指数保险市场均衡演化路径及其影响因素。结果表明,指数保险市场均衡随其生命周期的演进而变化,政府在指数保险市场中的职能将从管理者走向退出;政府对保险公司进行补贴更有效,但补贴力度需在适度范围内。影响因素方面,投保人的异质性风险偏好对市场均衡演化有重要影响,其损失敏感性将加快市场向均衡状态的收敛速度;提前赔付优势能够促进市场向均衡状态收敛,但溢出效应会延缓均衡的达成。基于此提出了政府对指数保险市场引导与鼓励的建议。     

保险动态惩罚机制对网约车平台监督作用的演化博弈研究

采用演化博弈方法,研究保险公司与网约车平台之间的博弈演化过程,分析了在保险公司监督下,网约车平台策略选择的影响因素,并比较了静态惩罚机制和动态惩罚机制下网约车平台与保险公司博弈的均衡策略。研究发现,保险公司的惩罚性保费可以促使网约车平台的策略选择发生改变。在静态惩罚机制下,网约车平台和保险公司的策略选择呈周期波动模式,不能收敛;在动态惩罚机制下,网约车平台和保险公司的博弈呈现螺旋收敛的演化轨迹,且收敛的均衡点不随策略选择的初始概率不同而改变。研究结论明确了保险在网约车行业管理中的社会监督职能,并为保险公司保费的制定提供理论参考。     

逆向选择与伯川德竞争下两期保险完全分离均衡

多期保险作为单期保险自选机制的一种补充,是一种重要的动态风险分类方法,有利于控制逆向选择风险.在伯川德竞争假设下,研究两期保险完全分离均衡存在的充要条件.首先,建立了两期保险问题的动态博弈模型,然后,通过分析投保人的激励相容约束与个人合理性约束推导出完全分离均衡存在的充要条件,并在直观标准下对均衡结果进行精炼,论证结果表明,这一最优均衡使得信号传递成本达到最小.     

通货膨胀影响下基于随机微分博弈的最优再保险和投资

本文在通货膨胀影响下,研究了具有再保险和投资的随机微分博弈.保险公司选择一个策略最小化终值财富的方差,而金融市场作为博弈的"虚拟手"选择一个概率测度所代表的经济"环境"最大化保险公司考虑的最小化终值财富的方差.通过保险公司和金融市场之间的这种双重博弈得到最优的投资组合.进行投资时考虑了通货膨胀的影响,通货膨胀的处理方式为:首先考虑通货膨胀对风险资产进行折算,然后再构造财富过程.通过把原先的基于均值-方差准则的随机微分博弈转化为无限制情况,应用线性-二次控制理论得到了无限制情况下最优再保险、投资、市场策略和有效边界的显式解;进而得到了原基于均值-方差准则的随机微分博弈的最优再保险、投资、市场策略和有效边界的显式解.     

保险精算中的一个随机模型

本文假设投保人到达保险公司的过程是一个强度为λ（ｘ）的非齐次Ｐｏｉｓｓｏｎ 过程、在时间区间（０,ｔ］中的索赔额是一个与保险规则及在（０,ｔ］中的投保人数有关的随机变量,提出一个新的保险精算模型,获得保险公司在（０,ｔ］中盈余额的一些数字特征．经典的个体模型和短期聚合风险模型均为本模型的特殊情形．     

连续时间模型下的动态随机合作再保险策略

如何通过选择再保险策略以最大化保险公司的终端期望效用是保险精算领域中的一个热门研究话题.这个问题在单期离散模型下已经有了很好的研究结果.本文首次考虑了连续时间模型下的最优动态合作再保险问题.基于互惠的再保险概念和指数效用函数,本文引入了博弈论中的Pareto最优概念,给出了含有Pareto最优合作再保险策略的核的界定方法并证明此核是非空的.通过实例,验证了合作再保险博弈的核的非空性,并且得出了在两家保险公司的情形下(保险公司和再保险公司),Pareto最优合作再保险策略是比例再保险策略.     

回收竞争的逆向供应链回收渠道的演化博弈分析

为了提高逆向供应链的运作效率,在两个回收商回收价格竞争的逆向供应链的市场结构下,应用演化博弈对逆向供应链回收渠道的决策进行了分析。文章首先描述了两条逆向供应链中处理商对不同回收渠道的选择,分析了两条逆向供应链上的处理商分别采取DD模式、DI模式、ID模式和II模式下逆向供应链的各成员的定价策略;然后运用演化博弈理论在市场机制下和政府参与回收补贴下对逆向供应链的回收渠道决策进行了分析;最后通过数值仿真了逆向供应链回收渠道系统的演化过程。研究结果表明:两条逆向供应链上的处理商都选择直接回收方式时的回收量最大和回收价格最高;回收市场的竞争程度影响回收渠道的演化结果;政府参与回收补贴可以促使处理商选择直接的回收方式的演化稳定策略,有利于整个社会系统。     

风险企业融资行为的逆向选择博弈模型研究

利用博弈论理论建立了风险企业融资行为的逆向选择信号传递博弈模型,分完全信息和不完全信息两种情况,对影响风险投资家努力水平的因素进行了分析,得出产权结构不合理、控制权分配失衡和风险企业家的寻租行为是造成风险投资家努力水平不高的主要原因,并给出了相应的对策建议.     

保险公司和再保险公司之间的停止损失再保险策略选择博弈

本文在扩散逼近风险模型下考虑保险公司和再保险公司之间的停止损失再保险策略选择博弈问题.假设保险公司和再保险公司都以期望终端盈余效用增加作为购买停止损失再保险和接受承保的条件.在保险公司和再保险公司都具有指数效用函数条件下,运用动态规划原理,通过求解其对应的Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman方程,得到了三种博弈情形下保险公司和再保险公司之间的停止损失再保险策略和值函数的显示解,以及再保险合约能够成交时再保费满足的条件.结果显示,在适当的条件下,保险公司和再保险公司之间的停止再保险合约是可以成交的.最后,通过灵敏性分析给出了最优停止损失再保险策略和再保费,以及效用损益与模型主要参数之间的关系,并给出相应的经济分析.     

Enhanced annuities and the impact of individual underwriting on an insurer’s profit situation

We analyze the effect of enhanced annuities on an insurer engaging in individual underwriting. We use a frailty model for heterogeneity of the insured population and model individual underwriting by a random variable that positively correlates with the corresponding frailty factor. For a given annuity portfolio, we analyze the effect of the quality of the underwriting on the insurer’s profit/loss situation and the impact of adverse selection effects.     

Equilibrium relationships between insurance and self-protection activity

When an insured understakes some costly self-protection activity that reduces the probability of loss, a competitive insurer will increase the insurance coverage, given a fixed premium per dollar of coverage, to reflect the lower insurance risk.However, an imperfectly informed insurer cannot correctly adjust the coverage; while he can observe the self-protection activity of the insured, the insurer cannot determine the cost to the insured of such activity, nor can the insurer determine the reduction in the loss probability of the insured due to the self-protection activity.This paper demonstrates in an equilibrium model that insurers may be able to use the amount of self-protection activity by an insured as a screen to indicate to the insurer what the loss probability of the insured is, thus allowing the insurer to provide correctly priced insurance to all individuals. The model points out that insurers operating in a market with moral hazard may be able to overcome the adverse incentives of insureds by selectively offering certain insurance contracts contingent upon the insured meeting certain screening requirements; in the model here, self-protection activity is the screen.     

Budget-constrained optimal insurance with belief heterogeneity

We re-examine the problem of budget-constrained demand for insurance indemnification when the insured and the insurer disagree about the likelihoods associated with the realizations of the insurable loss. For ease of comparison with the classical literature, we adopt the original setting of Arrow (1971), but allow for divergence in beliefs between the insurer and the insured; and in particular for singularity between these beliefs, that is, disagreement about zero-probability events. We do not impose the no sabotage condition on admissible indemnities. Instead, we impose a state-verification cost that the insurer can incur in order to verify the loss severity, which rules out ex post moral hazard issues that could otherwise arise from possible misreporting of the loss by the insured. Under a mild consistency requirement between these beliefs that is weaker than the Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) condition, we characterize the optimal indemnity and show that it has a simple two-part structure: full insurance on an event to which the insurer assigns zero probability, and a variable deductible on the complement of this event, which depends on the state of the world through a likelihood ratio. The latter is obtained from a Lebesgue decomposition of the insured’s belief with respect to the insurer’s belief.     

免赔额保险公平定价的期权博弈分析

传统保险定价实质上是供给方定价,忽视了保险契约是保险人和投保人双方互动决策的结果.另一方面,保单具有或有权益的性质,这使得近年来金融定价方法得以引入到保险定价中,以反映风险和回报之间的长期均衡关系.借助期权博弈框架引入博弈论和期权定价理论,分析了免赔额保险的公平定价问题,给出了基本模型和扩展模型两种情形下博弈均衡结果,即保单的无套利价值,并发现在扩展模型情形下,投保人的最优投保策略和均衡保险合同均发生变化.     

逆向选择下的委托—代理模型分析

分别讨论了在对称信息和逆向选择下,保险代理人的类型是离散和连续情形时激励合同设计问题,得出如下主要结论:保险人在对称信息和逆向选择下要求最高效率的代理人的努力水平相同,且在逆向选择下的支付更多,然而对其他类型的代理人而言,在逆向选择下要求的努力水平和所支付比在对称信息条件下都要少些.     

"NCD"系统中保险双方的最优决策

在"NCD"系统中,利用Markov决策过程,获得了投保双方博弈行为的最优结果.对被保险人来说,确定了其最优临界损失值;对保险人来说,确定了最优保费与折扣值.     

Optimal insurance design in the presence of exclusion clauses

The present work studies the design of an optimal insurance policy from the perspective of an insured, where the insurable loss is mutually exclusive from another loss that is denied in the insurance coverage. To reduce ex post moral hazard, we assume that both the insured and the insurer would pay more for a larger realization of the insurable loss. When the insurance premium principle preserves the convex order, we show that any admissible insurance contract is suboptimal to a two-layer insurance policy under the criterion of minimizing the insured’s total risk exposure quantified by value at risk, tail value at risk or an expectile. The form of optimal insurance can be further simplified to be one-layer by imposing an additional weak condition on the premium principle. Finally, we use Wang’s premium principle and the expected value premium principle to illustrate the applicability of our results, and find that optimal insurance solutions are affected not only by the size of the excluded loss but also by the risk measure chosen to quantify the insured’s risk exposure.     

Optimal insurance under the insurer’s risk constraint

In this paper, we impose the insurer’s risk constraint on Arrow’s optimal insurance model. The insured aims to maximize his/her expected utility of terminal wealth, under the constraint that the insurer wishes to control the expected loss of his/her terminal wealth below some prespecified level. We solve the problem, and it is shown that when the insurer’s risk constraint is binding, the solution to the problem is not linear, but piecewise linear deductible. Moreover, it can be shown that the insured’s optimal expected utility will increase if the insurer increases his/her risk tolerance.     

A game-theoretic model of reinsurance

We define a game between the insured and the insurer by which one can justify the choice of the discount function from the insurance premium payment as a function of the deductible. We find conditions that make it possible to conclude a contract using the deductible amount. We define a game between the insurer and the reinsurer in which the insurer chooses the loss-ratio limit and the reinsurer the price of the reinsurance policy. We seek a Stackelberg equilibrium with the reinsurer in the role of leader. Translated fromMetody Matematicheskogo Modelirovaniya, 1998, pp. 160–164.     

Optimal risk retention under partial insurance

This paper examines the situation where a risk-averse insured determines the optimal amount of deductible (or stop-loss) insurance. The insurer uses two different premium principles, the expected value principle and the exponential principle. The insured has an exponential utility function. Specific numerical results are obtained for the optimal stop-loss limit in the case of a group life insurance plan. The exact results are contrasted with those obtained by using the normal approximation instead of the exact distribution of aggregate claims.