| 保险动态惩罚机制对网约车平台监督作用的演化博弈研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 付淑换,石岿然.保险动态惩罚机制对网约车平台监督作用的演化博弈研究[J].运筹与管理,2021,30(10):23-30. |
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| 作者姓名： | 付淑换 石岿然 |
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| 作者单位： | 南京审计大学 金融学院,江苏 南京 211815 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金资助项目(18AGL001) |
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| 摘 要： | 采用演化博弈方法,研究保险公司与网约车平台之间的博弈演化过程,分析了在保险公司监督下,网约车平台策略选择的影响因素,并比较了静态惩罚机制和动态惩罚机制下网约车平台与保险公司博弈的均衡策略。研究发现,保险公司的惩罚性保费可以促使网约车平台的策略选择发生改变。在静态惩罚机制下,网约车平台和保险公司的策略选择呈周期波动模式,不能收敛;在动态惩罚机制下,网约车平台和保险公司的博弈呈现螺旋收敛的演化轨迹,且收敛的均衡点不随策略选择的初始概率不同而改变。研究结论明确了保险在网约车行业管理中的社会监督职能,并为保险公司保费的制定提供理论参考。
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| 关 键 词： | 网约车平台 保险监督 动态惩罚 演化博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020-05-20 |
Evolutionary Game Analysis of Regulatory Dilemmain Online Car-hailing and Optimizing Policy |
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| FU Shu-huan,SHI Kui-ran.Evolutionary Game Analysis of Regulatory Dilemmain Online Car-hailing and Optimizing Policy[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2021,30(10):23-30. |
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| Authors: | FU Shu-huan SHI Kui-ran |
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| Affiliation: | School of Finance, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China |
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| Abstract: | The evolutionary game method is used to study the evolution process of the game between the insurance company and the online car-hailing platform. The influencing factors of the online car-hailing platform strategy selection under the supervision of the insurance company are analyzed. The equilibrium strategiesunder the static and dynamic penalty strategies are compared. The research finds that the punitive premium of insurance companies can promote the change of strategy choice of the online car-hailing platform. Under the static penalty mechanism, the strategy choice of the online car-hailing platform and the insurance company is periodic fluctuation mode and cannot converge; under the dynamic penalty mechanism, the game presents a spiral convergence evolution track, and the convergence equilibrium point does not change with the initial probability of the strategy choice. |
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| Keywords: | online car-hailing platform Insurance supervision dynamic punishment evolutionary game |
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