The Tutte Polynomial as a Growth Function

The 'dollar game' represents a kind of diffusion process on a graph. Under the rules of the game some cofigurations are both stable and recurrent, and these are known as critical cofigurations. The set of critical configurations can be given the structure of an abelian group, and it turns out that the order of the group is the tree-number of the graph. Each critical configuration can be assigned a positive weight, and the generating function that enumerates critical configurations according to weight is a partial evaluation of the Tutte polynomial of the graph. It is shown that the weight enumerator can also be interpreted as a growth function, which leads to the conclusion that the (partial) Tutte polynomial itself is a growth function.     

On the core of information graph games

This paper considers a subclass of minimum cost spanning tree games, called information graph games. It is proved that the core of these games can be described by a set of at most 2n — 1 linear constraints, wheren is the number of players. Furthermore, it is proved that each information graph game has an associated concave information graph game, which has the same core as the original game. Consequently, the set of extreme core allocations of an information graph game is characterized as the set of marginal allocation vectors of its associated concave game. Finally, it is proved that all extreme core allocations of an information graph game are marginal allocation vectors of the game itself, though not all marginal allocation vectors need to be core allocations.     

基于图对策的收益分配

基于具有交流结构的合作对策,即图对策,对平均树解拓展形式的特征进行刻画,提出此解满足可加性公理。进一步地,分析了对于无圈图对策此解是分支有效的。并且当连通分支中两个局中人相关联的边删掉后,此连通分支的收益变化情况可用平均树解表示。这一性质是Shapley值和Myerson值所不具有的。最后,我们给出了模糊联盟图对策中模糊平均树解的可加性和分支有效性。     

An evolutionary game-theoretic model for ethno-religious conflicts between two groups

Ethno-religious conflict in multi-cultural societies has been one of the major causes of loss of life and property in recent history. In this paper, we present and analyze a multi-agent game theoretic model for computational study of ethno-religious conflicts in multi-cultural societies. Empirical fact-based research in sociology and conflict resolution literature have identified (a) ethno-religious identity of the population, (b) spatial structure (distribution) of the population, (c) existing history of animosity, and (d) influence of leaders as some of the salient factors causing ethno-religious violence. It has also been experimentally shown by Lumsden that multi-cultural conflict can be viewed as a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. Using the above observations, we model the multi-cultural conflict problem as a variant of the repeated PD game in graphs. The graph consists of labeled nodes corresponding to the different ethno-religious types and the topology of the graph encodes the spatial distribution and interaction of the population. We assume the structure of the graph to have the statistical properties of a social network with the high degree nodes representing the leaders of the society. The agents play the game with neighbors of their opponent type and they update their strategies based on neighbors of their same type. This strategy update dynamics, where the update neighborhood is different from the game playing neighborhood, distinguishes our model from conventional models of PD games in graphs. We present simulation results showing the effect of various parameters of our model to the propensity of conflict in a population consisting of two ethno-religious groups. We also compare our simulation results to real data of occurrence of ethno-religious violence in Yugoslavia.     

Minimum cost spanning tree games

We consider the problem of cost allocation among users of a minimum cost spanning tree network. It is formulated as a cooperative game in characteristic function form, referred to as a minimum cost spanning tree (m.c.s.t.) game. We show that the core of a m.c.s.t. game is never empty. In fact, a point in the core can be read directly from any minimum cost spanning tree graph associated with the problem. For m.c.s.t. games with efficient coalition structures we define and construct m.c.s.t. games on the components of the structure. We show that the core and the nucleolus of the original game are the cartesian products of the cores and the nucleoli, respectively, of the induced games on the components of the efficient coalition structure.This paper is a revision of [4].     

图上合作博弈和图的边密度

1977年, Myerson建立了以图作为合作结构的可转移效用博弈模型(也称图博弈), 并提出了一个分配规则, 也即"Myerson 值", 它推广了著名的Shapley值. 该模型假定每个连通集合(通过边直接或间接内部相连的参与者集合)才能形成可行的合作联盟而取得相应的收益, 而不考虑连通集合的具体结构. 引入图的局部边密度来度量每个连通集合中各成员之间联系的紧密程度, 即以该连通集合的导出子图的边密度来作为他们的收益系数, 并由此定义了具有边密度的Myerson值, 证明了具有边密度的Myerson值可以由"边密度分支有效性"和"公平性"来唯一确定.     

The Myerson value for directed graph games

A directed graph game consists of a cooperative game with transferable utility and a digraph which describes limited cooperation and the dominance relation among the players. Under the assumption that only coalitions of strongly connected players are able to fully cooperate, we introduce the digraph-restricted game in which a non-strongly connected coalition can only realize the sum of the worths of its strong components. The Myerson value for directed graph games is defined as the Shapley value of the digraph-restricted game. We establish axiomatic characterizations of the Myerson value for directed graph games by strong component efficiency and either fairness or bi-fairness.     

Potential theory for mean payoff games

The paper presents an O(mn2ⁿ log Z) deterministic algorithm for solving the mean payoff game problem, m and n being the numbers of arcs and vertices, respectively, in the game graph, and Z being the maximum weight (the weights are assumed to be integers). The theoretical basis for the algorithm is the potential theory for mean payoff games. This theory allows one to restate the problem in terms of solving systems of algebraic equations with minima and maxima. Also, in order to solve the mean payoff game problem, the arc reweighting technique is used. To this end, simple modifications, which do not change the set of winning strategies, are applied to the game graph; in the end, a trivial instance of the problem is obtained. It is shown that any game graph can be simplified by n reweightings. Bibliography: 16 titles. __________ Translated from Zapiski Nauchnykh Seminarov POMI, Vol. 340, 2006, pp. 61–75.     

On some balanced, totally balanced and submodular delivery games

This paper studies a class of delivery problems associated with the Chinese postman problem and a corresponding class of delivery games. A delivery problem in this class is determined by a connected graph, a cost function defined on its edges and a special chosen vertex in that graph which will be referred to as the post office. It is assumed that the edges in the graph are owned by different individuals and the delivery game is concerned with the allocation of the traveling costs incurred by the server, who starts at the post office and is expected to traverse all edges in the graph before returning to the post office. A graph G is called Chinese postman-submodular, or, for short, CP-submodular (CP-totally balanced, CP-balanced, respectively) if for each delivery problem in which G is the underlying graph the associated delivery game is submodular (totally balanced, balanced, respectively). For undirected graphs we prove that CP-submodular graphs and CP-totally balanced graphs are weakly cyclic graphs and conversely. An undirected graph is shown to be CP-balanced if and only if it is a weakly Euler graph. For directed graphs, CP-submodular graphs can be characterized by directed weakly cyclic graphs. Further, it is proven that any strongly connected directed graph is CP-balanced. For mixed graphs it is shown that a graph is CP-submodular if and only if it is a mixed weakly cyclic graph. Finally, we note that undirected, directed and mixed weakly cyclic graphs can be recognized in linear time. Received May 20, 1997 / Revised version received August 18, 1998?Published online June 11, 1999     

On the core and nucleolus of directed acyclic graph games

We introduce directed acyclic graph (DAG) games, a generalization of standard tree games, to study cost sharing on networks. This structure has not been previously analyzed from a cooperative game theoretic perspective. Every monotonic and subadditive cost game—including monotonic minimum cost spanning tree games—can be modeled as a DAG-game. We provide an efficiently verifiable condition satisfied by a large class of directed acyclic graphs that is sufficient for the balancedness of the associated DAG-game. We introduce a network canonization process and prove various structural results for the core of canonized DAG-games. In particular, we characterize classes of coalitions that have a constant payoff in the core. In addition, we identify a subset of the coalitions that is sufficient to determine the core. This result also guarantees that the nucleolus can be found in polynomial time for a large class of DAG-games.     

Product rule wins a competitive game

We consider a game that can be viewed as a random graph process. The game has two players and begins with the empty graph on vertex set . During each turn a pair of random edges is generated and one of the players chooses one of these edges to be an edge in the graph. Thus the players guide the evolution of the graph as the game is played. One player controls the even rounds with the goal of creating a so-called giant component as quickly as possible. The other player controls the odd rounds and has the goal of keeping the giant from forming for as long as possible. We show that the product rule is an asymptotically optimal strategy for both players.

     

Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games

We consider cooperative transferable utility games, or simply TU-games, with limited communication structure in which players can cooperate if and only if they are connected in the communication graph. Solutions for such graph games can be obtained by applying standard solutions to a modified or restricted game that takes account of the cooperation restrictions. We discuss Harsanyi solutions which distribute dividends such that the dividend shares of players in a coalition are based on power measures for nodes in corresponding communication graphs. We provide axiomatic characterizations of the Harsanyi power solutions on the class of cycle-free graph games and on the class of all graph games. Special attention is given to the Harsanyi degree solution which equals the Shapley value on the class of complete graph games and equals the position value on the class of cycle-free graph games. The Myerson value is the Harsanyi power solution that is based on the equal power measure. Finally, various applications are discussed.     

The combinatorial game Nofil played on Steiner triple systems

We introduce an impartial combinatorial game on Steiner triple systems called Next One to Fill Is the Loser (Nofil ). Players move alternately, choosing points of the triple system. If a player is forced to fill a block on their turn, they lose. By computing nim-values, we determine optimal strategies for Nofil on all Steiner triple systems up to order 15 and a sampling for orders 19, 21 and 25. The game Nofil can be thought of in terms of play on a corresponding hypergraph which will become a graph during play. At that point Nofil is equivalent to playing the game Node Kayles on the graph. We prove necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for a graph to reached playing Nofil. We conclude that the complexity of determining the outcome of the game Nofil on Steiner triple systems is PSPACE-complete for randomized reductions.     

Analogues of Cayley graphs for topological groups

We define for a compactly generated totally disconnected locally compact group a graph, called a rough Cayley graph, that is a quasi-isometry invariant of the group. This graph carries information about the group structure in an analogous way to the ordinary Cayley graph for a finitely generated group. With this construction the machinery of geometric group theory can be applied to topological groups. This is illustrated by a study of groups where the rough Cayley graph has more than one end and a study of groups where the rough Cayley graph has polynomial growth. Supported by project J2245 of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) and be an IEF Marie Curie Fellowship of the Commission of the European Union.     

Game chromatic number of strong product graphs

The graph coloring game is a two-player game in which the two players properly color an uncolored vertex of G alternately. The first player wins the game if all vertices of G are colored, and the second wins otherwise. The game chromatic number of a graph G is the minimum integer k such that the first player has a winning strategy for the graph coloring game on G with k colors. There is a lot of literature on the game chromatic number of graph products, e.g., the Cartesian product and the lexicographic product. In this paper, we investigate the game chromatic number of the strong product of graphs, which is one of major graph products. In particular, we completely determine the game chromatic number of the strong product of a double star and a complete graph. Moreover, we estimate the game chromatic number of some King's graphs, which are the strong products of two paths.     

Vertex Cuts

Given a connected graph, in many cases it is possible to construct a structure tree that provides information about the ends of the graph or its connectivity. For example Stallings' theorem on the structure of groups with more than one end can be proved by analyzing the action of the group on a structure tree and Tutte used a structure tree to investigate finite 2‐connected graphs, that are not 3‐connected. Most of these structure tree theories have been based on edge cuts, which are components of the graph obtained by removing finitely many edges. A new axiomatic theory is described here using vertex cuts, components of the graph obtained by removing finitely many vertices. This generalizes Tutte's decomposition of 2‐connected graphs to k‐connected graphs for any k, in finite and infinite graphs. The theory can be applied to nonlocally finite graphs with more than one vertex end, i.e. ends that can be separated by removing a finite number of vertices. This gives a decomposition for a group acting on such a graph, generalizing Stallings' theorem. Further applications include the classification of distance transitive graphs and k‐CS‐transitive graphs.     

On the optimality of a simple strategy for searching graphs

Consider a search game with an immobile hider in a graph. A Chinese postman tour is a closed trajectory which visits all the points of the graph and has minimal length. We show that encircling the Chinese postman tour in a random direction is an optimal search strategy if and only if the graph is weakly Eulerian (i.e it consists of several Eulerian curves connected in a tree-like structure). Received: December 1999/Revised version: September 2000     

具有图结构和联盟结构的Banzhaf值及应用

Banzhaf值是经典可转移效用合作对策中一个著名的分配规则,可以用来评估参与者在对策中的不同作用。本文将Banzhaf值推广到具有联盟结构和图结构的TU-对策中,首先提出并定义了具有联盟结构和图结构的Banzhaf值(简称PL-Banzhaf值),证明了PL-Banzhaf值满足公平性、平衡贡献性和分割分支总贡献性,并给出了该值的两种公理性刻画。其次,讨论了PL-Banzhaf值在跨国天然气管道案例中的应用,并和其他分配规则进行了比较分析。     

Cops and Robbers on Planar‐Directed Graphs

Aigner and Fromme initiated the systematic study of the cop number of a graph by proving the elegant and sharp result that in every connected planar graph, three cops are sufficient to win a natural pursuit game against a single robber. This game, introduced by Nowakowski and Winkler, is commonly known as Cops and Robbers in the combinatorial literature. We extend this study to directed planar graphs, and establish separation from the undirected setting. We exhibit a geometric construction that shows that a sophisticated robber strategy can indefinitely evade three cops on a particular strongly connected planar‐directed graph.