International environmental cooperation: a new eye on the greenhouse gas emissions’ control

This paper re-examines the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) modelled as a two-stage non-cooperative game when countries’ strategies to control pollution are complementary. This new assumption relying on empirical and theoretical evidences means that reinforcement effects do exist between countries’ strategies when polluting or abating. From a deliberately conventional model the results established analytically strongly contrast with those in the literature on IEAs. We find that the unique stable agreement can consist in half countries involved in the negotiation; we demonstrate that the environmental impact of such cooperation is almost total: it tends toward the one of the full cooperative solution. Even if the incentives to free-ride are less strong, we do not observe the formation of the “grand” coalition: not all the countries sign the agreement. We also explain why the level of cooperation is decreasing with the perception countries have of the seriousness of the problem.     

基于可信性理论的PPP项目特许期-价格联合调整策略研究

需求预测误差是影响PPP项目收益预测准确性的主要因素。为减少谈判争议,确保风险和收益的动态均衡,本文基于模糊数学可信性理论,构建了考虑需求不确定的特许期-价格联合调整模型。将项目运营期间的需求预测误差作为模糊变量,将运营期内特许期和价格的联合调整策略作为决策变量,通过模糊模拟求解出不同特许期和价格调整组合下的期望收益误差以及正收益预期下的可信性,进而得到特许期和价格的联合调整策略可行解集。并将该模型应用于某污水项目中,结果表明,该模型能够有效地解决需求不确定性风险对特许期测算影响的问题,弥补了目前PPP项目特许期和价格调整决策研究中未考虑需求预测误差的不足,对PPP项目特许期和价格的调整决策有着重要的参考意义。     

国际气候谈判达成合作协议的内在动因与稳定性研究

通过建立国际气候谈判的合作博弈理论模型,从协议内部缔约国收益预期出发,研究气候谈判国际合作治理的内在动因与稳定性。结论表明:合作协议有助于异质性国家间增加温室气体减排治理带来的收益,参与气候谈判的国家间形成合作协议的内在动因,正是对合作净收益的预期分配;而这种内在动因并不能使合作协议达到均衡,均衡的实现过程,是对预期净收益的内部分配政策的调整过程:当部分谈判参与国以退出合作联盟作为最有力威胁,没有任何一方能在联盟瓦解时,在不造成损失的情况下获得效用的增加,这就使谈判参与国在相互制衡中形成稳定状态。研究贡献在于突破了固有的非合作博弈框架,在更为一般层面上解释了异质性国家间的气候谈判合作机理,有助于各国采取有效措施建立气候合作联盟,应对气候挑战。     

阈值风险下的多企业合作治理污染的演化博弈分析

针对环境污染具有跨区域性,环境资源的公共物品属性,由单一产污企业治理污染物难以取得有效成果,辖区内多个产污企业合作治理是环境保护的必由之路。 本文从演化博弈论的研究视角探讨了多个排污企业之间的决策演化过程,建立了多主体演化博弈模型,并考虑了污染排放总量超过总量阈值时的环境恶化风险,研究阈值风险对产污企业合作治理污染策略选择的影响。 研究结果表明,较高的治理成本很大地约束了逐利企业治理污染的行为选择,造成公地悲剧的社会问题。 企业治污成本较大背景下,环境阈值风险发生概率越高,越能有效促进合作治理环境策略的演化稳定,合作治理占优于不治理。 出于对企业自身初始禀赋的保护,产污企业初始禀赋越大、排污收费率越高,越能有效促进企业治理污染物的积极性。 最后,为促进辖区内污染企业合作治理污染提出了政策建议。     

Dynamic linear programming games with risk-averse players

Motivated by situations in which independent agents wish to cooperate in some uncertain endeavor over time, we study dynamic linear programming games, which generalize classical linear production games to multi-period settings under uncertainty. We specifically consider that players may have risk-averse attitudes towards uncertainty, and model this risk aversion using coherent conditional risk measures. For this setting, we study the strong sequential core, a natural extension of the core to dynamic settings. We characterize the strong sequential core as the set of allocations that satisfy a particular finite set of inequalities that depend on an auxiliary optimization model, and then leverage this characterization to establish sufficient conditions for emptiness and non-emptiness. Qualitatively, whereas the strong sequential core is always non-empty when players are risk-neutral, our results indicate that cooperation in the presence of risk aversion is much more difficult. We illustrate this with an application to cooperative newsvendor games, where we find that cooperation is possible when it least benefits players, and may be impossible when it offers more benefit.     

A one-shot bargaining problem

There are bargaining situations in which the parties cannot arrive at an agreement through negotiations but rather must make one irreversible claim which may or may not be fulfilled. In this paper we discuss a model for such a “one-shot bargaining”.     

PPP项目中非完全利益群体的合作形成机制研究

协调政府与社会资本合作的利益分歧,进而实现个体理性向集体理性的趋同,这是纾解PPP项目合作困境的切入点之一。基于合作博弈理论,本文构建PPP项目非完全利益群体的合作形成机制,分析政府与社会资本间“合作共赢”的必要因素。研究表明,由政府与社会资本组成的PPP项目非完全利益群体,可在“理性-效用转移-有效协商”机制的协同作用下主动采取最优合作策略。其中,理性机制验证了政府与社会资本达成合作意向的前提,效用转移机制可实现二者之间的风险-收益对等,有效协商机制将达成政府与社会资本合作的帕累托均衡。     

Non-binding agreements and fairness in commons dilemma games

Usually, common pool games are analyzed without taking into account the cooperative features of the game, even when communication and non-binding agreements are involved. Whereas equilibria are inefficient, negotiations may induce some cooperation and may enhance efficiency. In the paper, we propose to use tools of cooperative game theory to advance the understanding of results in dilemma situations that allow for communication. By doing so, we present a short review of earlier experimental evidence given by Hackett, Schlager, and Walker 1994 (HSW) for the conditional stability of non-binding agreements established in face-to-face multilateral negotiations. For an experimental test, we reanalyze the HSW data set in a game-theoretical analysis of cooperative versions of social dilemma games. The results of cooperative game theory that are most important for the application are explained and interpreted with respect to their meaning for negotiation behavior. Then, theorems are discussed that cooperative social dilemma games are clear (alpha- and beta-values coincide) and that they are convex (it follows that the core is “large”): The main focus is on how arguments of power and fairness can be based on the structure of the game. A second item is how fairness and stability properties of a negotiated (non-binding) agreement can be judged. The use of cheap talk in evaluating experiments reveals that besides the relation of non-cooperative and cooperative solutions, say of equilibria and core, the relation of alpha-, beta- and gamma-values are of importance for the availability of attractive solutions and the stability of the such agreements. In the special case of the HSW scenario, the game shows properties favorable for stable and efficient solutions. Nevertheless, the realized agreements are less efficient than expected. The realized (and stable) agreements can be located between the equilibrium, the egalitarian solution and some fairness solutions. In order to represent the extent to which the subjects obey efficiency and fairness, we present and discuss patterns of the corresponding excess vectors.     

Strategic Manipulation Approach for Solving Negotiated Transfer Pricing Problem

This paper suggests an approach for solving the transfer pricing problem, where negotiation between divisions is carried out considering the manipulation game theory model for a multidivisional firm. The manipulation equilibrium point is conceptualized under the Machiavellian social theory, represented by three concepts: views, tactics and immorality. In this approach, we are considering a non-cooperative model for the transfer pricing problem: a game model involving manipulating and manipulated players engaged cooperatively in a Nash game, restricted by a Stackelberg game. The cooperation is represented by the Nash bargaining solution. The transfer pricing problem is conceptualized as a strong Stackelberg game involving manipulating and manipulated divisions. This structure established conditions of unequal relative power among divisions, where high-power divisions tend to be abusive and less powerful divisions have a tendency to behave compliantly. For computation purposes, we transform the Stackelberg game model into a Nash game, where every division is able of manipulative behavior to some degree: the Nash game relaxes the interpretation of the manipulation game and the equilibrium selection for the transfer pricing problem. The manipulation dynamics and rationality proposed for the transfer pricing problem correspond to many real-world negotiation situations. We present an example, that illustrates how manipulation can be employed to solve the transfer pricing problem in a multidivisional firm.     

A simultaneous multi-issue negotiation through autonomous agents

Automated negotiation through autonomous agents has become increasingly important since the advent of e-marketplace. A deadlock may arise in which both negotiators refuse to disclose more information; then, mediation is required. We propose an agent-based sealed-bid design in which both agents simultaneously submit their respective offers to the mediate agent, and construct an efficient negotiation strategy which can reach an agreement aiming to maximize their owner’s utility. An important contribution of this paper is that we consider negotiators not necessarily to conflict over all issues, such as quantity. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed automated negotiation strategy is efficient in terms of the Pareto-efficiency of the negotiated contracts, the joint utility obtained, and the equality of both agents. In addition, since disclosure of information is reduced greatly, the design can discourage counter-speculation and effectively control fraud and misrepresentation to a certain extent. The method we proposed is simple and stable in the context of a game and the model could be well suited for practical agent applications.     

Some soluble groups of finite rank and some related matrix groups

Let G be a torsion-free soluble group of finite rank and F any field. The group algebra FG is an Ore domain; let D denote its division ring of quotients. It seems likely that D is always locally residually finite-dimensional over F. This is certainly so in the non-modular case. Here in some special situations we settle the modular case. We include some applications to groups of matrices.Published in Ukrainskii Matematicheskii Zhurnal, Vol. 43, Nos. 7 and 8, pp. 894–901, July–August, 1991.     

基于模糊方法的多人合作对策的研究

多人合作对策模型中联盟的收入和总体的收入常常出现相互矛盾的情况 ,此时核是空集 .由于不存在核 ,无法用 Nash-Harsanyi谈判模型求解 .采用模糊数学方法 ,调整模型中线性约束的右端系数 ,使核在一定程度上是非空集合 ,得到模糊意义下的 Nash平衡解 .该方法一定程度上解决了各联盟收入与总体收入的矛盾 .最后通过一个算例说明该方法的可行性 .     

Learning about preferences in electronic negotiations – A volume-based measurement method

To create an integrative solution in a bargaining problem, negotiators need to have information about each other’s preferences. Empirical negotiation research therefore requires methods to measure the extent to which information about preferences is available during a negotiation. We propose such a method based on Starr’s domain criterion, which was originally developed for sensitivity analysis in decision making. Our method provides indices for the amount of preference information that can be inferred both in negotiations reaching an agreement and negotiations where an agreement was not (yet) reached. To test the external validity of our proposed measures, we conduct an empirical study which shows that the proposed measures exhibit positive relationships to the success of negotiations as well as to the efficiency of outcomes that would be expected according to negotiation theory.     

Satisfiability and completeness of protocols for electronic negotiations

Many of the existing e-negotiation support systems are built around one negotiation protocol. This effectively restricts their use to those problems and interactions that had been assumed a priori by the systems’ designers. Field and experimental studies show that the way the negotiation process is structured depends on the negotiators’ characteristics, the problem and the context in which an agreement is sought. It has also been recognized in literature that both the way a problem is represented and the solution process implemented strongly influence the results at which individual decision-makers and negotiators arrive. Building on the e-negotiation Montreal taxonomy this article proposes a more complete typology of protocols and their characteristics. It also presents the elements of a theory for the design of negotiation protocols. The proposed protocol formalism allows for the construction of models from which users can select a protocol instance that suits them and/or is appropriate for the problem at-hand. Furthermore, this formalism allows for the construction of protocols that can be modified during the user–system interactions. The paper also presents two key requirements for negotiation protocols embedded in support systems, namely their satisfiability and completeness.     

A partial cooperation model for non-unique linear two-level decision problems

This paper examines a linear static Stackelberg game where the follower's optimal reaction is not unique. Traditionally, the problem has been approached using either an optimistic or a pessimistic framework, respectively, representing the two extreme situations of full cooperation and zero cooperation from the follower. However, partial cooperation from the follower is a viable option. For partial cooperation, the leader's optimal strategy may be neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Introducing a cooperation index to describe the degree of follower cooperation, we first formulate a partial cooperation model for the leader. The two-level problem is then reformulated into a single-level model. It is shown that the optimistic and pessimistic situations are special cases of the general model, and that the leader's optimal choice may be an intermediate solution.     

NEGOTIATING OVER EXTERNALITIES

We present a simple model in which two perfectly informed, risk neutral agents will not negotiate an efficient agreement to lessen the effects of an externality and for which the outcome of negotiation depends on the legal assignment of property rights. The model permits agents to pre-commit themselves to refuse to negotiate particular agenda issues. The result is obtained because we prove that one player is always made strictly worse off from the addition of side-payments to a bargaining game. Along the way, we devise a supporting hyperplane for the n-person Nash bargaining game solution. We also display a simple game which establishes that our main result holds true—for at least some games—for an array of alternative bargaining game solutions such as that of Raiffa, Kalai, and Smorodinski.     

具有常数利率的延迟更新风险模型

考虑常数利率情形下的延迟更新风险过程．得到了该延迟更新风险模型下的Gerber-Shiu期望折现罚金函数的表达式,并得到了常数利率下的一种特殊的延迟更新风险模型的破产概率的显示表达式.     

考虑联盟结构的联合采购合作剩余分配博弈分析

联合采购合作剩余分配本质是在最大联盟剩余值与最小期望分配值之间的谈判协商过程。当前联合采购合作剩余分配研究主要基于参与企业地位无差别假设,忽略了联盟结构对剩余分配具有明显影响。基于联盟形成的层次结构,研究论证了采购企业通过组建小联盟形式参与更大联盟的联合采购,可提升其在分配谈判中的话语权。通过算例分析表明,考虑联盟结构的联合采购合作剩余分配相对于不考虑联盟结构得到的分配方案更具公平性和合理性。     

Manufacturer cooperation in supplier development under risk

Supplier development involves efforts undertaken by manufacturing firms to improve their suppliers’ capabilities and performance. These improvement efforts can be targeted at a variety of areas such as quality management, product development, and cost reduction. Since supplier development requires investments on the part of the manufacturer, it is important to optimally allocate investment dollars among multiple suppliers to minimize risk while maintaining an acceptable level of return. This paper presents a set of optimization models that address this issue. We consider two scenarios: single-manufacturer and multiple suppliers (SMMS) and two-manufacturer and multiple suppliers (TMMS). In the SMMS case, we suggest optimal investments in various suppliers by effectively considering risk and return. The TMMS case investigates whether manufacturers with differing capabilities could gain risk reduction benefits from cooperating with each other in supplier development. Through illustrative applications, we identify conditions in which both cooperation and non-cooperation are beneficial for manufacturers. Under conditions of cooperation, we propose optimal investments for manufacturers to achieve high levels of risk reduction benefits.     

An agent-based negotiation model on price and delivery date in a fashion supply chain

Price and due-date negotiation between supply chain members is a critical issue. Motivated by industrial practice, we consider in this paper a make-to-order fashion supply chain in which the downstream manufacturer and the upstream supplier are cooperative on due-date and competitive on price. We propose a two-phase negotiation agenda based on such characteristics, and aim to find an optimal solution to deal with the negotiation problem considering production cost and mutual benefit. We build an analytical negotiation model for a manufacturer-supplier pair, discuss their utilities, and examine the Pareto efficiency frontier from the theoretical perspective. After that, from an application perspective, we build an agent-based two-phase negotiation system where agents are used to represent the two parties to enhance communication. In the cooperative phase, a simulated annealing based intelligent algorithm is employed to help the manufacturer agent and the supplier agent search tentative agreement on due dates which can minimize the total supply chain cost. In the competitive phase, the two parties bargain on the pricing issue using concession based methods. They adjust the reservation value and aspiration value for pricing accordingly based on the integrated utility and the result of the previous phase. Simulation results show that, the proposed negotiation approach can achieve optimal utility of agents and reach a win-win situation for the bilateral parties. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to further generate insights on how different parameters affect the performance of the proposed system.