| PPP项目中非完全利益群体的合作形成机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 程帆,邓斌超,尹贻林.PPP项目中非完全利益群体的合作形成机制研究[J].运筹与管理,2022,31(10):227-234. |
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| 作者姓名： | 程帆 邓斌超 尹贻林 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津理工大学 管理学院,天津 300384 |
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| 基金项目： | 自然科学基金青年项目(71602144);天津市教委人文社科重大项目(2017JWZD15) |
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| 摘 要： | 协调政府与社会资本合作的利益分歧,进而实现个体理性向集体理性的趋同,这是纾解PPP项目合作困境的切入点之一。基于合作博弈理论,本文构建PPP项目非完全利益群体的合作形成机制,分析政府与社会资本间“合作共赢”的必要因素。研究表明,由政府与社会资本组成的PPP项目非完全利益群体,可在“理性-效用转移-有效协商”机制的协同作用下主动采取最优合作策略。其中,理性机制验证了政府与社会资本达成合作意向的前提,效用转移机制可实现二者之间的风险-收益对等,有效协商机制将达成政府与社会资本合作的帕累托均衡。
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| 关 键 词： | PPP项目 非完全利益群体 合作形成机制 合作博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020-09-17 |
Research on the Cooperation Formation Mechanism of Non-complete Interest Groups in PPP Projects |
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| CHENG Fan,DENG Bin-chao,YIN Yi-lin.Research on the Cooperation Formation Mechanism of Non-complete Interest Groups in PPP Projects[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2022,31(10):227-234. |
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| Authors: | CHENG Fan DENG Bin-chao YIN Yi-lin |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management, Tianjin University of Technology, Tianjin 300848, China |
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| Abstract: | One entry point of alleviating the plight in the cooperation in PPP projects is to coordinate the interest divergence in the cooperation between the government and the social capital, and further achieve the convergence of individual rationality to collective rationality. Based on the cooperative game theory, this article introduces a cooperative formation mechanism for the non-complete interest groups in the PPP projects, and analyses the key factors for achieving the “win-win cooperation” between the government and social capital. The study shows that the non-complete interest groups of PPP projects composed of the government and social capital may take the initiative to adopt the optimal cooperation strategy under the synergy of the mechanism of “rationality-transfer of utility-effective negotiation”. Among them,the mechanism of rationality verifies the precondition for achieving the intention to cooperate between the government and the social capital,the mechanism of transfer of utility can help to realise the risk-return equivalence between the two parties, and the mechanism of effective negotiation can achieve the Pareto optimality in the cooperation between the government and the social capital. |
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| Keywords: | PPP projects non-complete interest groups cooperative formation mechanism cooperative game |
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