弱伪连续向量值函数及其在多目标博弈中的应用

基于对弱伪连续实值函数的研究, 提出向量值函数关于锥的弱伪连续定义, 并建立了向量值函数$R_+^k$弱伪连续与实值函数弱伪连续的对应关系. 作为弱伪连续向量值函数的应用, 给出了弱伪连续下的向量值Ky Fan点的存在性定理, 并通过该定理证明了伪连续向量值支付下的多目标博弈弱Pareto-Nash平衡点的存在性定理.     

On some balanced, totally balanced and submodular delivery games

This paper studies a class of delivery problems associated with the Chinese postman problem and a corresponding class of delivery games. A delivery problem in this class is determined by a connected graph, a cost function defined on its edges and a special chosen vertex in that graph which will be referred to as the post office. It is assumed that the edges in the graph are owned by different individuals and the delivery game is concerned with the allocation of the traveling costs incurred by the server, who starts at the post office and is expected to traverse all edges in the graph before returning to the post office. A graph G is called Chinese postman-submodular, or, for short, CP-submodular (CP-totally balanced, CP-balanced, respectively) if for each delivery problem in which G is the underlying graph the associated delivery game is submodular (totally balanced, balanced, respectively). For undirected graphs we prove that CP-submodular graphs and CP-totally balanced graphs are weakly cyclic graphs and conversely. An undirected graph is shown to be CP-balanced if and only if it is a weakly Euler graph. For directed graphs, CP-submodular graphs can be characterized by directed weakly cyclic graphs. Further, it is proven that any strongly connected directed graph is CP-balanced. For mixed graphs it is shown that a graph is CP-submodular if and only if it is a mixed weakly cyclic graph. Finally, we note that undirected, directed and mixed weakly cyclic graphs can be recognized in linear time. Received May 20, 1997 / Revised version received August 18, 1998?Published online June 11, 1999     

Weakly clopen functions

We introduce a new class of functions called weakly clopen function which includes the class of almost clopen functions due to Ekici [Ekici E. Generalization of perfectly continuous, regular set-connected and clopen functions. Acta Math Hungar 2005;107:193–206] and is included in the class of weakly continuous functions due to Levine [Levine N. A decomposition of continuity in topological spaces. Am Math Mon 1961;68:44–6]. Some characterizations and several properties concerning weakly clopenness are obtained. Furthermore, relationships among weak clopenness, almost clopenness, clopenness and weak continuity are investigated.     

Generalized Maiorana–McFarland class and normality of p-ary bent functions

A class of bent functions which contains bent functions with various properties like regular, weakly regular and not weakly regular bent functions in even and in odd dimension, is analyzed. It is shown that this class includes the Maiorana–McFarland class as a special case. Known classes and examples of bent functions in odd characteristic are examined for their relation to this class. In the second part, normality for bent functions in odd characteristic is analyzed. It turns out that differently to Boolean bent functions, many – also quadratic – bent functions in odd characteristic and even dimension are not normal. It is shown that regular Coulter–Matthews bent functions are normal.     

Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibria inN-person games over reflexive Banach spaces

Sufficient conditions are obtained for the existence of Nash equilibrium points inN-person games when the strategy sets are closed, convex subsets of reflexive Banach spaces. These conditions require that each player's cost functional is convex in that player's strategy, weakly continuous in the strategies of the other players, weakly lower semicontinuous in all strategies, and furthermore satisfies a coercivity condition if any of the strategy sets is unbounded. The result is applied to a class of linear-quadratic differential games with no information, to prove that equilibrium points exist when the duration of these games is sufficiently small.This work was supported by a Commonwealth of Australia, Postgraduate Research Award.     

Sufficient global optimality conditions for weakly convex minimization problems

In this paper, we present sufficient global optimality conditions for weakly convex minimization problems using abstract convex analysis theory. By introducing (L,X)-subdifferentials of weakly convex functions using a class of quadratic functions, we first obtain some sufficient conditions for global optimization problems with weakly convex objective functions and weakly convex inequality and equality constraints. Some sufficient optimality conditions for problems with additional box constraints and bivalent constraints are then derived.      

Definition and properties of cooperative equilibria in a two-player game of infinite duration

A two-player multistage game, with an infinite number of stages is considered. The concepts of overtaking and weakly overtaking payoff sequences are introduced. The class of strategies considered consists of memory strategies, which are based on the past history of the control and the initial state from where the game has been played. Weak equilibria are defined in this class of strategies. It is then shown how such equilibria can be constructed by composing into a trigger strategy a nominal cooperative control sequence and two threat strategies representing the announced retaliation by each player in the case where the other player does not play according to the nominal control. When the threats consists of a feedback equilibrium pair, the resulting cooperative equilibrium is perfect. Another result shows that, if each player can use a most effective threat based on a saddle-point feedback strategy, then any weak equilibrium in the class of memory strategies is in some sense related to this particular kind of equilibrium in the class of trigger strategies.Dedicated to G. LeitmannThis research was supported by SSHRC Grant No. 410-81-0722 and FCAC Grant No. EQ-428 to the first author. This research has also been made possible by a financial support from the University of Puerto Rico.     

Generalized convex functions on normal decomposition systems

Aequationes mathematicae - In this paper, the class of weakly $$ \psi $$ -uniformly convex functions is introduced and studied. Such functions are defined on a convex subcone D of a linear space V...     

On the stability of the solution for multiobjective generalized games with the payoffs perturbed

This paper studies the stability of weakly Pareto-Nash and Pareto-Nash equilibrium for multiobjective generalized games with the payoff perturbed. Using a simple characterization of the weakly Pareto-Nash solution, we obtain a generic continuous result concerning weakly Pareto-Nash solution mapping. Examples are given to show that Pareto-Nash equilibrium mapping is neither upper semicontinuous nor lower semicontinuous. Through seeking the sub-mapping, we prove that most multiobjective generalized games have at least one essential Pareto-Nash solution.     

Modularity of Galois traces of class invariants

Zagier showed that the Galois traces of the values of j-invariant at CM points are Fourier coefficients of a weakly holomorphic modular form of weight 3/2 and Bruinier–Funke expanded his result to the sums of the values of arbitrary modular functions at Heegner points. In this paper, we identify the Galois traces of real-valued class invariants with modular traces of the values of certain modular functions at Heegner points so that they are Fourier coefficients of weight 3/2 weakly holomorphic modular forms.     

一类调和映射的边界正则性

讨论一类映入球面的满足拟单调不等式的弱调和映射的边界正则性。利用函数的延拓技巧以及Hardy空间和BMO空间的对偶性，对这类弱调和映射的边界正则性给出一个简明的证明。     

Duality Theorems of Multiobjective Programming for a Class of Generalized Convex Functions

1.DefinitionsDefinition1.AfunctionalF(x)inthespaceVCE"issaidtobeasublinearfunctionalifforx,yeV,andor20,Inparticular,F(0)=0.Letop(x)beadifferentiablerealfunctiononasetCCEd.ForagivensublinearfunctionFandafunctionp:CxC-EIIp(x,u)/0(x/u),themoregeneralgeneralizedconvexfunctioncanbedefinedasthefollwing:Definition2.op(x)issaidtobe(F,p)--invarialltconvexfunctiononCifforxl,xZECDefinition3.op(x)issaidtobe(F,P)--invariantquasiconvexfunctiononCifforal,xZECthatis,Definition4.op(x)issaidtobe(F,…     

On Optimization Properties of Functions, with a Concave Minorant

We give a definition of the class of functions with a concave minorant and compare these functions with other classes of functions often used in global optimization, e.g. weakly convex functions, d.c. functions, Lipschitzian functions, continuous and lower semicontinuous functions. It is shown that the class of functions with a concave minorant is closed under operations mainly used in optimization and how a concave minorant can be constructed for a given function.     

The KKT optimality conditions in a class of generalized convex optimization problems with an interval-valued objective function

In this paper, we study the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker optimality conditions in a class of nonconvex optimization problems with an interval-valued objective function. Firstly, the concepts of preinvexity and invexity are extended to interval-valued functions. Secondly, several properties of interval-valued preinvex and invex functions are investigated. Thirdly, the KKT optimality conditions are derived for LU-preinvex and invex optimization problems with an interval-valued objective function under the conditions of weakly continuous differentiablity and Hukuhara differentiablity. Finally, the relationships between a class of variational-like inequalities and the interval-valued optimization problems are established.     

The not-quite non-atomic game: Non-emptiness of the core in large production games

We show that, in cooperative production games, when the production functions are not concave, the core may well be empty. However, as the number of players increases (subject to some regularity conditions), the relative deficit obtained by using concavified functions decreases to zero. Furthermore, differentiability of the functions will cause the absolute deficit to go to zero.     

On the saddle-point stability for a class of dynamic games

In this paper, we study the stability properties of the class of capital accumulation games introduced by Fershtman and Muller (Ref. 1). Both discrete and continuous time versions are discussed. It is shown that the open-loop Nash equilibrium solutions for both games are characterized by a general saddle-point property, a result best known from the turnpike literature in optimal growth theory. In the case of zero discount rates, an even stronger result can be derived: As long as the Hessian matrix of the instantaneous profit functions has a quasidominant diagonal, no pure imaginary roots are possible.The authors thank J. Boyd III, G. Feichtinger, S. Jørgensen, and G. Schwann for helpful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council of Canada, Grant No. OGP-0037342.     

Maximal q-Plurisubharmonic Functions in {\mathbb{C}^{n}}

In this paper we will study maximal q-plurisubharmonic functions in ${\mathbb{C}^n}$ . At the same time, we define a notion above weakly q-plurisubharmonic functions and describe the relation between these functions and maximal q-plurisubharmonic functions.     

A novel fixed point theorem for the k-Meir-Keeler function

Generalized Meir-Keeler functions are introduced that contain a class of weakly uniformly strict contraction maps. A theorem is proven that assures the existence of a fixed point for the closed k-Meir-Keeler functions and provides a con- structive method to find the points. An advantage of the method is that it is possible to show the existence of a fixed point for functions with domains that are neither complete nor closed.     

Limit Consistent Solutions in Noncooperative Games

Strong and limit consistency in finite noncooperative games are studied. A solution is called strongly consistent if it is both consistent and conversely consistent (Ref. 1). We provide sufficient conditions on one-person behavior such that a strongly consistent solution is nonempty. We introduce limit consistency for normal form games and extensive form games. Roughly, this means that the solution can be approximated by strongly consistent solutions. We then show that the perfect and proper equilibrium correspondences in normal form games, as well as the weakly perfect and sequential equilibrium correspondences for extensive form games, are limit consistent.