Dynamic pricing and strategic retailers in the energy sector: A multi-leader-follower approach

We consider strategic retail pricing in markets, where retail companies buy commodities at fluctuating wholesale prices and resell them to final consumers by applying dynamic retail tariffs. This is of especially large relevance in the context of energy markets where substantial wholesale price fluctuations are observed. Policy makers currently foster the introduction of such dynamic tariff schemes. From a modelling point of view, we propose a multi-leader-follower problem to investigate the implications of strategic retail pricing and we compare the impacts of implementing dynamic tariffs on retailers and final consumers. Our analysis tackles different aspects: first, we formulate the model and provide theoretical results. Second, we develop algorithms, which solve the multi-leader-follower problem and allow us to characterize the resulting market equilibria. Third, we calibrate and solve our framework based on data of the German retail electricity market for the years 2020 and 2021. This allows us to quantitatively assess the impact of introducing real time prices on retailers’ profits and customers’ benefits. As our results show, dynamic real-time pricing on the one hand typically increases market efficiency, which confirms previous results obtained without the explicit consideration of strategic behavior. On the other hand, however, as a novel aspect, dynamic real-time pricing turns out to significantly reduce equilibrium profits in case of strategic firms. This effect is especially large in environments with strongly fluctuating wholesale prices.     

The Balassa–Samuelson effect in Romania – The role of regulated prices

Due to the Balassa–Samuelson effect, the candidate countries to the European Monetary Union face a possible conflict between the effects of tradable productivity increase on inflation and on the appreciation of the real exchange rate on one hand, and the Maastricht criteria regarding inflation and exchange rate stability on the other hand. A restrictive monetary policy could succeed in reaching inflation criteria, but only with the cost of slowing down real convergence. This paper deals with the Balassa–Samuelson effect in Romania. The main conclusion of the paper is that in the period 1998–2006 the average annual rate of inflation generated by the Balassa–Samuelson effect in Romania was on average 0.6% in the case of the classical model. Due to the existence of government-regulated prices (mostly non-tradable goods) accounting for as much as 21% of the CPI basket in Romania – the price of non-tradables has increased by less than in the case those prices were market prices. If we include these regulated prices in non-tradable, which is named by us extended model, the impact of Balassa–Samuelson on inflation could have been on average 2.46%. Therefore, the Balassa–Samuelson effect is expected to result into higher inflation with future price liberalization for non-tradables.     

On martingale diffusions describing the ‘smile‐effect’ for implied volatilities

This paper discusses diffusion models describing the ‘smile‐effect’ of implied volatilities for option prices partly following the new approach of Bruno Dupire. If one restricts to the time homogeneous case, a careful study of this approach shows that the call option prices considered as a function of the price x of the underlying security, remaining time to maturity T–t and strike price K have necessarily to satisfy a certain functional equation, in order to fit into a coherent model. It is shown that for certain examples of empirically observed option prices which are reported in the literature, this functional equation does not hold. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Average shadow price and equilibrium price: A case study of tradable pollution permit markets

Shadow prices indicate implicit values of limited resources at the margin and provide important information in decision making for resource management. In continuous economic models, shadow prices associated with demand-supply balance constraints represent consumers’ willingness to pay and producers’ marginal cost, hence they correspond to market equilibrium prices. As well known, however, marginal analysis fails in the case of discrete optimization, such as mixed integer programming. An alternative concept has been introduced in the literature to measure the value of an extra unit of a limited resource in such cases. This concept is based on average rather than marginal values, thus called the average shadow price, and interpreted in the same way as conventional shadow prices. Whether average shadow prices in a discrete economic model can serve as market equilibrium prices has not been addressed in the related literature. The present paper addresses this issue in an empirical setting. Using a tradable pollution permit market as an example, where firms’ YES/NO type technology adoption decisions are represented by binary variables, we show that the average shadow price of tradable permits can be interpreted as the equilibrium price only when certain conditions related to the cost structure and emission levels hold. On the other hand, we show that an iterative procedure based on individual firms’ cost minimizing behavior presents a better approach for finding a price that can eliminate or reduce the gap between demand and supply of permits in the market.     

AN ITERATIVE MULTILEVEL APPROACH TO NATURAL RESOURCE OPTIMIZATION: A TEST CASE

Forest planners face a dilemma. On the one hand, they desire more detail than they currently have in their planning optimization models, and on the other hand, these models are already extremely large and complex. This sort of problem is common in other natural resource management situations as well. This paper investigates an iterative multilevel approach that would allow districts within the forest to have models approaching the size and complexity of current forest models, but still approximate a forest-level optimum. A specific procedure based on equating shadow prices across districts is developed and tested with a case example where a global optimum is determinable as a standard of comparison. The procedure shows promise, but difficulties in recognizing optimality are indicated.     

Sequential auctions on Böhm-Bawerk's horse market

This paper studies what prices and final allocations would arise under strategic (or sophisticated) behavior of buyers when homogeneous goods are auctioned off sequentially, one at a time. It is shown, using subgame perfect equilibria, that prices (and thus final allocations) vary depending on the order of goods to be auctioned off. However, opposed to the case where buyers bid sincerely, the number of goods sold out is always unchanged and final allocations are always Pareto-optimal in any sequence of auctions.     

Prevention efforts,insurance demand and price incentives under coherent risk measures

This paper studies an equilibrium model between an insurance buyer and an insurance seller, where both parties’ risk preferences are given by convex risk measures. The interaction is modeled through a Stackelberg type game, where the insurance seller plays first by offering prices, in the form of safety loadings. Then the insurance buyer chooses his optimal proportional insurance share and his optimal prevention effort in order to minimize his risk measure. The loss distribution is given by a family of stochastically ordered probability measures, indexed by the prevention effort. We give special attention to the problems of self-insurance and self-protection, and show that if the buyer’s risk measure decreases faster in effort than his expected loss, optimal effort is non-decreasing in the safety loading with a potential discontinuity when optimal coverage switches from full to zero. On the contrary, if the decrease of the buyer’s risk measure is slower than the expected loss, optimal effort may or may not be non-decreasing in the safety loading. In case of Pareto distributed losses, the seller sets the highest possible price under which the buyer still prefers full insurance over no insurance. We also analyze the case of discrete distributions: on the one hand, for self-protection, under the assumption that the marginal impact of the effort is higher on small losses than it is on catastrophic losses, the optimal effort is non-decreasing in the safety loading. On the other hand, in the case of self-protection, more conditions are needed, in particular, we obtain sufficient conditions for the optimal effort to be non-decreasing or non-monotone in the safety loading.     

Optimal harvest strategy for even‐aged stands with price uncertainty and risk of natural disturbances

We present a reservation price model to examine the joint impacts of natural disturbances and stumpage price uncertainty on the optimal harvesting decision for even‐aged forest stands. We consider a landowner who manages a loblolly pine stand to produce timber and amenities, under age‐dependent risk of wildfires and uncertainty in future timber prices. We show that the incorporation of risk of wildfires decreases the optimal reservation prices. The inclusion of risk of wildfires leads to lower land values and reduces the mean harvest age compared with the case of no‐risk of wildfires. Higher economic gains are obtained with the reservation price strategy compared with the deterministic rotation age model—a difference in the land value of $2,326 ha^?1 (21%) between the two approaches. Recommendations for Resource Managers

• Our adaptive harvest strategy shows that the incorporation of risk of wildfires decreases the optimal reservation prices compared with the case of no‐risk of wildfires.
• Low reservation prices—a price that makes the landowner indifferent between harvesting or waiting longer—result in lower economic benefits for landowners and potential conversions of lands to nonforest use.
• Forest management practices oriented to reduce the effects of catastrophic disturbances, for example, creating a more complex forest structure with different stand densities, become imperative to ensure the sustainability of forestlands in the US South.
• Our analysis also suggests that the valuation of forestry investments should consider not only the risk of catastrophic events but also uncertainty in future timber prices. Higher appraisals of land value are obtained when timber price uncertainty is explicitly recognized, providing financial incentives for landowners to invest in forestry.

     

The effect of market power on risk-sharing

The paper studies an oligopolistic equilibrium model of financial agents who aim to share their random endowments. The risk-sharing securities and their prices are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game played among all the participating agents. In the complete-market setting, each agent’s set of strategic choices consists of the security payoffs and the pricing kernel that are consistent with the optimal-sharing rules; while in the incomplete setting, agents respond via demand functions on a vector of given tradeable securities. It is shown that at the (Nash) risk-sharing equilibrium, the sharing securities are suboptimal, since agents submit for sharing different risk exposures than their true endowments. On the other hand, the Nash equilibrium prices stay unaffected by the game only in the special case of agents with the same risk aversion. In addition, agents with sufficiently lower risk aversion act as predatory traders, since they absorb utility surplus from the high risk averse agents and reduce the efficiency of sharing. The main results of the paper also hold under the generalized models that allow the presence of noise traders and heterogeneity in agents’ beliefs.     

The ability to compensate for suboptimal capacity decisions by optimal pricing decisions

Certain companies have high capacity cost and rather moderate production cost. These companies usually assume that deciding about their capacity is quite critical. Frequently, however, they are able to adjust the demand for their products to the available capacity by setting appropriate prices, that is higher (lower) than current prices in the presence of under-capacity (over-capacity). We argue that appropriate prices can reduce the adverse effects of non-optimal capacities. We analyze the sensitivity of profit in such a situation for a company in a monopolistic market, selling a non-storable product and facing fluctuating but interdependent demand across two time periods which allows to profitably differentiate prices. Therefore, we state optimality conditions for prices in situations of variable and given capacities and describe a procedure to determine them. The main suggestion of this analysis is that, within the bounds of the normative models and specific parameters examined, optimal prices can substantially reduce the adverse effects of capacity deviating from its optimum. In this way, profit is rather insensitive to deviations of capacity from its optimum. The implications of this finding are discussed for a number of situations.     

The Herd Behavior Index: A new measure for the implied degree of co-movement in stock markets

We introduce a new and easy-to-calculate measure for the expected degree of herd behavior or co-movement between stock prices. This forward looking measure is model-independent and based on observed option data. It is baptized the Herd Behavior Index (HIX).The degree of co-movement in a stock market can be determined by comparing the observed market situation with the extreme (theoretical) situation under which the whole system is driven by a single factor. The HIX is then defined as the ratio of an option-based estimate of the risk-neutral variance of the market index and an option-based estimate of the corresponding variance in case of the extreme single factor market situation.The HIX can be determined for any market index provided an appropriate series of vanilla options is traded on this index as well as on its components. As an illustration, we determine historical values of the 30-days HIX for the Dow Jones Industrial Average, covering the period January 2003 to October 2009.     

基于战略顾客行为的最优定价与容量选择模型

研究了当市场中同时存在战略顾客和短视顾客时零售商的最优定价与容量选择问题。零售商在正常销售阶段和出清销售阶段制定不同的销售价格,同时通过容量选择影响战略顾客的购买行为,而战略顾客则根据零售商的定价和容量选择确定最优购买时机。分别分析了零售商在无限容量时的定价决策、固定价格时的容量选择、固定容量时的定价决策以及有限容量下的定价与容量选择四种情形。研究结果表明,零售商在无容量限制时的最优定价决策是制定两阶段定价策略,在固定价格时的最优容量选择依赖于模型的参数,而当零售商的容量固定时,部分满足出清销售阶段的顾客需求始终优于完全满足出清销售阶段的顾客需求。     

Market share in a post-entry game

This paper investigates the dynamics of market share within a contemporary, real life, entry deterrence situation in the provision of National Health Service (NHS) pathology services. The major conclusion is that the previous Government's initiatives did not succeed in promoting competition in markets where existing NHS providers were operating significantly more efficiently than their neighbours. Evidence suggests managers were influenced more by potential competition from a new private sector entrant than by actual competition among existing providers. The effect of a new entrant is modelled as a perturbation of a pre-existing stable equilibrium in a seeming oligopoly influenced by market forces subject to Government regulation. Economic analysis of the market share which a new entry might gain shows that, on the assumptions made and contrary to expectations, the likely impact of Government regulation of NHS prices would be an increase in price per test in most of the market. Nevertheless the policy objective of improving quality at value for money prices was achieved for the near-monopoly provider within our case study area.     

基于电子优惠券投放和服务创新的线上线下渠道竞争分析

基于豪泰林模型分析具有渠道偏好的线上网络渠道和线下实体渠道市场竞争格局及其博弈关系,构建线上网络渠道投放电子优惠券、线下实体渠道服务创新的渠道竞争模型,剖析优惠券和服务创新对市场份额、定价及利润的影响,并给出具有市场进入时序的渠道退出边界。研究发现:市场缺额情形凭借高价获得较小市场份额下的较高利润,而市场重叠情形的低价策略在较大市场份额下获得较小利润。当服务创新足以支撑实体渠道要价时,其可获得较高利润,守住混合偏好市场;投放电子优惠券的让价方式可增大网络渠道的调价空间,且存在最优电子优惠券面值使网络渠道获得期望收益,夺得混合偏好市场。     

Spatial oligopoly as a noncooperative game

Equilibrium in spatial markets has been studied as a problem of monopolistic competition. The typical assumption is that firms charge mill prices and believe that other firms either keep prices constant or preserve their market areas. In this paper somewhat different assumptions are made. First, a system of delivered or c.i.f. prices is assumed. A second model considers different production costs. A third model examines the case of more than two firms, but only for the special case where all firms are spaced at equal distance. Throughout this paper it is assumed that collusion is illegal, the game is a noncooperative one.     

Two-settlement electricity markets with price caps and Cournot generation firms

We compare two alternative mechanisms for capping prices in two-settlement electricity markets. With sufficient lead time, forward market prices are implicitly capped by competitive pressure of potential entry that will occur when forward prices rise above some backstop price. Another more direct approach is to cap spot prices through a regulatory intervention. In this paper we explore the implications of these two alternative mechanisms in a two-settlement Cournot equilibrium framework. We formulate the market equilibrium as a stochastic equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) capturing congestion effects, probabilistic contingencies and horizontal market power. As an illustrative test case, we use the 53-bus Belgian electricity network with representative generator costs but hypothetical demand and ownership structure. Compared to a price-uncapped two-settlement system, a forward cap increases firms’ incentives for forward contracting, whereas a spot cap reduces such incentives. Moreover, in both cases, more forward contracts are committed as the generation resource ownership structure becomes more diversified.     

Entropy methods for identifying hedonic models

This paper contributes to the literature on hedonic models in two ways. First, it makes use of Queyranne’s reformulation of a hedonic model in the discrete case as a network flow problem in order to provide a proof of existence and integrality of a hedonic equilibrium and efficient computation of hedonic prices. Second, elaborating on entropic methods developed in Galichon and Salanié (Cupid’s invisible hand: social surplus and identification in matching models. Working Paper, 2014), this paper proposes a new identification strategy for hedonic models in a single market. This methodology allows one to introduce heterogeneities in both consumers’ and producers’ attributes and to recover producers’ profits and consumers’ utilities based on the observation of production and consumption patterns and the set of hedonic prices.     

Sequential Discrete p-Facility Models for Competitive Location Planning

Two new models for duopolistic competitive discrete location planning with sequential acting and variable delivered prices are introduced. If locations and prices are assumed to be set once and for all by the players, the resulting bilevel program is nonlinear. Under the assumption that further price adjustments are possible, i.e., that a Nash equilibrium in prices is reached, the model can be simplified to a linear discrete bilevel formulation. It is shown that in either situation players should not share any locations or markets if they strive for profit-maximization.For the situation with price adjustments, a heuristic solution procedure is suggested. In addition, the bilevel models are shown to serve as a basis from which different well-known location models – as, for example, the p-median problem, the preemptive location problem and the maximum covering problem – can be derived as special cases.     

Spatial competition facility location models: Definition,formulation and solution approach

Models are presented for locating a firm's production facilities and determining production levels at these facilities so as to maximize the firm's profit. These models take into account the changes in price at each of the spatially separated markets that would result from the increase in supply provided by the new facilities and also from the response of competing firms. Two different models of spatial competition are presented to represent the competitive market situation in which the firm's production facilities are being located. These models are formulated as variational inequalities; recent sensitivity analysis results for variational inequalities are used to develop derivatives of the prices at each of the spatially separated markets with respect to the production levels at each of the new facilities. These derivatives are used to develop a linear approximation of the implicit function relating prices to productions. A heuristic solution procedure making use of this approximation is proposed.     

Equilibrium prices supported by dual price functions in markets with non-convexities

The issue of finding market clearing prices in markets with non-convexities has had a renewed interest due to the deregulation of the electricity sector. In the day-ahead electricity market, equilibrium prices are calculated based on bids from generators and consumers. In most of the existing markets, several generation technologies are present, some of which have considerable non-convexities, such as capacity limitations and large start-up costs. In this paper we present equilibrium prices composed of a commodity price and an uplift charge. The prices are based on the generation of a separating valid inequality that supports the optimal resource allocation. In the case when the sub-problem generated as the integer variables are held fixed to their optimal values possess the integrality property, the generated prices are also supported by non-linear price functions that are the basis for integer programming duality.