The dynamics of Bertrand model with bounded rationality

The paper considers a Bertrand model with bounded rational. A duopoly game is modelled by two nonlinear difference equations. By using the theory of bifurcations of dynamical systems, the existence and stability for the equilibria of this system are obtained. Numerical simulations used to show bifurcations diagrams, phase portraits for various parameters and sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We observe that an increase of the speed of adjustment of bounded rational player may change the stability of Nash equilibrium point and cause bifurcation and chaos to occur. The analysis and results in this paper are interesting in mathematics and economics.     

Complex dynamics and chaos control of duopoly Bertrand model in Chinese air-conditioning market

A dynamic duopoly Bertrand model with quadratic cost function which is closer to reality and different from previous researches is discussed. The model is applied into air-conditioning market where the boundary equilibrium point is locally stable. Numerical simulations illustrate that the stability of Nash equilibrium strongly depends on the speed of adjustment of bounded rational player. The adjustment speeds and the degree of substitutability may undermine the stability of the equilibrium and cause a market structure to behave chaotically. The Lyapunov dimension of the chaos attractor is 1.9585 under some conditions. The stabilization of the chaotic behavior can be obtained by reducing the degree of substitutability. The results have an important theoretical and practical significance to Chinese air-conditioning market.     

Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory

In this paper I analyze a repeated coordination game between a bounded memory player and a fully rational player. A bounded memory player is a player who is subject to imperfect recall, but, conditional on this constraint, acts optimally every point in time given her beliefs over the actual history of the game. I show that the results contrast with the ones in the finite automata literature. In particular, a result denoted the “tyranny of the weak” in Gilboa and Samet (Games Econ Behav 1: 213–221, 1989) is no longer present here.     

Application of duopoly multi-periodical game with bounded rationality in power supply market based on information asymmetry

In the power market, each entity is not completely rational when generate strategy, and the market information held by each entity is not exactly the same. In this paper, duopoly power providers with different selling adjustment structures are simplified from the actual grid background, where one provider can sell part of its power to another at contract price to store the power. Each provider is trying to maximize its profit by adjusting its power selling strategy. The process of evolutionary game with multi-periods bounded rational is established. One provider adjusts its selling strategy through the multi-periods market price and another through its multi-periods marginal profit. The quantity of power sold by each provider will tend to Nash equilibrium and how information asymmetry affects the stability of Nash equilibrium is analyzed through comparing dynamic power selling with and without information asymmetry. Information asymmetry has a great impact on one provider but not another. The numerical simulations also show that the information asymmetry will increase the stability region of the system. Different adjustment suggestions are proposed for different providers when information asymmetry occurs.     

Nonzero-sum stochastic games with unbounded costs: Discounted and average cost cases

We treat non-cooperative stochastic games with countable state space and with finitely many players each having finitely many moves available in a given state. As a function of the current state and move vector, each player incurs a nonnegative cost. Assumptions are given for the expected discounted cost game to have a Nash equilibrium randomized stationary strategy. These conditions hold for bounded costs, thereby generalizing Parthasarathy (1973) and Federgruen (1978). Assumptions are given for the long-run average expected cost game to have a Nash equilibrium randomized stationary strategy, under which each player has constant average cost. A flow control example illustrates the results. This paper complements the treatment of the zero-sum case in Sennott (1993a).     

Adaptive expectations and dynamic adjustment in noncooperative games with incomplete information

This paper is concerned with the analysis of a Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game. It can be shown that, without complete information about the other players' objectives or interests, the group of players, as a whole, can reach a Nash equilibrium by adopting a class of adaptive expectation and dynamic adjustment processes. It is shown that, if the expectation and adjustment processes are made continuously, the stability of the overall dynamic process is independent of the specific mechanisms of the expectation and the adjustment, but depends on the properties of each player's objective or payoff function. If, however, expectation and adjustment processes are made at discrete time intervals, the stability of the discrete process depends on the speed of adjustment chosen by each player.This research was supported by ONR Contract No. N00014-75-C-0738. The authors are indebted to the referee for several valuable comments and suggestions for improvement.     

Single-suit two-person card play

We consider a two-person constant sum perfect information game, which we call theEnd Play Game, which arises from an abstraction of simple end play positions in card games of the whist family, including bridge. This game was described in 1929 by Emanuel Lasker, the mathematician and world chess champion, who called itwhistette. The game uses a deck of cards that consists of a single totally ordered suit of 2n cards. To begin play the deck is divided into two handsA andB ofn cards each, held by players Left and Right, and one player is designated as having thelead. The player on lead chooses one of his cards, and the other player after seeing this card selects one of his own to play. The player with the higher card wins a “trick” and obtains the lead. The cards in the trick are removed from each hand, and play then continues until all cards are exhausted. Each player strives to maximize his trick total, and thevalue of the game to each player is the number of tricks he takes. Despite its simple appearance, this game is quite complicated, and finding an optimal strategy seems difficult. This paper derives basic properties of the game, gives some criteria under which one hand is guaranteed to be better than another, and determines the optimal strategies and value functions for the game in several special cases.     

Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality

We consider a repeated congestion game with imperfect monitoring. At each stage, each player chooses to use some facilities and pays a cost that increases with the congestion. Two versions of the model are examined: a public monitoring setting where agents observe the cost of each available facility, and a private monitoring one where players observe only the cost of the facilities they use. A partial folk theorem holds: a Pareto-optimal outcome may result from selfish behavior and be sustained by a belief-free equilibrium of the repeated game. We prove this result assuming that players use strategies of bounded complexity and we estimate the strategic complexity needed to achieve efficiency. It is shown that, under some conditions on the number of players and the structure of the game, this complexity is very small even under private monitoring. The case of network routing games is examined in detail.     

Strategic bidding in continuous electricity auctions: an application to the Spanish electricity market

In this paper we introduce an asymmetric model of continuous electricity auctions with limited production capacity and bounded supply functions. The strategic bidding is studied with this model by means of an electricity market game. We prove that for every electricity market game with continuous cost functions a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists. In particular, we focus on the behavior of producers in the Spanish electricity market. We consider a very simple form for the Spanish electricity market: an oligopoly consisting just of independent hydro-electric power production units in a single wet period. We show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the Spanish electricity market game always exists.     

Playing off-line games with bounded rationality

We study a two-person zero-sum game where players simultaneously choose sequences of actions, and the overall payoff is the average of a one-shot payoff over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game played in pure strategies by boundedly rational players and model bounded rationality by introducing complexity limitations. First we define the complexity of a sequence by its smallest period (a nonperiodic sequence being of infinite complexity) and study the maxmin of the game where player 1 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most n and player 2 is restricted to strategies with complexity at most m. We study the asymptotics of this value and a complete characterization in the matching pennies case. We extend the analysis of matching pennies to strategies with bounded recall.     

Analysis of decision-making in economic chaos control

In some economic chaotic systems, players are concerned about whether their performance is improved besides taking some methods to control chaos. In the face of chaos occurring in competition, whether one player takes controlling measures or not affects not only their own earning but also other opponents’ income. An output duopoly competing evolution model with bounded rationality is introduced in this paper. Using modern game theory, decision-making analyses about chaos control of the model are taken by taking aggregate profits as players’ payoff. It is found that the speed of players’ response to the market and whether the decisive parameters are in the stable region of the Nash equilibrium or not have a distinct influence on the results of the game. The impact of cost function’ type on results of the game is also found. The mechanism of influences is discovered by using numerical simulation.     

专业零售商与厂家直售商的多渠道供应价格博弈的混沌动力学研究

在零售市场,专业零售商与厂家直售商的价格竞争日益突起,再次背景下构建了专业零售商和厂家直售商组成的多渠道供应链价格博弈模型。利用管理学、经济学以及混沌动力学有关理论,对多渠道供应链中各渠道间长期价格博弈的动态演化过程进行理论验证和数据仿真,研究了专业零售商和厂家直售商的价格决策变量的变化给市场带来的影响。研究表明,双方价格决策变量的不断增加,市场从稳定进入混沌无序状态。采用调整参数可以对混沌进行有效的控制,研究结果具有较好的理论和实际应用价值。     

The bounded core for games with precedence constraints

An element of the possibly unbounded core of a cooperative game with precedence constraints belongs to its bounded core if any transfer to a player from any of her subordinates results in payoffs outside the core. The bounded core is the union of all bounded faces of the core, it is nonempty if the core is nonempty, and it is a continuous correspondence on games with coinciding precedence constraints. If the precedence constraints generate a connected hierarchy, then the core is always nonempty. It is shown that the bounded core is axiomatized similarly to the core for classical cooperative games, namely by boundedness (BOUND), nonemptiness for zero-inessential two-person games (ZIG), anonymity, covariance under strategic equivalence (COV), and certain variants of the reduced game property (RGP), the converse reduced game property (CRGP), and the reconfirmation property. The core is the maximum solution that satisfies a suitably weakened version of BOUND together with the remaining axioms. For games with connected hierarchies, the bounded core is axiomatized by BOUND, ZIG, COV, and some variants of RGP and CRGP, whereas the core is the maximum solution that satisfies the weakened version of BOUND, COV, and the variants of RGP and CRGP.     

Mixed complementarity problems for robust optimization equilibrium in bimatrix game

In this paper, we investigate the bimatrix game using the robust optimization approach, in which each player may neither exactly estimate his opponent’s strategies nor evaluate his own cost matrix accurately while he may estimate a bounded uncertain set. We obtain computationally tractable robust formulations which turn to be linear programming problems and then solving a robust optimization equilibrium can be converted to solving a mixed complementarity problem under the l ₁ ∩ l _∞-norm. Some numerical results are presented to illustrate the behavior of the robust optimization equilibrium.     

On Cournot–Bertrand competition with differentiated products

In this paper, we present a game theoretic framework for Cournot–Bertrand competition based on a nonlinear price function. The competition is between two firms and is assumed to take place in terms of pricing decision and quantity produced. However, the proposed objective function has not been used in literature before, yet the throughput obtained in this paper generalizes some of the existing results in literature. The competitive interaction between firms is described and analyzed using best-reply reaction, proposed adaptive adjustment and bounded rationality approach. The condition of stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is induced by these approaches. Interestingly, we prove that there exists exactly a unique NE. Furthermore, it is noticed that when firms adopt best-reply and the proposed adaptive adjustment, the firms’ strategic variables become asymptotically stable. On the contrary, when the bounded rationality is used both quantity and price behave chaotically due to bifurcation occurred.     

Zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information

Repeated zero-sum two-person games of incomplete information on one side are considered. If the one-shot game is played sequentially, the informed player moving first, it is proved that the value of then-shot game is constant inn and is equal to the concavification of the game in which the informed player disregards his extra information. This is a strengthening ofAumann andMaschler's results for simultaneous games. Optimal strategies for both players are constructed explicitly.     

Dynamical analysis and chaos control in a heterogeneous Kopel duopoly game

A dynamic of a nonlinear Kopel duopoly game with heterogeneous players is presented. By assuming two heterogeneous players where one player use naive expectation whereas the other employs a technique of adaptive. The stability conditions of equilibrium points are analyzed. Numerical simulations are used to show bifurcation diagrams, phase portraits and sensitive dependence on initial conditions. The chaotic behavior of the game has been controlled by using feedback control method.     

Measuring super-efficiency in DEA in the presence of infeasibility

Super-efficiency data envelopment analysis (DEA) model is obtained when a decision making unit (DMU) under evaluation is excluded from the reference set. Because of the possible infeasibility of super-efficiency DEA model, the use of super-efficiency DEA model has been restricted to the situations where constant returns to scale (CRS) are assumed. It is shown that one of the input-oriented and output-oriented super-efficiency DEA models must be feasible for a any efficient DMU under evaluation if the variable returns to scale (VRS) frontier consists of increasing, constant, and decreasing returns to scale DMUs. We use both input- and output-oriented super-efficiency models to fully characterize the super-efficiency. When super-efficiency is used as an efficiency stability measure, infeasibility means the highest super-efficiency (stability). If super-efficiency is interpreted as input saving or output surplus achieved by a specific efficient DMU, infeasibility does not necessary mean the highest super-efficiency.     

有限理性下参数最优化问题解的稳定性

主要研究有限理性下参数最优化问题解的稳定性. 即在两类扰动即目标函数及可行集二者, 目标函数、可行集及参数三者分别同时发生扰动的情形下, 对参数最优化问题引入一个抽象的理性函数, 分别建立了参数最优化问题的有限理性模型M, 运用``通有'的方法, 得到了上述两种扰动情形下相应的有限理性模型M的结构稳定性及对\varepsilon-平衡(解)的鲁棒性, 即有限理性下绝大多数的参数最优化问题的解都 是稳定的, 并以一个例子说明所得的稳定性结果均是正确的.