企业税收稽查关

2009年，国家税务总局稽查局下达了1000亿元的稽查任务，各地稽查局已展开了对重点行业的税务检查。透过具有丰富执业经验的税务稽查人员与企业财务人员的双角度的综合分析，相信正经受税收自查压力的企业能够从中学习借鉴到相关技巧。     

供应链网络道德风险演化与仿真研究

针对目前供应链网络存在的越来越严重的道德风险问题,利用演化博弈和系统动力学理论,从供应链网络结构入手,对其演化过程进行了研究。首先基于供应商之间合作过程中的诚信和败德行为,建立供应链网络同级企业间道德风险的演化博弈模型,并分析了其演化路径。其次通过对制造商和供应商之间博弈的动态性分析,建立供应链网络上下游企业间道德风险演化的SD模型,并对其演化过程进行了仿真分析。研究结果表明:供应链网络道德风险的演化结果取决于网络内败德企业获得的超额收益、收益调整程度、惩罚力度和惩罚机制。另外,罚款力度大小与供应链网络道德风险演化的动态性密切相关;动态惩罚机制在其演化的波动性控制方面,具有明显效果。     

利益相关者视角下公路货运超限超载的对策研究——基于演化博弈模型和仿真分析

为有效遏制公路货运超限超载现象,深化交通执法领域的“放管服”改革,本研究针对运输者、稽查人员和交管部门等利益相关者,建立三方演化博弈模型,研究超限超载运输中各利益主体的决策演化过程,并对稳定策略的演化路径进行仿真分析,比较不同参数组合下不同政策力度的治理效果。研究发现,提高超限超载运输的处罚系数可以明显规范运输者的行为;管理成本越低,监管部门的策略越可能向积极监管的方向演化;三方博弈系统存在两种可能的演化稳定策略,加重对稽查人员消极执法行为的处罚、加大资金设备投入能够提高系统向最优状态演化的概率。     

股权激励计划所得的税务处理

在企业股权激励计划所得的税务处理方面,我国已先后出台了多部税收法规,实务中,不少企业对相关业务的处理,仍存在疑惑及问题。为此,记者采访了普华永道税务部合伙人杨治中先生，希望通过梳理相关税务法规，明晰处理与把控之道。     

跨国公司转让定价规制博弈与税务执法能力

假设东道国政府将追求社会福利最大化作为规制跨国公司转让定价行为的最终目标,分别构建了东道国政府与跨国公司之间有关转让定价规制的静态博弈和动态博弈模型,揭示了东道国政府的税务执法能力对其针对跨国公司转让定价进行规制的效果的影响机理,指出了东道国政府加强税务执法能力建设的重要性,并提出了具体的政策建议.     

加强珠协工作的领导充分发挥珠算在税收工作中的作用

税务工作是财经工作的重要组成部分,税收是理财,理财离不开计算,而计算又离不开珠算,因此,珠算是税务干部职业技能中不可缺少的学科之一。十几年来我们一直加强珠协工作的领导,使珠算在税收工作中发挥了重要作用。 税收工作 需要珠算 1983年前,伊春市税务干部的珠算知识水平、理论水平和计算水平都是很低的,虽然在干部中也曾进行过珠算培训。因抓法不够     

中华珠算文化高峰论坛在山西财政税务专科学校举行

<正>2014年5月31日,由教育部、财政部等30个部委和山西省人民政府主办,山西省教育厅,财政厅承办,中国高等教育学会高等财经教育分会、山西财政税务专科学校协办,以"昨天·今天·明天"为主题的中华珠算文化高峰论坛在山西财政税务专科学校举行。与此同时,2014年全国职业院校技能大赛高职组会计技能赛项的各省(市、自治区)49所高职院校代表队领队、教师和山西财政税务专科学校师生共1500余人参加了论坛活动。中国珠算心算协会     

企业创建税务文化

成功的企业通常注重培育自己的价值观,它对内感召群体,形成战斗力;对外形成传播,树立良好形象。然而,企业税务文化建设,是目前企业文化建设当中的短板,却是企业税务管理当中的灵魂部分。通过税务文化的影响力与控制力,可以使企业树立健康、诚信的纳税理念,通过“自律”方式,使企业实现“安全纳税、科学纳税”。     

税控之道

税务工作的展开，应建立在企业的业务需求之上，即要遵从企业整体目标与相关税收法律法规制订税务部门的具体目标，建立科学的组织架构，制订行之有效的流程，并定期测试目标以及流程执行情况，进而不断改进。     

基于税款时间价值的税企博弈模型

本文在考虑税款时间价值的前提下,通过建立税企博弈模型,给出罚款系数与税款滞纳金征收率之间的关系,分析偷税罚款赦免的因素,指出确定动态罚款系数的方法,为税务执行部门合理使用偷税罚款自由裁量权提供了可操作的理论工具.     

Optimal Tax Inspection Strategy

A game-theoretical model is constructed describing the interaction of tax inspectors with taxpayers. The models allows for tax evasion and bribing of inspectors. We find the primary and secondary audit probabilities that maximize the net tax revenue for various inspector hiring strategies. The comparative revenue statics is analyzed and the optimal hiring strategy is determined as a function of the model parameters.     

Optimal Tax Enforcement with Imperfect Tax Payers and Inspectors

A mathematical model of tax enforcement is analyzed for the case when the probability of detecting tax evasion depends on the inspector's efforts. Contrary to the case with fixed inspection costs, the optimal tax enforcement strategy does not fully eliminate tax evasion. We examine how tax payers' random mistakes and the inspectors' corruptibility affect the optimal tax enforcement mechanism. We show that, contrary to the model with fixed inspection costs, corruption among inspectors reduces the optimal tax revenue.     

A mathematical model of optimal tax inspection

A game-theoretical model of tax inspection is considered. Stable forms of behavior of the entrepreneurs and the tax inspectors are identified as a function of the strategy adopted by the central tax service. An optimal central strategy is proposed, which maximizes the average tax revenue for given entrepreneur incomes.Translated from Programmno-apparatnye Sredstva i Matematicheskoe Obespechenie Vychislitel'nykh Sistem, pp. 168–181, 1994.     

Mathematical models for organizing the tax service

Game-theoretical models are proposed for describing the interaction of tax inspectors and taxpayers. A return-auditing probability that maximizes net tax revenue is calculated for a model without corruption. A dynamic audit strategy is described, and it is shown to converge to the optimal model under complete information. For a model with corruption, we also calculate the optimal probability of secondary audit and carry out a comparative analysis of net tax revenue assuming various tax rates and various penalties for evasion and negligent audit. The study was partially supported by the Russian Program for Economic Studies (grant 97-3011) and Russian Foundation of Basic Research (grant 96-01-0999). Useful comments by Mikhail Alekseev, Jim Leitzel, and Francisco Marhuenda are acknowledged. Translated from Chislennye Metody i Vychislitel'nyi Eksperiment, Moscow State University, pp. 64–81, 1998.     

监察员背景特征对民航安全监管绩效的影响研究

为探索民航安全监察员背景特征对民航安全监管绩效的影响作用.系统分析了衡量民航安全监管绩效的维度,并构建了其与监察员性别、年龄、学历、专业背景、企事业单位工作经历和籍贯6个背景特征之间的假设关系,通过问卷调查的方式收集数据,利用单因素方差检验和独立样本T检验验证了原假设.结果表明:不同背景特征的监察员对民航安全监管绩效的影响存在显著性差异.年龄差异体现在监管效能上,性别差异体现在监管效能和监管成本方面,是否具有民航企事业单位工作经历体现在监管效率上.在民航安全监察效能方面,男性要高于女性,40~50岁的监察员对监管效能的影响最高;在民航安全监管成本控制方面,女性要优于男性;具有民航企事业单位工作经历的监察员的监管效率高于不具有类似工作经历的人员.不同年龄段、学历和籍贯的监察员对监管效率均不存在显著性差别.     

一种检验定性指标的有效方法

介绍了一种检验定性指标的有效方法,可用于确定产品的合格率和评价检验人员的检验水平。用该方法分析了某厂产品的一项实际指标,合格率为91 4%,还对该厂10名检验员的检验水平作了客观的评价。     

排污监察博弈与策略选择

针对当前排污监察的现状,提出了环境监察部门聘用环境监察员与排污单位之间的监察与反监察博弈观点.就监察员不同的收入结构,分别建立了监察排污静态博弈模型和查处排污动态博弈模型,探讨了监察员固定收入结构与罚款提成收入结构对那什均衡的影响,得出了监察员与排污单位的期望得益.通过分析有关参数,提出了排污监察中信息不对称问题的解决方法,探求了环境监察部门的策略选择.     

Quality inspection scheduling for multi-unit service enterprises

The traveling salesman problem is a classic NP-hard problem used to model many production and scheduling problems. The problem becomes even more difficult when additional salesmen are added to create a multiple traveling salesman problem (MTSP). We consider a variation of this problem where one salesman visits a given set of cities in a series of short trips. This variation is faced by numerous franchise companies that use quality control inspectors to ensure properties are maintaining acceptable facility and service levels. We model an actual franchised hotel chain using traveling quality inspectors to demonstrate the technique. The model is solved using a commercially available genetic algorithm (GA) tool as well as a custom GA program. The custom GA is proven to be an effective method of solving the proposed model.     

The equivalence of two tax processes

We introduce two models of taxation, the latent and natural tax processes, which have both been used to represent loss-carry-forward taxation on the capital of an insurance company. In the natural tax process, the tax rate is a function of the current level of capital, whereas in the latent tax process, the tax rate is a function of the capital that would have resulted if no tax had been paid. Whereas up to now these two types of tax processes have been treated separately, we show that, in fact, they are essentially equivalent. This allows a unified treatment, translating results from one model to the other. Significantly, we solve the question of existence and uniqueness for the natural tax process, which is defined via an integral equation. Our results clarify the existing literature on processes with tax.