不同情形下供应链优化决策模型的比较分析

本文提出三种不同情形（制造商与零售商追求各自利润最大化，并且没有价格折扣策略；制造商与零售商共同追求总利润最大化，不实施价格折扣策略；制造商与零售商共同追求总利润最大化，并实施价格折扣策略）下供应链价格和库存补充策略的优化决策模型，并通过具体数例进行比较分析，结果表明，供应链合作并实施价格折扣策略时的供应链总利润最高，而供应链双方利润分配系数的变化对基于供应链总利润最大化的供应链优化决策没有影响．     

风险中性零售商的合作广告策略与订货模型

考虑了由一个制造商与一个零售商构成的单期二阶段供应链是否进行合作广告的博弈问题.面对市场需求的不确定性,零售商从制造商处订购报童类型产品销售给消费者,零售商具有风险中性的行为特征.通过不合作广告与合作广告两种情形,制造商与零售商进Stackelberg主从博弈,得到了均衡解,比较后发现,合作广告下的最优解及利润总是优于不合作广告下的最优解和利润,告诉了上下游企业采用合作广告的广告策略.最后,通过数值算例,给出了需求敏感系数对最优决策的影响,同时也论证了有关结论.     

基于Bertrand模型的企业广告投放策略研究

广告投入水平是企业进行广告竞争战略中的重要决策环节,只有合理的广告投入才能够为企业带来利润的增长.广告投入又分为广告的制作投入和播放投入两部分,因此企业在广告竞争中面临着如何选择最佳的投入策略问题.基于此,构建了生产同一种商品的2家企业,在完全信息静态条件下,广告投放策略选择的博弈模型,并求出其均衡解.通过对相关参数赋值进行模拟分析,分别求出博弈参与双方在广告内容制作投入和广告播放频率投入两方面进行策略选择时的收益矩阵,进而找出企业应对竞争对手广告投放策略发生变化时的最优策略向量,减少广告投入浪费;分析结果还表明企业对产品的广告投放选择策略组合时获得的产品利润高于选择单一策略的利润情况.     

基于策略型消费者的电商平台折扣销售期定价策略研究

电商平台折扣销售期的双重折扣现象激发了巨大的消费需求,本文构建了具有折扣销售期的电商平台和商家的斯坦伯格博弈模型,研究了在电商平台不提供消费者返利和提供消费者返利的情况下商家和电商平台的最优定价策略。从消费者效用出发,结合最优化方法和博弈论,力图为商家和电商平台的决策提供参考。研究结果表明:(1)在电商平台不提供返利时,消费者的策略性越高,正常销售期的价格越高,折扣率越低。(2)当电商平台给消费者提供返利时,正常销售期的价格会升高,而折扣销售期的价格会降低,差异化定价现象愈加明显。(3)当消费者的麻烦成本高于某一阈值时,电商平台提供顾客返利时的收益相比不提供顾客返利时更高且最优利润随着消费者的麻烦成本的增加而增加。(4)拓展部分考虑了过高麻烦成本造成的消费者流失,发现适当的提高消费者的麻烦成本能增加平台和商家的收益,但是当超过一定的范围,会引起用户流失,反而损害双方的利润。     

考虑预付定金和退货的SMPEs产品定价与优化策略

借鉴中小制造型企业(SMPEs)在线渠道预售模式,考虑市场中存在预付订金和不预付订金的顾客,并将其退货情况引入到生产商利润表达式中,构建确定性和随机性市场需求下的SMPEs产品销售利润最大化模型,推导生产商产品最优定价的解析解;对比两种销售模式的利润,得到了生产商选择不同销售策略的条件。进一步考虑预付定金的产品数量、预交定金比例、退货数量是关于价格折扣敏感的情况,采用拉格朗日乘子法对生产商产品定价及优化问题进行研究,分析求得生产商销售策略(产品定价和价格折扣)的近似最优解。最后,通过数值算例对研究结论进行了验证并给出经济学解释。     

社会责任情境资金约束生产商的供应链融资

考虑社会责任情境下,资金短缺的生产商和零售商之间进行Stackelberg博弈,建立无资金约束、提前支付和银行贷款三种供应链融资模型,分析社会责任因子和初始资金如何影响供应链成员的最优决策和利润,以及生产商选择何种融资方式.结果表明:一旦生产商有资金约束时,其社会责任水平会降低.当供应链外部融资(银行)利率大于提前支付折扣时,生产商选择银行贷款融资策略,社会责任因子超过临界值后,生产商选择提前支付融资策略;当供应链外部融资(银行)利率小于提前支付折扣时,生产商先选择提前支付融资策略,社会责任因子超过临界值后,生产商选择银行贷款融资策略.此研究可为履行社会责任的企业提供融资参考及借鉴意义.     

一种随机需求下的供应链激励机制

研究了在随机需求条件下，供应链中用价格折扣策略协调供需双方利益的问题。考虑随机性需求有可能造成分销商的库存积压，本提出了生产商给予分销商的积压商品价格折扣的策略，分析了其激励机制，给出了最优价格折扣的模型和算法。最后用数值方法验证了这种价格折扣策略能够给生产商和分销商带来利益改善，而且需求波动越大，该策略的协调效果越好。     

供应链互补产品广告投入和捆绑销售联合决策研究

以一个制造商和一个零售商的供应链为研究对象,制造商生产两种互补产品,零售商可选择分开或捆绑两种销售策略。考虑互补品的负交叉弹性和广告外部性的特点,构建基于溢出效应的需求模型,运用博弈论的方法,求解零售商采取分开和捆绑两种销售策略时的均衡结果。通过比较不同销售策略下的均衡结果及利润关系,探讨在分散式和集中式两种情况下,零售商的最优广告投入和捆绑销售的联合决策问题。最后,通过数值算例,讨论产品互补程度和广告成本系数对决策结果的影响。研究结果表明,无论是在分散式还是集中式决策下,当产品互补程度较高或广告成本系数低时,分开销售是占优策略而广告费用较高;当产品互补程度较低且广告成本系数高时,捆绑销售是占优策略且广告费用较低。     

线上结合线下的供应链动态服务与定价决策研究

本文研究由一个传统电商企业和线下实体零售商组成的线上结合线下的供应链系统。由于线下服务努力能同时增加线上和线下的销售量,于是传统电商纷纷开设线下实体店,或者与已有的实体店进行合作。这两种模式分别对应集中决策和分散决策模式,因此本文构建了线上结合线下的供应链动态模型并研究这两种决策模式下的最优服务和定价决策。结果表明:(1)当线下渠道偏好增加时,无论是集中决策下还是分散决策模式下,企业都应该提高线下价格而降低线上价格以获得最优利润,而在分散决策模式下,传统电商还应该提高其批发价格;(2)成本分担策略能够提高线下实体店对服务的投入,从而提高服务和商誉水平;(3)成本分担策略能使线下零售店和传统电商的利润水平都得到了提高,实现了帕累托改进;(4)当满足一定条件时,成本分担-收益分担机制能够实现供应链的协调。     

基于营运资金信息匹配平台的供应链金融动态折扣决策研究

当前逐渐受到实业界关注的一种新型供应链金融模式是基于营运资金信息匹配平台的动态折扣。本文针对两级供应链的动态折扣决策问题进行建模,揭示了动态折扣的应用对于改善供应链参与方现金流的影响机理。首先通过考虑供需双方动态折扣的独立决策,得出日折扣率的边界条件、双方效用最大时的日折扣率、买方混合还款方式下营运资金的最优准备方案和最低边界值;其次考虑供需双方动态折扣的最优决策,推导出在不同折扣率和利率关系下的最优还款策略,研究表明动态折扣可以明显提升供需双方的利润情况。     

Coordination of cooperative advertising in a two-level supply chain when manufacturer offers discount

We studied the coordination of cooperative advertisement in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain when the manufacturer offers price deductions to customers. With a price sensitive market, the expected demand with cooperative advertising and price deduction is demonstrated. When the manufacturer is a leader, we obtained the optimal national brand name investment, local advertisement and associated manufacturer’s allowance with any given price deduction. When the manufacturer offers more price deduction to customers, the retailer will increase local advertisement if the manufacturer provides the same portion of the local advertising allowance. We obtained the necessary and sufficient condition for the price deduction to ensure an increase of manufacturer’s profit, and a search procedure for determining such an optimal price deduction is provided as well. When the manufacturer and retailer are partners, we obtained the optimal national brand name investment and local advertisement. For any given price deduction, the total profit for the supply chain with cooperative scheme is always higher than that with the non-cooperative scheme. When price elasticity of demand is larger than one, the resulting closed form optimal price deduction with partnership is also obtained. To increase profits for both parties in a supply chain, we recommend that coordination in local and national cooperative advertising with a partnership relationship between manufacturer and retailer is the best solution. The bargaining results show how to share the profit gain between the manufacturer and the retailer, and determine the associated pricing and advertising policies for both parties.     

Pricing and advertisement in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain

We use a game theoretical approach to study pricing and advertisement decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain when price discounts are offered by both the manufacturer and retailer. When the manufacturer is the leader of the game, we obtained Stackelberg equilibrium with manufacturer’s local allowance, national brand name investment, manufacturer’s preferred price discount, retailer’s price discount, and local advertising expense. For the special case of two-stage equilibrium when the manufacturer’s price discount is exogenous, we found that the retailer is willing to increase local advertising expense if the manufacturer increases local advertising allowance and provides deeper price discount, or if the manufacturer decreases its brand name investment. When both the manufacturer and retailer have power, Nash equilibrium in a competition game is obtained. The comparison between the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium shows that the manufacturer always prefers Stackelberg equilibrium, but there is no definitive conclusion for the retailer. The bargaining power can be used to determine the profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Once the profit sharing is determined, we suggest a simple contract to help the manufacturer and retailer obtain their desired profit sharing.     

A game theoretic approach to coordinate pricing and vertical co-op advertising in manufacturer-retailer supply chains

Vertical cooperative (co-op) advertising is a marketing strategy in which the retailer runs local advertising and the manufacturer pays for a portion of its entire costs. This paper considers vertical co-op advertising along with pricing decisions in a supply chain; this consists of one manufacturer and one retailer where demand is influenced by both price and advertisement. Four game-theoretic models are established in order to study the effect of supply chain power balance on the optimal decisions of supply chain members. Comparisons and insights are developed. These embrace three non-cooperative games including Nash, Stackelberg-manufacturer and Stackelberg-retailer, and one cooperative game. In the latter case, both the manufacturer and the retailer reach the highest profit level; subsequently, the feasibility of bargaining game is discussed in a bid to determine a scheme to share the extra joint profit.     

考虑消费者具有质量和价格偏好的双渠道供应链最优决策

产品价格和质量是消费者永恒的关注点。虽然多渠道给消费者带来了便捷的购物途径, 但是不同渠道的产品存在质量和价格分差异, 消费者在购买时须面对一个渠道、价格和质量的协调选择问题。本文提出了消费者对产品质量和价格偏好的双渠道定价决策模型, 并讨论了以制造商为领导者的分散决策和集中决策情形下的最优策略。比较了消费者偏好及产品质量水平对不同决策情形下的供应链决策的影响, 并通过设计收益共享契约机制实现了渠道的协调并证明了其有效性。研究表明:当产品质量在一定范围内时, 制造商和零售商可以获得最大利润;当消费者对质量的偏好逐渐增加时, 制造商的利润和零售商的利润随着消费者对质量的偏好提高而下降;制造商和零售商可以通过协调销售价格消除供应链的双重边际效应,从而实现供应链的协调。最后利用算例分析了消费者的质量、价格偏好对总利润的影响并给出了相应的管理启示。     

Channel Coordination with Cooperative Advertising Considering Effect of Advertising on Willingness to Pay

In this paper, cooperative advertising in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain is studied. Advertising can enhance willingness to pay (WTP) of customers. This trade-off between the benefits of increasing WTP of customers and the advertising expenditure is a key to understanding the retailers optimal advertising decision. On the other hand, it is interesting to understand in which condition supporting the retailer for his advertising expenditure is beneficial for the manufacturer. In this study, in order to capture pricing and advertising strategies of the channel member, three non-cooperative games including Nash, Stackelberg retailer and Stackelberg manufacturer game-theoretic models are established. In spite of the related studies which restrict price in order to prevent negative demand, the proposed model allows channel members to increase their prices by enhancing WTP of customers. In this study, contrary to similar additive form demand functions applied in the co-op ad literature which limits their studies for cases that profit function is concave with respect to variables, optimal prices and advertising strategies are obtained for all the solution space. Surprisingly for the very high values of the advertising effect coefficient, a finite optimal advertising expenditure is achieved.     

零售商主导的模糊供应链博弈——考虑销售努力的情形

以包含一个制造商与一个零售商的两级供应链为研究对象,考虑零售商居于主导地位并付出销售努力时供应链各成员的决策。结合经济环境的不确定性,将市场需求函数和制造商的制造成本、零售商的经营成本视为模糊变量;运用斯塔克尔伯格模型刻画零售商和制造商之间的博弈过程,并引入期望值模型、机会约束模型来解决最优决策问题;通过一个数值算例证明了供应链博弈模型的有效性。研究表明,在均衡结果中,考虑到零售商所承担的销售努力成本,其总体期望值利润相比于制造商而言偏低,但单位产品边际利润较高。原因在于,零售商的主导地位使其不仅通过销售努力提高产品销量,提高了供应链的整体利润,同时也能够采用压低批发价格的方式,使自身在供应链中获取更多收益。     

Coordinating order quantity decisions in the supply chain contract under random demand

In this paper, we are concerned with the coordinating quantity decision problem in a supply chain contract. The supply chain contract is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer to meet the random demand of a single product with a short lifecycle. Our analysis show that the retailer expects to obtain higher profit under proper ordering policies, which can also maximize the expected profit of the supply chain. The manufacturer may induce the retailer to order the coordinated quantity by adjusting the unit return price. As a result, the supply chain is expected to achieve the optimal expected profit.     

考虑捆绑销售的多产品供应链定价策略

以一个制造商向一个零售商同时销售两种互补产品的二级供应链为研究对象,研究了制造商、零售商分别采用不同捆绑策略下的供应链定价博弈问题,并对四种定价模型(分开—分开,分开—捆绑,捆绑—分开,捆绑—捆绑)进行比较分析,探讨了产品互补程度、边际利润水平与供应链利润、最优捆绑策略的关系。研究结果表明,对领导者制造商而言,采取分开定价是占优决策;对于追随者零售商而言,是否采取捆绑定价取决于产品互补程度与产品边际利润水平比值,当产品互补程度变大或者边际利润比值降低时,零售商的最优策略由捆绑策略向分开定价策略转变。     

供需不确定条件下考虑双边努力的供应链组合契约设计

本文研究供需同时不确定条件下考虑双边努力的供应链契约设计问题,在一个供应商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链系统中,供应商的努力影响产量的不确定性,零售商的努力影响市场需求的不确定性。首先,利用Stackerberg主从博弈模型计算了分散决策时零售商、供应商的最优期望利润,并将计算结果与集中决策时供应链整体的最优期望利润进行对比。由于双重边际效应的存在,分散决策时供应链的最优期望利润小于集中决策时供应链的最优期望利润。基于此,本文设计了回购和成本分担组合契约来协调该供应链,计算了回购价格和成本分担系数的表达式,得到了回购和成本分担契约下供应商和零售商的最优期望利润。结果表明,在特定条件下,该组合契约不仅可以协调供应链,还可以实现供应链利润的任意分配。最后,通过数值计算,分析了供需双方的决策变量和期望利润随契约参数的变化情况。