Collective Strategy Condensation: When Envy Splits Societies

Human societies are characterized by three constituent features, besides others. (A) Options, as for jobs and societal positions, differ with respect to their associated monetary and non-monetary payoffs. (B) Competition leads to reduced payoffs when individuals compete for the same option as others. (C) People care about how they are doing relatively to others. The latter trait—the propensity to compare one’s own success with that of others—expresses itself as envy. It is shown that the combination of (A)–(C) leads to spontaneous class stratification. Societies of agents split endogenously into two social classes, an upper and a lower class, when envy becomes relevant. A comprehensive analysis of the Nash equilibria characterizing a basic reference game is presented. Class separation is due to the condensation of the strategies of lower-class agents, which play an identical mixed strategy. Upper-class agents do not condense, following individualist pure strategies. The model and results are size-consistent, holding for arbitrary large numbers of agents and options. Analytic results are confirmed by extensive numerical simulations. An analogy to interacting confined classical particles is discussed.     

Efficient Collocation Schemes for Singular Boundary Value Problems

We discuss an error estimation procedure for the global error of collocation schemes applied to solve singular boundary value problems with a singularity of the first kind. This a posteriori estimate of the global error was proposed by Stetter in 1978 and is based on the idea of Defect Correction, originally due to Zadunaisky. Here, we present a new, carefully designed modification of this error estimate which not only results in less computational work but also appears to perform satisfactorily for singular problems. We give a full analytical justification for the asymptotical correctness of the error estimate when it is applied to a general nonlinear regular problem. For the singular case, we are presently only able to provide computational evidence for the full convergence order, the related analysis is still work in progress. This global estimate is the basis for a grid selection routine in which the grid is modified with the aim to equidistribute the global error. This procedure yields meshes suitable for an efficient numerical solution. Most importantly, we observe that the grid is refined in a way reflecting only the behavior of the solution and remains unaffected by the unsmooth direction field close to the singular point.     

可重构制造系统重组过程中设备选择模型的研究

根据生产任务选择加工设备进行制造资源重组是实现可重构制造系统的关键问题之一，由于设备的选择涉及到多种因素，既有定量指标，又有定性指标，传统的依靠人工经验的方法显得力不从心。本文首先结合实际情况，提出了一套设备选择评价体系，通过对模糊判断矩阵采用最小对数二乘法确定各评价因素的权重系数，针对定性指标和定量指标采用不同的方法确定其性能指标值，通过模糊积分对评判指标进行综合评判，最后进行了实例研究。所提出的方法有效地简化了决策过程，为可重构制造系统设备选择提供了一套行之有效的方法。     

运用量子约束动力学对具有耗散的量子位的追踪控制

在有限温度环境内，量子约束动力学及其追踪控制可使退相干系统的相干性稳定一段时间.约束方程产生的控制场能够按量子比特的动力学状态进行控制(量子动力学轨道的反馈控制)；依靠量子比特的这种反馈效应，可使量子位稳定在设定的时间内.同时，在量子位的稳定方面，温度扮演一种消极的角色. 关键词： 量子约束动力学 耗散量子位的控制 追踪控制 量子比特的反馈效应     

两个安全第一思想模型的比较分析

针对投资者可能的投资需求确立了基于安全第一思想下两个相近的投资目标:1、极大化投资末期总收益率超过给定水平α的概率;2、极小化投资末期总收益率与给定水平α的距离.并分别就这两个目标建立了优化决策模型,得到了模型解析解,最后对两个模型结果进行了比较分析和经济解释.     

光突发交换的交换控制策略和光缓存配置

光突发交换是面向下一代互联网的光交换模式.讨论了异步光突发交换系统的交换控制策略以及相应光缓存的优化配置策略.除了传统预约模式的交换策略,还研究了非预约和改进型预约模式,它们的性能评估由计算机仿真给出.结果表明:在条件相当情况下,改进型预约模式具有最低的丢包率.同时光缓存的配置对上述几类交换控制策略的性能都有很大影响,仿真结果指出:光缓存的粒度对系统性能具有重要影响,所讨论的几类交换模式都存在最佳时延粒度,研究结果对光交换矩阵的设计有指导意义.     

企业合作联盟成员位次竞争战略的Shapley值分析

针对Yanowitz和Bruckstein的二值字图像后处理算法存在的问题，提出了一种新的基于灰度期望值的后处理算法。实验结果表明，该算法能自动选取阈值、运算速度快、处理效果好，具有良好的噪声适应性。     

数码相机CMOS图像传感器的特性参数与选择

介绍了数码相机的核心器件———CMOS图像传感器的特性参数和在数码相机设计过程中CMOS图像传感器的选择。选择CMOS图像传感器,不仅需要考虑包括传感器的尺寸、像素总数和有效像素数、最小照度、动态范围、灵敏度、分辨力、光电响应不均匀性以及光谱响应等在内的特性参数,而且还要考虑电源管理和功耗、模数转换位数、开发的简便性以及成本等因素。     

Predictability and model selection in the context of ARCH models

Most of the methods used in the ARCH literature for selecting the appropriate model are based on evaluating the ability of the models to describe the data. An alternative model selection approach is examined based on the evaluation of the predictability of the models in terms of standardized prediction errors. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamic Strategic Pricing and Speed of Diffusion

Defining speed of diffusion as the amount of time it takes to get from one penetration level to a higher one, we introduce a dynamic model in which we study the link between pricing policy, speed of diffusion, and number of competitors in the market. Our analysis shows that, in the case of strategic (oligopolistic) competition, the speed of diffusion has an important influence on the optimal pricing policy. In particular, we find that higher speeds of diffusion create an incentive to strategically interacting firms to lower their prices.