| 含成本因素的出口退税的博弈模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈华友,侯定丕.含成本因素的出口退税的博弈模型研究[J].数学的实践与认识,2004,34(2):16-21. |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈华友 侯定丕 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 南京大学管理科学与工程研究院,南京,210093
2. 中国科学技术大学数学系,合肥,230026 |
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| 基金项目： | 安徽省教育厅科研基金资助项目 ( 2 0 0 0 j10 0 3,2 0 0 2 kj0 2 2 ) |
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| 摘 要： | 利用博弈论的分析方法进一步考虑成本因素 ,在更为一般的条件下分别建立了税务机关与外贸企业之间的完全信息静态博弈模型和无限阶段重复博弈模型 .得到国家税务机关最优混合策略及其骗税罚款系数公式 ,并且讨论了多种因素对局中人的影响 ,提出了降低企业骗税概率的建议 .
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| 关 键 词： | 成本 重复博弈 混合策略 触发策略 精炼均衡 |
| 修稿时间： | 2001年9月19日 |
Research on Model of Export Refund Game Subject to Costs |
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| CHEN Hua-you,HOU Ding-pi.Research on Model of Export Refund Game Subject to Costs[J].Mathematics in Practice and Theory,2004,34(2):16-21. |
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| Authors: | CHEN Hua-you HOU Ding-pi |
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| Institution: | CHEN Hua-you1,HOU Ding-pi2 |
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| Abstract: | Two game models subject to costs are proposed between taxation bureau and export enterprises under the more general condition, which are complete information static game and infinitely repeated game. The optimal mixed strategy of taxation bureau and penalty coefficient formulas are given in this paper. It is also discussed that many factors influence the players′ equilibrium behavior and some suggestion are put forward to reduce the possibility of the enterprises cheating in duties. |
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| Keywords: | costs repeated game mixed strategy trigger strategy perfect equilibrium |
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