手机广告链中移动运营商的努力动机研究与仿真

建立了由单手机广告主、手机广告代理商和移动运营商构成的三级广告产业链之间的基于协作的收益共享契约模型,分析了在以移动运营商为主导的手机广告链中,移动运营商的努力动机受收益共享和努力成本补偿参数的影响.采用量化分析和模拟仿真结合的方法,得出契约参数只有在满足一定条件下,移动运营商所做出的最优努力水平投入决策,将使得整个手机产业链收益最大化,实现多方共赢.     

Cooperative advertising models in supply chain management: A review

This paper reviews articles on cooperative advertising, a topic which has gained substantial interest in the recent years. Thereby, we first briefly distinguish five different definitions of cooperative advertising which can be found in operations research literature. After that, we concentrate on vertical cooperative advertising, which is the most common object of investigation and is understood as a financial agreement where a manufacturer offers to pay a certain share of his retailer’s advertising expenditures. In total, we identified 58 scientific papers considering mathematical modeling of vertical cooperative advertising. These articles are then analyzed with regard to their general model setting (e.g., the underlying supply chain structure and design of the cooperative advertising program). After that, we explain the different demand and cost functions that are employed, whereupon we distinguish between static and dynamic models. The last dimension of our review is dedicated to the game-theoretic concepts which are mostly used to reflect different forms of distribution of power within the channel.     

Optimal Distributed Dynamic Advertising

We propose a novel approach to modeling advertising dynamics for a firm operating over a distributed market domain based on controlled partial differential equations of the diffusion type. Using our model, we consider a general type of finite-horizon profit maximization problem in a monopoly setting. By reformulating this profit maximization problem as an optimal control problem in infinite dimensions, we derive sufficient conditions for the existence of its optimal solutions under general profit functions, as well as state and control constraints, and provide a general characterization of the optimal solutions. Sharper, feedback-form characterizations of the optimal solutions are obtained for two variants of the general problem. The first author gratefully acknowledges financial support by the NSF, the DAAD, the SFB 611 (Bonn), and the Max-Planck-Institut für Mathematik (Leipzig) through an IPDE fellowship.     

广告分担、价格折扣与供应链的纵向合作广告

研究了生产商和零售商的纵向合作广告问题。分别在广告分担和价格折扣策略下，探讨了双方的均衡结果和利润。当生产商的边际利润较小时，生产商的最优决策是不采取任何一种策略。当生产商的边际利润达到一定范围时，广告分担策略是双方共同的最优选择。而无论在什么样的条件内，价格折扣策略都不会使双方同时满意。为了增加双方的收益，供应链成员应该在广告上集成决策。最后给出了系统集成的可行最优解的范围和Nash讨价还价解。     

A review of Bayesian dynamic forecasting models: Applications in marketing

We briefly review the main developments of Bayesian dynamic models. The emphasis is on marketing applications. Typical examples in this area are discussed. The concepts of monitoring and intervention are carefully explained with illustrative examples and open source computational routines. We avoid algebraic developments and instead use graphical examples to illustrate theoretical aspects. Two real-world problems using Bayesian dynamic models are discussed. Finally, we describe recent developments and alternative proposals to formally address the dependence when dealing with the modeling of multiple time series.     

Optimal dynamic advertising policies in the presence of continuously distributed time lags

The Nerlove-Arrow model of optimal dynamic advertising policies is generalized by incorporating a continuously distributed lag between advertising expenditures and increases in the stock of goodwill. This leads to a control problem where the equation of motion is given by an integro-differential equation. The transitory and steady-state properties of the optimal policies are examined, both for a general lag function and for a gamma distributed lag. The dependence of the steady-state solution on the parameters of the gamma distribution is also investigated. An example is given using specific demand and cost functions.     

Generalized Nonlinear Variational-Like Inequalities

This study investigates how to dynamically allocate resources with a given budget for advertising through Web portals using keyword-activated banner ads on the Internet. Identifying the factors that affect the potential number of banner ad clickthroughs in each portal, we show that the process of budget allocation between the two types of portals (generic vs specialized) that leads to the largest banner clicksthrough in the long run is an optimal control problem. Using techniques of dynamic programming, we find analytical solutions for the optimal budgeting decisions. Our analysis shows that an advertisers optimal portal budgeting depends nonlinearly on the number of visitors who type the same trigger keyword and the average clicksthrough rates, as well as on the advertiser and ad effectiveness. Further, we find that the maximal number of banner clickthroughs from both portals, at time t, depends on the remaining budget until the end of the planning period. The analytical results have useful managerial insight. One of the interesting features of our solution shows that, while a large visitor base may favor the generic portal, other parameters may affect it unfavorably: e.g., lower clickthrough rates of keyword banners from a more heterogeneous audience. Using a specificaction that is consistent with empirical observations, we show that, in the long run, an advertiser must always spend more ad money at the specialized portal.     

Cooperative advertising in a distribution channel with fairness concerns

Cooperative (co-op) advertising has been widely used in practice and employed as a strategy to improve the performance of a distribution channel. It is known from the existing models that co-op advertising could not achieve the channel coordination (i.e., maximize the total channel profit). In this paper, we consider a distribution channel consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer, and investigate the effect of the retailer’s fairness concerns. Applying the equilibrium analysis, we obtain the following results: (1) Channel coordination can be achieved if the retailer has fairness concerns and model parameters satisfy certain conditions. (2) Although both channel members become better off with co-op advertising if neither channel member has fairness concerns, we find situations where co-op advertising brings detrimental effects to the retailer if the retailer has fairness concerns. (3) The retailer’s fairness concerns may increase or decrease the equilibrium participation rate, the equilibrium advertising effort, and the equilibrium profit of the manufacturer and the whole channel. (4) We identify the conditions under which the effectiveness of co-op advertising can be improved or reduced by the retailer’s fairness concerns. As long as co-op advertising can bring extra profit to the manufacturer, the retailer’s fairness concerns could improve the effectiveness of the co-op advertising. (5) There exists a Pareto improvement for the profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer when a retailer without fairness concerns becomes fair-minded.     

不同推介模式下网络零售商广告策略研究

研究了不同推介模式下网络零售商的广告策略问题,通过Nash静态博弈方法求解无推介、单向推介以及双向推介三种模式下零售商均衡零售价格、广告努力水平及利润。研究发现:无推介情况下,两零售商均衡广告策略为同时投入广告。单向推介情况下,若利润分享比例较小,则两零售商同时投入广告;若利润分享比例较大,则随着广告成本系数的增大,两零售商均衡广告策略从仅有被推介零售商投入广告转变为同时投入广告。双向推介情况下,若广告成本系数较小,则两家零售商都不投入广告;若广告成本系数较大,则两家零售商同时投入广告。此外,还分析了零售商均衡广告策略下的推介动力问题。