ESS,NIS and GIS for multi‐player matrix game in single population

In this paper, we distinguish the concept of global invader strategy (GIS) from that of neighborhood invader strategy (NIS), and discuss the concepts and the properties of ESS, NIS and GIS and relationship among them in the scenario of multi‐player matrix game. We show that a GIS is always an ESS and GIS is unique for any multi‐player. We also show that NIS is equivalent to ESS for pairwise game and there are some results in multi‐player game different from those in pairwise game. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dynamics Behaviors and Scaling in Intermittent Turbulence of a Shell Model

In this paper, the dynamics behaviors on fo-δ parameter surface is investigated for Gledzer-Ohkitani- Yamada model We indicate the type of intermittency chaos transitions is saddle node bifurcation. We plot phase diagram on fo-δ parameter surface, which is divided into periodic, quasi-periodic, and intermittent chaos areas. By means of varying Taylor-microscale Reynolds number, we calculate the extended self-similarity of velocity structure function.     

Cascade of Random Rotation and Scaling in a Shell Model Intermittent Turbulence

The time behaviors of intermittent turbulence in Gledzer-Ohkitani-Yamada model are investigated. Two kinds of orbits of each shell which is in the inertial range are discussed by portrait analysis in phase space. We find intermittent orbit parts wandering randomly and the directions of unstable quasi-periodic orbit parts of different shells form rotational, reversal and locked cascade of period three with shell number. We calculate the critical scaling of intermittent turbulence and the extended self-similarity of the two parts of orbit and point out that nonlinear scaling in inertial-range is decided by intermittent orbit parts.     

PPP项目中投资者协同行为发生机制及其演化规律研究

在公私合作项目(PPP)项目中,政府和私人投资者可能会采取协同行为来追求自身利益。这就需要对政府和私人投资者的协同行为进行研究,以了解提高项目绩效的基础机制。首先,基于演化博弈模型分析项目投资者策略选择的动态演化过程,据此政府和私人投资者通过交互选择来实现各自的最优策略。其次,通过演化博弈模型分析发现,政府和私人投资者协作管理具有多重复杂路径演化,其稳定策略很大程度上取决于组织的初始状态及相互激励关系。然后,探讨不同情境下投资者的最优策略和有效增强投资者协同行为的利益协调机制。     

不对称信息下技术员工股票期权管理激励的博弈分析

分析了技术员工偷懒“囚徒困境”的形成过程,构建了技术员工股票期权管理激励的博弈模型,进行ESS博弈均衡分析,得出了防范技术员工偷懒行为的惩罚力度与股票期权管理激励因子之间的关系,在此基础上得出结论：股票期权与偷懒惩罚力度相结合,能有效预防技术员工偷懒行为．     

Cascade of Random Rotation and Scaling in a Shell Model Intermittent Turbulence

The time behaviors of intermittent turbulence in Gledzer-Ohkitani-Yamada model are investigated. Two kinds of orbits of each shell which is in the inertial range are discussed by portrait analysis in phase space. We find intermittent orbit parts wandering randomly and the directions of unstable quasi-periodic orbit parts of different shellsform rotational, reversal and locked cascade of period three with shell number. We calculate the critical scaling of intermittent turbulence and the extended self-similarity of the two parts of orbit and point out that nonlinear scaling in inertial-range is decided by intermittent orbit parts.     

三群体2×2×2非对称演化博弈稳定性分析

针对目前三方演化博弈的稳定性研究不足这一问题,利用复制动态方程构建了一般化的三维动力系统,首先讨论了单群体策略演化趋势,接着根据李雅普诺夫稳定性理论分析了系统的渐进稳定性,并结合单群体策略的演化趋势对系统稳定性作了深入研究。研究表明:严格纯策略纳什均衡是ESS,不严格纯策略纳什均衡是线性策略收敛(自定义概念),所有类型的混合策略纳什均衡均为鞍点,共同划分了ESS的吸引域,并证明了零特征值非ESS定理,以及ESS不共边定理,在此基础上给出了N维双策略系统中ESS的最多个数。最后,设计了六组经典算例,首先结合研究结果分析了算例,接着对算例进行系统仿真,仿真结果与理论分析一致,为演化博弈的进一步研究提供借鉴与启发。     

Singularity of Lotka‐Volterra models under unfoldings

In this paper, we classify the singularity of a Lotka‐Volterra competitive model with a Gaussian competition function and non‐Gaussian carrying capacity functions. These functions need not be completely different to affect adaptive dynamics of the model. For instance, it will be seen how ostensibly similar models can actually give rise to quite different behaviors due to their properties under unfolding. The use of Gaussian‐like carrying capacity functions can also show the sensitivity of the model to assumptions on the carrying capacity function's shapes. The classification is achieved using singularity theory of fitness functions under dimorphism equivalence. We also investigate the effect of the presence of unfolding and bifurcation parameters on the evolution of the system near its singular points. Particularly, we study the adaptive dynamics of the system near the singularity by focusing on ESS and CvSS types, and dimorphisms. Mutual invasibility plots are used to show regions of coexistence.     

Network effects of animal conflicts

We simulated animal conflicts on different networks, where five strategies that the animals may take are considered. The result of the evolution of the five strategies on networks shows that whether one strategy dominates or two strategies coexist on the network is determined by the structure of the network. But no matter what structure the network is, the total-war strategy is constrained and never becomes a final winning strategy when it contests with the other four limited-war strategies. This may be the reason that the animals choose the limited-war strategies to fight against other animals of the same species.     

Dynamics of a single species evolutionary model with Allee effects

We investigate the evolutionary outcomes of a single species population subject to Allee effects within the framework of a continuous strategy evolutionary game theory (EGT) model. Our model assumes a single trait creates a phenotypic trade-off between carrying capacity (i.e., competition) and predator evasion ability following a Gaussian distribution. This assumption contributes to one of our interesting findings that evolution prevents extinction even when population exhibits strong Allee effects. However, the extinction equilibrium can be an ESS under some special distributions of anti-predation phenotypes. The ratio of variation in competition and anti-predation phenotypes plays an important role in determining global dynamics of our EGT model: (a) evolution may suppress strong Allee effects for large values of this ratio; (b) evolution may preserve strong Allee effects for small values of this ratio by generating a low density evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) equilibrium which can serve as a potential Allee threshold; and (c) intermediate values of this ratio can result in multiple ESS equilibria.