The effects of resource limitation and consensual incentives on cooperation

Exploring the evolution of cooperation has been one of the most challenging topics and attracted increasing attention in various realms. Hereby, we institute an analytic model where the relationship between the common benefits and contributions is the typical saturation nonlinearity. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation with and without consensual incentives respectively. The population always evolves to full defection when the incentives are absent. Cooperation, however, can be promoted by consensual incentives when the degree of cooperators' preferences for incentives is great. There exists an intermediate amount of resources at which the positive effect of consensual incentives on cooperation is minimized. Furthermore, there is a U-shape relationship between the degree of cooperators' preference for an incentive and the evolution of cooperation. A greater basin of full cooperation can be induced when the cooperators' preference for reward is more pronounced than that for punishment.     

Carathéodory's method for a class of dynamic games

The method of equivalent variational methods, originally due to Carathéodory for free problems in the calculus of variations is extended to investigate feedback Nash equilibria for a class of n-person differential games. Both the finite-horizon and infinite-horizon cases are considered. Examples are given to illustrate the presented results.     

合作联盟资源集成计划一种新方法

合作联盟里，资源集成计划往往是联盟成员群体谈判博弈的结果。本以两人博弈为例，对联盟的资源集成计划给出一个谈判博弈模型，能够较好地模仿和反映合作联盟资源整合计划的制订过程。     

Upper Bounds of the Pursuer Control Based on a Linear-Quadratic Differential Game

Differential game formulations provide an adequate basis for a guidance law synthesis against highly maneuvering targets. This paper deals with a guidance law based on a linear-quadratic differential game formulation. This guidance law has many attractive properties: it is continuous, linear with respect to the state variables, and its gain coefficients can be precalculated offline. Nevertheless, due to the lack of hard control constraints in the formulation, the magnitude of the control can exceed the admissible level imposed by the nature of the problem. In this paper, the upper bound of the interceptor control is obtained depending on the system parameters and the penalty coefficients of the game performance index. It is shown that the interceptor can guarantee an arbitrarily small miss distance without exceeding the control constraints if it has sufficient maneuverability and if the penalty coefficients are chosen properly. By manipulating the penalty coefficients, it is possible to reduce significantly the maneuverability requirements compared to the case of zero interceptor penalty coefficient.     

Dynamic Strategic Pricing and Speed of Diffusion

Defining speed of diffusion as the amount of time it takes to get from one penetration level to a higher one, we introduce a dynamic model in which we study the link between pricing policy, speed of diffusion, and number of competitors in the market. Our analysis shows that, in the case of strategic (oligopolistic) competition, the speed of diffusion has an important influence on the optimal pricing policy. In particular, we find that higher speeds of diffusion create an incentive to strategically interacting firms to lower their prices.     

The Modeling of Velocity Enhancement in Polymer Flooding

In single-phase polymer flooding experiments it has repeatedly been observed that the average velocity of the polymer molecules is higher than the average velocity of the water molecules. This effect is incorporated in many conventional Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) simulators by the introduction of a constant velocity enhancement factor. In this paper we show that, in absence of dispersion, a constant enhancement factor in the mathematical model for two-phase polymer flow (Buckley--Leverett displacement) leads to ill-posedness of the model equations. We propose a saturation dependent enhancement factor, derived from a model based on percolation concepts, for which this problem does not occur.     

弱1—凸对策及其解的性质

本文提出了一类特殊的ｎ人合作对策模型─—弱１—凸对策，研究了弱１—凸对策的解的性质，并证明弱１—凸对策的解满足所有常见的公理化特征．     

Reductions of interval noncooperative games

Noncooperative games of a finite number of persons with interval-valued payoff functions are considered. The concept of an equilibrium situation is introduced. A reduction of such games to deterministic noncooperative games is proposed. Properties of the reduced games are discussed. Interval antagonistic and bimatrix games are examined, and illustrative examples are considered.     

Network externalities in a dynamic monopoly

We reconsider the role of network externalities in a dynamic spatial monopoly where the firm must invest in order to accumulate capacity, while consumers may have either linear or quadratic preferences. We (1) characterise saddle point equilibria, (2) prove that the extent of market coverage is increasing in the network effect and (3) unlike the existing static literature on the same problem, the monopolist may not make introductory price offers. Then, we briefly deal with the socially optimal solution, showing that, in general, a planner would serve more consumers than a profit-seeking monopolist.      

Sequencing games without initial order

In this note we study uncertainty sequencing situations, i.e., one-machine sequencing situations in which no initial order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links with the classic sequencing games introduced by Curiel et al. (Eur J Oper Res 40:344–351, 1989). Moreover, we propose and characterize two simple cost allocation rules for uncertainty sequencing situations with equal processing times.