EFFORT SUBSIDIES AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN TRANSBOUNDARY FISHERIES

ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes a two-stage game, based on the Gordon-Schaefer model of the fishery, to examine the strategic entry-deterring role for effort subsidies in noncooper-ative transboundary fisheries. The game reveals that a country, whose domestic fleet has an effort cost advantage over a rival foreign fleet, may choose to subsidize domestic effort to the point that foreign entry in the fishery becomes unprofitable. Whether the outcome of the game is characterized by foreign entry deterrence or accommodation, and whether it is also characterized by a domestic effort subsidy or a tax, depends on domestic and foreign effort costs and the number of firms in each fleet. The various outcomes of the game analyzed here help to explain the persistence of subsidies in some world fisheries.     

HUMAN FERTILITY DECISIONS AND COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES: A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS

ABSTRACT. In rural areas of developing countries, parental decisions on number of offspring may be made on the basis of the role of children in harvesting local common property renewable resources. It has been argued that this may lead to a cycle of human over‐population and resource over‐exploitation. To investigate the plausibility of this argument, we present a discrete dynamic model with two state variables representing human population level N and resource stock level S. The model is similar to one given by Nerlove and Meyer but differs in several important respects. It is assumed that, in each over‐lapping generation of parents and children, parents decide how many children to have based on their resulting share of the local resource harvest and the costs associated with child‐rearing. Using simulation and analytical methods, the long term steady state population and resource stock levels for this dynamic noncooperative game are contrasted with the steady state when parental fertility decisions are made in a cooperative manner.