The effects of resource limitation and consensual incentives on cooperation

Exploring the evolution of cooperation has been one of the most challenging topics and attracted increasing attention in various realms. Hereby, we institute an analytic model where the relationship between the common benefits and contributions is the typical saturation nonlinearity. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation with and without consensual incentives respectively. The population always evolves to full defection when the incentives are absent. Cooperation, however, can be promoted by consensual incentives when the degree of cooperators' preferences for incentives is great. There exists an intermediate amount of resources at which the positive effect of consensual incentives on cooperation is minimized. Furthermore, there is a U-shape relationship between the degree of cooperators' preference for an incentive and the evolution of cooperation. A greater basin of full cooperation can be induced when the cooperators' preference for reward is more pronounced than that for punishment.     

白色荧光粉CaF2∶Yb3+/Eu3+/La3+的制备及其上转换发光特性

采用改进的两步高温固相熔融法制备了Yb^3+、Eu^3+、La^3+共掺杂CaF 2的上转换荧光粉。基于荧光猝灭原理,通过改变La^3+掺杂浓度来调节CaF 2∶Yb^3+/Eu^3+材料的发光性能,并在980 nm近红外光激发下,获得了该材料的白色上转换发光(UCL)。在该发光体系中,Yb^3+不仅起到了敏化Eu^3+的作用,同时,Yb^3+二聚体(Yb^3+-dimer)自身合作发出波长范围480~540 nm的绿色荧光。而白光三基色中的绿光正是来自Yb^3+二聚体的合作发光。Eu^3+则作为激活剂,同时发出红色和蓝色荧光。荧光寿命测试结果表明Yb^3+-dimer与Eu^3+之间存在有效的能量传递。值得注意的是,在980 nm激光激发下,1%La^3+掺杂的样品表现出最佳的红、绿、蓝三基色光比列,实现了材料的上转换白光发射,其色度坐标为(0.311,0.340)。     

Price coordination in distribution channels: A dynamic perspective

In this study, we investigate two important questions related to dynamic pricing in distribution channels: (i) Are coordinated pricing decisions efficient in a context where prices have carry-over effects on demand? (ii) Should firms practice a skimming or a penetration strategy if they choose to coordinate or to decentralize their activities? To answer these questions, we consider a differential game that takes place in a bilateral monopoly where the past retail prices paid by consumers contribute to the building of a reference price. The latter is used by consumers as a benchmark to evaluate the value of the product, and by firms to decide whether to adopt a skimming or a penetration strategy.     

Controlling the Length of Cooperative Supramolecular Polymers with Chain Cappers

The design and the characterization of supramolecular additives to control the chain length of benzene-1,3,5-tricarboxamide (BTA) cooperative supramolecular polymers under thermodynamic equilibrium is unraveled. These additives act as chain cappers of supramolecular polymers and feature one face as reactive as the BTA discotic to interact strongly with the polymer end, whereas the other face is nonreactive and therefore impedes further polymerization. Such a design requires fine tuning of the conformational preorganization of the amides and the steric hindrance of the motif. The chain cappers studied are monotopic derivatives of BTA, modified by partial N-methylation of the amides or by positioning of a bulky cyclotriveratrylene cage on one face of the BTA unit. This study not only clarifies the interplay between structural variations and supramolecular interactions, but it also highlights the necessity to combine orthogonal characterization methods, spectroscopy and light scattering, to elucidate the structures and compositions of supramolecular systems.     

Meyniel's conjecture holds for random d‐regular graphs

In the game of cops and robber, the cops try to capture a robber moving on the vertices of the graph. The minimum number of cops required to win on a given graph G is called the cop number of G. The biggest open conjecture in this area is the one of Meyniel, which asserts that for some absolute constant C, the cop number of every connected graph G is at most . In a separate paper, we showed that Meyniel's conjecture holds asymptotically almost surely for the binomial random graph. The result was obtained by showing that the conjecture holds for a general class of graphs with some specific expansion‐type properties. In this paper, this deterministic result is used to show that the conjecture holds asymptotically almost surely for random d‐regular graphs when d = d(n) ≥ 3.     

企业自主研发与合作创新的风险测度及组合优化

企业在整合内部创新要素进行自主研发的同时,也会寻求外部创新资源进行合作创新,当前同时从事多个R&D项目已成为常见的企业经营活动,如何在不确定条件下分析多个R&D项目投资的策略选择及风险优化,对于企业的长期发展具有重要意义。根据企业是否采取合作创新策略,可将其R&D项目分为自主研发与合作创新两类,以项目的研发成功率和投资收益率代表技术风险和市场风险,分别测度自主研发与合作创新项目的风险特性,并在此基础上构建企业R&D项目投资组合优化模型,以在自主研发与合作创新项目之间进行权衡取舍。结果表明,企业对于自主研发与合作创新项目投资组合的最优投资权重,主要取决于这两类组合的期望收益率、收益率方差、期望成功率以及两组合之间的协方差。企业可基于关键参数制定出最优的R&D项目投资组合选择策略,合理分配资金以达到风险最小化的投资目标。     

Selectivity Effects in Bimetallic Catalysis

An emerging area of homogeneous catalysis is the use of catalysts featuring two closely associated metal sites. This approach complements the traditional focus on single‐site catalysts and makes available new parameters with which to optimize catalytic behavior. Single‐site catalysts are optimized through changing 1) the identity of the metal, and 2) the steric and electronic properties of the ligands. Bimetallic catalysts introduce new optimization parameters such as 3) catalyst nuclearity (mononuclear vs. binuclear), and 4) bimetallic pairing (relative compatibility of two metal sites). In order to harness these new optimization parameters in developing systems, it is necessary to first understand the origin of bimetallic selectivity effects that already have been documented. This Concept article highlights bimetallic effects on the chemo‐, regio‐, and stereoselectivity of catalytic transformations, using selected case studies from the recent literature as illustrative examples.     

On the non-emptiness of the one-core and the bargaining set of committee games

We study the committee decision making process using game theory. Shenoy  [15] introduced two solution concepts: the one-core and the bargaining set, and showed that the one-core of a simple committee game is nonempty if there are at most four players. We extend this result by proving that whether the committee is simple or not, as far as there are less than five players, the one-core is nonempty. This result also holds for the bargaining set.