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舰船光电对抗中烟幕遮蔽与激光引偏的配合作战研究   总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0  
通过分析舰船光电对抗作战中烟幕干扰和激光引偏干扰的特点,提出了烟幕遮蔽和激光引偏在对抗半自主激光制导武器时配合使用的作战样式,分析了各种作战样式的使用条件、工作流程和配合要素,以及作战样式的优势与不足,指出了多种干扰手段配合作战是发挥光电对抗系统综合对抗效能的关键.  相似文献   
3.
陈含爽  侯中怀  张季谦  辛厚文 《中国物理 B》2010,19(5):50205-050205
We study evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game on adaptive networks where a population of players co-evolves with their interaction networks.During the co-evolution process,interacted players with opposite strategies either rewire the link between them with probability p or update their strategies with probability 1 p depending on their payoffs.Numerical simulation shows that the final network is either split into some disconnected communities whose players share the same strategy within each community or forms a single connected network in which all nodes are in the same strategy.Interestingly,the density of cooperators in the final state can be maximised in an intermediate range of p via the competition between time scale of the network dynamics and that of the node dynamics.Finally,the mean-field analysis helps to understand the results of numerical simulation.Our results may provide some insight into understanding the emergence of cooperation in the real situation where the individuals’ behaviour and their relationship adaptively co-evolve.  相似文献   
4.
An application of cooperative game among container terminals of one port   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
In this paper a two-stage game that involves three container terminals located in Karachi Port in Pakistan is discussed. In the first stage, the three terminals have to decide on whether to act as a singleton or to enter into a coalition with one or both of the other terminals. The decision at this stage should presumably be based on the predicted outcome for the second stage. The second stage is here modelled as a Bertrand game with one outside competitor, the coalition and the terminal in Karachi Port (if any) that has not joined the coalition. Furthermore, three partial and one grand coalition among the three terminals at Karachi Port are investigated. The concepts of “characteristic function” and “core” are used to analyse the stability of these coalitions and this revealed that one combination does not satisfy the superadditivity property of the characteristic function and can therefore be ruled out. The resulting payoffs (profits) of these coalitions are analysed on the basis of “core”. The best payoff for all players is in the case of a “grand coalition”. However, the real winner is the outsider (the terminal at the second port) which earns a better payoff without joining the coalition, and hence will play the role of the “orthogonal free-rider”.  相似文献   
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在网站动态竞争模型的基础上,建立了含有真正的合作关系的网站竞争模型.随后对二维的特殊情况进行了定性分析,结合给出的数值模拟图,分析了模型中的相关系数对系统的作用,并针对分析的结果讨论了影响网站发展的主要因素.  相似文献   
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0. Einleitwng

1. Reaktorwissenschaft und -technik und Kernenergetik

2. Kerntechnischer Gerätebau

3. Produktion von Isotopenerzeugnissen

4. Strahlenschulz und Schutztechnik

5. Isotopenanwendung

6. Strahlentechnik

7. Zur weiteren Tätigkeit der Ständigen Kommission Atomenergie des RGW  相似文献   
8.
《Physics letters. A》2020,384(35):126904
Exploring the evolution of cooperation has been one of the most challenging topics and attracted increasing attention in various realms. Hereby, we institute an analytic model where the relationship between the common benefits and contributions is the typical saturation nonlinearity. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation with and without consensual incentives respectively. The population always evolves to full defection when the incentives are absent. Cooperation, however, can be promoted by consensual incentives when the degree of cooperators' preferences for incentives is great. There exists an intermediate amount of resources at which the positive effect of consensual incentives on cooperation is minimized. Furthermore, there is a U-shape relationship between the degree of cooperators' preference for an incentive and the evolution of cooperation. A greater basin of full cooperation can be induced when the cooperators' preference for reward is more pronounced than that for punishment.  相似文献   
9.
The existence of reputation can significantly promote the level of cooperation within the human population. In the recent years, most of the researches were based on binary image score or first-order evaluation standard. In this paper, we propose a second-order reputation evaluation model, in which the individual's image score will change not only in accordance with his own strategy, but also the reputation value of neighbors. Individuals try to enhance their reputation to cooperate with the surrounding high-reputation individuals, and then becomes an influential individual in the population. The existence of this mechanism renders the individuals who at the edge of the clusters formed by the cooperators to rapidly accumulate their reputation values through the adoption of cooperative strategy, and then the cooperative strategy can be spread widely and rapidly in the whole population. Through extensive numerical simulations, it is clearly indicated that the population cooperation behavior will be obviously improved when the individual's influence factor becomes smaller or the reputation step length increases. The current results are further conducive to understanding the emergence of cooperation in many real world systems.  相似文献   
10.
针对由一个拥有线上直销渠道的制造商以及一个线下零售商组成的供应链,考虑消费者对不同渠道的偏好构建了供应链博弈模型,研究了竞争环境下制造商与零售商的最优BOPS合作策略,并分析了BOPS合作在改善交通拥堵方面的作用。研究表明,BOPS合作在缓解供应链双重边际效应的同时会加剧渠道之间的价格竞争,所以并不总是对供应链有利;仅当消费者线上渠道偏好程度比较低且线下麻烦成本比较大时,制造商和零售商才会都从BOPS合作中受益从而自愿达成合作,其他情形下制造商可根据供应链利润变化设计转移支付契约促成与线下零售商的BOPS合作并实现双赢;此外,一定条件下BOPS合作能够通过调整渠道需求结构,在保证供应链成员利润的同时对交通拥堵改善也带来正向作用。  相似文献   
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