粘塑性损伤模型模拟准超塑性单轴拉伸行为

发展了Chaboche粘塑性本构模型的大变形隐式算法，用损伤(DM)和无损伤(NDM)模型模拟准超塑性单轴拉伸。发现变形过程可分为三个阶段：均匀变形、颈缩发展、断裂破坏阶段。DM可准确模拟前两个阶段变形，NDM只能较好地模拟均匀变形阶段，表明DM可以较精确地描述稳定发展的动态过程。由于有限元方法只能描述连续介质，因此对于断裂破坏阶段，NDM模拟载荷大于试验结果，DM的载荷小于试验结果，这是由高应变速率敏感性造成。DM能够描述试验中出现地多处颈缩现象，局部应变速率分布随时间演化反映了颈缩发展程度。严重颈缩部位的距离代表着超塑性变形能力，距离越大，抗颈缩能力越好。     

On‐line flow‐through extraction–preconcentration‐large volume injection‐RP LC for trace determination of pyrethroids in Slovak soil

A rapid micro‐analytical multiresidue method was developed for analysis of pyrethroids (kadethrin K, cypermethrin C and permethrin P) in soil micro‐sample (200 mg). It uses on‐line flow‐through extraction of soil micro‐samples (packed into a short glass column) with a methanol‐aqueous citric acid buffer mixture, successive on‐line SPE preconcentration of analytes from the extract and on‐line RP‐HPLC analysis with UV photometric detection. The separation of pyrethroids is performed on a Purospher RP‐18e column with methanol/water as mobile phase. Effects of sorbent placed at the bottom of a short column holding the soil sample and different kinds of on‐line SPE columns were tested. Besides, the influence of volume of the effluent on the pyrethroids recovery was also studied. Calibration curves were linear over the range assayed from 0.01 to 0.2 μg/mL with correlation coefficients of linear regression (least‐squares method) in the range 0.998–0.999. Recovery studies were carried out at 0.25–1.00 μg/g dry soil fortification level and obtained recoveries were for K 81–84%, C 56–59% and for P 58–63%. Achieved LOD (confidence band) of studied pyrethroids were for large‐volume injection (1 mL) 4.5 ng K, 3.7 ng C, 3.6 ng P or 27 ng/g K, 32 ng/g C and 29 ng/g P in dry soil “solid sampling HPLC”.     

Emergent cooperation amongst competing agents in minority games

We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives every day, and there is a reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to guess the choice others will make, based only on the past history of the number of people choosing the two alternatives. We describe a simple probabilistic strategy using which the agents, acting independently, and trying to maximize their individual expected payoff, still achieve a very efficient overall utilization of resources, and the average deviation of the number of happy agents per day from the maximum possible can be made O(N^?), for any ?>0. We also show that a single agent does not expect to gain by not following the strategy.     

Evolution of cooperation among mobile agents

We study the effects of mobility on the evolution of cooperation among mobile players, which imitate collective motion of biological flocks and interact with neighbors within a prescribed radius R. Adopting the the prisoner’s dilemma game and the snowdrift game as metaphors, we find that cooperation can be maintained and even enhanced for low velocities and small payoff parameters, when compared with the case that all agents do not move. But such enhancement of cooperation is largely determined by the value of R, and for modest values of R, there is an optimal value of velocity to induce the maximum cooperation level. Besides, we find that intermediate values of R or initial population densities are most favorable for cooperation, when the velocity is fixed. Depending on the payoff parameters, the system can reach an absorbing state of cooperation when the snowdrift game is played. Our findings may help understanding the relations between individual mobility and cooperative behavior in social systems.     

Evolution of cooperation among mobile agents with heterogenous view radii

In this paper, we study cooperative behavior among mobile agents; the agents have heterogenous view radii and they play the prisoner’s dilemma game with those being within their vision fields. It is found that the cooperation level is remarkably promoted when the heterogeneity of view radii is considered, and the degree distribution of the system is investigated to explain this interesting phenomenon. Moreover, we report that the cooperative behavior is best favored by low density, moderate view radius, and small moving speed. Our findings may be helpful in understanding cooperative behavior in natural and social systems consisting of mobile agents.     

基于再保险和投资的随机微分博弈

本文研究了具有再保险和投资的随机微分博弈.应用线性-二次控制的理论,在指数效用和幂效用下,求得了最优再保险策略、最优投资策略、最优市场策略和值函数的显示解,推广了文[8]的结果.通过本文的研究,当市场出现最坏的情况时,可以指导保险公司选择恰当的再保险和投资策略使自身所获得的财富最大化.     

The uniqueness property for networks with several origin–destination pairs

We consider congestion games on networks with nonatomic users and user-specific costs. We are interested in the uniqueness property defined by Milchtaich (2005) as the uniqueness of equilibrium flows for all assignments of strictly increasing cost functions. He settled the case with two-terminal networks. As a corollary of his result, it is possible to prove that some other networks have the uniqueness property as well by adding common fictitious origin and destination. In the present work, we find a necessary condition for networks with several origin–destination pairs to have the uniqueness property in terms of excluded minors or subgraphs. As a key result, we characterize completely bidirectional rings for which the uniqueness property holds: it holds precisely for nine networks and those obtained from them by elementary operations. For other bidirectional rings, we exhibit affine cost functions yielding to two distinct equilibrium flows. Related results are also proven. For instance, we characterize networks having the uniqueness property for any choice of origin–destination pairs.     

Developing real option game models

By mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory, an investment decision in a competitive market can be seen as a “game” between firms, as firms implicitly take into account other firms’ reactions to their own investment actions. We review two decades of real option game models, suggesting which critical problems have been “solved” by considering game theory, and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed. We provide some insights on the plausible empirical applications, or shortfalls in applications to date, and suggest some promising avenues for future research.     

Three-level warranty service contract among manufacturer,agent and customer: A game-theoretical approach

A warranty is a service contract between a manufacturer and a customer which plays a vital role in many businesses and legal transactions. In this paper, various three-level service contracts will be presented among the following three participants; a manufacturer, an agent, and a customer. In order to obtain a better result, the interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and semi-cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost or repair cost for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter. Several numerical examples and managerial insights are presented and used to illustrate the models presented in this paper.     

Sensitivity analysis of markup equilibria in complementary markets

We study the competitive structure of a market in which firms compete to provide various products within a bundle. Firms adopt price functions proportional to their per-unit costs by selecting markups. We consider two measures reflecting, respectively, the intensity of direct competition and the impact of complementarity on each producer’s markup. We characterize the sensitivity of these terms to various changes in the market structure and relate this to changes in producer profits and the social efficiency of the market.