Complex networks: Dynamics and security

This paper presents a perspective in the study of complex networks by focusing on how dynamics may affect network security under attacks. In particular, we review two related problems: attack-induced cascading breakdown and range-based attacks on links. A cascade in a network means the failure of a substantial fraction of the entire network in a cascading manner, which can be induced by the failure of or attacks on only a few nodes. These have been reported for the internet and for the power grid (e.g., the August 10, 1996 failure of the western United States power grid). We study a mechanism for cascades in complex networks by constructing a model incorporating the flows of information and physical quantities in the network. Using this model we can also show that the cascading phenomenon can be understood as a phase transition in terms of the key parameter characterizing the node capacity. For a parameter value below the phase-transition point, cascading failures can cause the network to disintegrate almost entirely. We will show how to obtain a theoretical estimate for the phase-transition point. The second problem is motivated by the fact that most existing works on the security of complex networks consider attacks on nodes rather than on links. We address attacks on links. Our investigation leads to the finding that many scale-free networks are more sensitive to attacks on short-range than on long-range links. Considering that the small-world phenomenon in complex networks has been identified as being due to the presence of long-range links, i.e., links connecting nodes that would otherwise be separated by a long node-to-node distance, our result, besides its importance concerning network efficiency and security, has the striking implication that the small-world property of scale-free networks is mainly due to short-range links.     

Robustness analysis of static routing on networks

Robustness is one of the crucial properties that needs to be considered in the design of routing strategies on networks. We study the robustness of three typical routing strategies, which are the SP (shortest path), EP (efficient path), and OP (optimal path) strategies, by simulating several different kinds of attacks including random attacks, target attacks and cascading failures on scale-free networks. Results of the average path length, betweenness centrality, network capacity, etc., demonstrate that the EP strategy is more robust than the other two, and the OP strategy is more reliable than the SP strategy in general. However, on the power-grid network, the OP strategy is more resistant against cascading failures than the EP and SP strategies.     

How non-uniform tolerance parameter strategy changes the response of scale-free networks to failures

In this paper, we introduce a non-uniform tolerance parameter (TP) strategy (the tolerance parameter is characterized by the proportion between the unused capacity and the capacity of a vertex) and study how the non-uniform TP strategy influences the response of scale-free (SF) networks to cascading failures. Different from constant TP in previous work of Motter and Lai (ML), the TP in the proposed strategy scales as a power-law function of vertex degree with an exponent b. The simulations show that under low construction costs D, when b>0 the tolerance of SF networks can be greatly improved, especially at moderate values of b; When b<0 the tolerance gets worse, compared with the case of constant TP in the ML model. While for high D the tolerance declines slightly with the b, namely b<0 is helpful to the tolerance, and b>0 is harmful. Because for smaller b the cascade of the network is mainly induced by failures of most high-degree vertices; while for larger b, the cascade attributes to damage of most low-degree vertices. Furthermore, we find that the non-uniform TP strategy can cause changes of the structure and the load-degree correlation in the network after the cascade. These results might give insights for the design of both network capacity to improve network robustness under limitation of small cost, and for the design of strategies to defend cascading failures of networks.     

基于超图的超网络相继故障分析

分析了快递超网络和电子元件超网络的相继故障扩散方式, 结合超图理论提出了2-section 图分析法和线图分析法, 并仿真分析了无标度超网络耦合映像格子的相继故障进程. 结果表明: 无标度超网络对外部攻击表现出了既鲁棒又脆弱的特性. 针对相继故障的不同扩散方式, 无标度超网络的相继故障行为表现出不同的特点. 超网络的相继故障行为和超网络的超度以及超边度分布有密切的联系, 也和超网络中超边的个数有关. 通过和同规模的Barabasi-Albert (BA)无标度网络对比, 在同一种攻击方式下同规模的无标度超网络都比BA 无标度网络表现出了更强的鲁棒性. 另外, 基于超边扩散的相继故障进程比基于节点扩散的相继故障进程更加缓慢.     

一种全局同质化相依网络耦合模式

相依网络的相依模式(耦合模式)是影响其鲁棒性的重要因素之一.本文针对具有无标度特性的两个子网络提出一种全局同质化相依网络耦合模式.该模式以子网络的总度分布均匀化为原则建立相依网络的相依边,一方面压缩度分布宽度,提高其对随机失效的抗毁性,另一方面避开对度大节点(关键节点)的相依,提高其对蓄意攻击的抗毁性.论文将其与常见的节点一对一的同配、异配及随机相依模式以及一对多随机相依模式作了对比分析,仿真研究其在随机失效和蓄意攻击下的鲁棒性能.研究结果表明,本文所提全局同质化相依网络耦合模式能大大提高无标度子网络所构成的相依网络抗级联失效能力.本文研究成果能够为相依网络的安全设计等提供指导意义.     

Edge-based-attack induced cascading failures on scale-free networks

Most previous existing works on cascading failures only focused on attacks on nodes rather than on edges. In this paper, we discuss the response of scale-free networks subject to two different attacks on edges during cascading propagation, i.e., edge removal by either the descending or ascending order of the loads. Adopting a cascading model with a breakdown probability p of an overload edge and the initial load (k_ik_j)^α of an edge ij, where k_i and k_j are the degrees of the nodes connected by the edge ij and α is a tunable parameter, we investigate the effects of two attacks for the robustness of Barabási-Albert (BA) scale-free networks against cascading failures. In the case of α<1, our investigation by the numerical simulations leads to a counterintuitive finding that BA scale-free networks are more sensitive to attacks on the edges with the lowest loads than the ones with the highest loads, not relating to the breakdown probability. In addition, the same effect of two attacks in the case of α=1 may be useful in furthering studies on the control and defense of cascading failures in many real-life networks. We then confirm by the theoretical analysis these results observed in simulations.     

Novel hybrid mitigation strategy for improving the resiliency of hierarchical networks subjected to attacks

This paper studies the resiliency of hierarchical networks when subjected to random errors, static attacks, and cascade attacks. The performance is compared with existing Erdös–Rényi (ER) random networks and Barabasi and Albert (BA) scale-free networks using global efficiency as the common performance metric. The results show that critical infrastructures modeled as hierarchical networks are intrinsically efficient and are resilient to random errors, however they are more vulnerable to targeted attacks than scale-free networks. Based on the response dynamics to different attack models, we propose a novel hybrid mitigation strategy that combines discrete levels of critical node reinforcement with additional edge augmentation. The proposed modified topology takes advantage of the high initial efficiency of the hierarchical network while also making it resilient to attacks. Experimental results show that when the level of damage inflicted on a critical node is low, the node reinforcement strategy is more effective, and as the level of damage increases, the additional edge augmentation is highly effective in maintaining the overall network resiliency.     

Two-peak and three-peak optimal complex networks

A central issue in complex networks is tolerance of random failures and intentional attacks. Current literature emphasizes the dichotomy between networks with a power-law node connectivity distribution, which are robust to random failures but fragile to targeted attacks, versus networks with an exponentially decaying connectivity distribution, which are less tolerant to failures but more resilient to attacks. We prove analytically that the optimal network configuration under a classic measure of robustness is altogether different from both of the above: in all cases, failure and/or attack, there are no more than three distinct node connectivities in the optimal network.     

Robustness analysis of network controllability

Structural controllability, which is an interesting property of complex networks, attracts many researchers from various fields. The maximum matching algorithm was recently applied to explore the minimum number of driver nodes, where control signals are injected, for controlling the whole network. Here we study the controllability of directed Erdös–Rényi and scale-free networks under attacks and cascading failures. Results show that degree-based attacks are more efficient than random attacks on network structural controllability. Cascade failures also do great harm to network controllability even if they are triggered by a local node failure.     

负荷作用下相依网络中的级联故障

研究负荷作用下相依网络中的级联故障具有重要的现实意义, 可为提高相依网络的鲁棒性提供参考. 构建了双层相依网络级联故障模型, 主要研究了外部度和内部度对负荷贡献比、耦合因素、层内度-度相关性对相依网络级联故障的影响. 研究表明, 当外部度和内部度对负荷贡献比达到一定值时, 相依网络抵抗级联故障的鲁棒性最强. 而耦合因素的影响是多方面的, 为了达到较高鲁棒性, 建议采用异配耦合方式和尽可能大的平均外部度, 并尽量使外部度保持均匀分布. 另外, 与不考虑负荷作用时相反, 当表征层内度-度相关性的相关系数越大时, 其抵抗级联故障的能力越强.     

Dynamical robustness of networks based on betweenness against multi-node attack

We explore the robustness of a network against failures of vertices or edges where a fraction f of vertices is removed and an overload model based on betweenness is constructed. It is assumed that the load and capacity of vertex i are correlated with its betweenness centrality B_i as B_i~θ and(1 + α)Bθi(θ is the strength parameter, α is the tolerance parameter).We model the cascading failures following a local load preferential sharing rule. It is found that there exists a minimal αc when θ is between 0 and 1, and its theoretical analysis is given. The minimal αc characterizes the strongest robustness of a network against cascading failures triggered by removing a random fraction f of vertices. It is realized that the minimalαc increases with the increase of the removal fraction f or the decrease of average degree. In addition, we compare the robustness of networks whose overload models are characterized by degree and betweenness, and find that the networks based on betweenness have stronger robustness against the random removal of a fraction f of vertices.     

复杂网络中带有应急恢复机理的级联动力学分析

提出带有应急恢复机理的网络级联故障模型,研究模型在最近邻耦合网络,Erdos-Renyi随机网络,Watts-Strogatz小世界网络和Barabasi-Albert无标度网络四种网络拓扑下的网络级联动力学行为.给出了应急恢复机理和网络效率的定义,并研究了模型中各参数对网络效率和网络节点故障率在级联故障过程中变化情况的影响.结果表明,模型中应急恢复概率的增大减缓了网络效率的降低速度和节点故障率的增长速度,并且提高了网络的恢复能力.而且网络中节点负载容量越大,网络效率降低速度和节点故障率的增长速度越慢.同时,随着节点过载故障概率的减小,网络效率的降低速度和节点故障率的增长速度也逐渐减缓.此外,对不同网络拓扑中网络效率和网络节点故障率在级联故障过程中的变化情况进行分析,结果发现网络拓扑节点度分布的异质化程度的增大,提高了级联故障所导致的网络效率的降低速度和网络节点故障率的增长速度.以上结果分析了复杂网络中带有应急恢复机理的网络级联动力学行为,为实际网络中级联故障现象的控制和防范提供了参考.     

Cascading failures in congested complex networks with feedback

In this article, we investigate cascading failures in complex networks by introducing a feedback. To characterize the effect of the feedback, we define a procedure that involves a self-organization of trip distribution during the process of cascading failures. For this purpose, user equilibrium with variable demand is used as an alternative way to determine the traffic flow pattern throughout the network. Under the attack, cost function dynamics are introduced to discuss edge overload in complex networks, where each edge is assigned a finite capacity (controlled by parameter α). We find that scale-free networks without considering the effect of the feedback are expected to be very sensitive to α as compared with random networks, while this situation is largely improved after introducing the feedback.     

Impact of core-periphery structure on cascading failures in interdependent scale-free networks

Core-periphery structure is a typical meso-scale structure in networks. Previous studies on core-periphery structure mainly focus on the improvement of detection methods, while the research on the impact of core-periphery structure on cascading failures in interdependent networks is still missing. Therefore, we investigate the cascading failures of interdependent scale-free networks with different core-periphery structures and coupling preferences in the paper. First, we introduce an evaluation index to calculate the goodness of core-periphery structure. Second, we propose a new scale-free network evolution model, which can generate tunable core-periphery structures, and its degree distribution is analyzed mathematically. Finally, based on a degree-load-based cascading failure model, we mainly investigate the impact of goodness of core-periphery structure on cascading failures in both symmetrical and asymmetrical interdependent networks. Through numerical simulations, we find that with the same average degree, the networks with weak core-periphery structure will be more robust, while the initial load on node will influence the improvement of robustness. In addition, we also find that the inter-similarity coupling performs better than random coupling. These findings may be helpful for building resilient interdependent networks.     

Effects of the cascading failures on scale-free traffic networks

In this paper, we consider the artificial scale-free traffic network with dynamic weights (cost) and focus on how the removal strategies (flow-based removal, betweenness-based removal and mix-based removal) affect the damage of cascading failures based on the user-equilibrium (UE) assignment, which ensures the balance of flow on the traffic network. Experiment simulation shows that different removal strategies can bring large dissimilarities of the efficiency and damage after the intentional removal of an edge. We show that the mix-based removal of a single edge might reduce the damage of cascading failures and delay the breakdown time, especially for larger reserve capacity coefficient α. This is particularly important for real-world networks with a highly hetereogeneous distribution of flow, i.e., traffic and transportation networks, logistics networks and electrical power grids.     

基于负荷局域择优重新分配原则的复杂网络上的相继故障

相继故障普遍存在现实的网络系统中,为了更好地探讨复杂网络抵制相继故障的全局鲁棒性,采用网络中节点j上的初始负荷为L_j=k^α_j（k_j为节点j的度）的形式,并基于崩溃节点上负荷的局域择优重新分配的原则,提出了一个新的相继故障模型.依据新的度量网络鲁棒性的指标,探讨了4种典型复杂网络上的相继故障现象.数值模拟表明, 关键词： 相继故障 复杂网络 关键阈值 相变     

Cascading failures on weighted urban traffic equilibrium networks

In this paper, we study the cascading failure on weighted urban traffic equilibrium networks by introducing a more practical flow assignment mechanism. The whole process including edges overloading to node malfunctioning, dynamic spanning clustering and the phase transitions trigged with O-D flow evolving is simulated. It is found that there are three districts: slow, fast and stationary (collapse for scale-free networks) cascading failure districts. And different topologies have large effects on the ranges of these districts. Simulations also show that, although the latter can support larger traffic flow, homogeneous networks appear to be more robust against cascading failures than heterogeneous ones.     

Tolerance of edge cascades with coupled map lattices methods

This paper studies the cascading failure on random networks and scale-free networks by introducing the tolerance parameter of edge based on the coupled map lattices methods. The whole work focuses on investigating some indices including the number of failed edges, dynamic edge tolerance capacity and the perturbation of edge. In general, it assumes that the perturbation is attributed to the normal distribution in adopted simulations. By investigating the effectiveness of edge tolerance in scale-free and random networks, it finds that the larger tolerance parameter λ can more efficiently delay the cascading failure process for scale-free networks than random networks. These results indicate that the cascading failure process can be effectively controlled by increasing the tolerance parameter λ. Moreover, the simulations also show that, larger variance of perturbation can easily trigger the cascading failures than the smaller one. This study may be useful for evaluating efficiency of whole traffic systems, and for alleviating cascading failure in such systems.     

False Positive and False Negative Effects on Network Attacks

Robustness against attacks serves as evidence for complex network structures and failure mechanisms that lie behind them. Most often, due to detection capability limitation or good disguises, attacks on networks are subject to false positives and false negatives, meaning that functional nodes may be falsely regarded as compromised by the attacker and vice versa. In this work, we initiate a study of false positive/negative effects on network robustness against three fundamental types of attack strategies, namely, random attacks (RA), localized attacks (LA), and targeted attack (TA). By developing a general mathematical framework based upon the percolation model, we investigate analytically and by numerical simulations of attack robustness with false positive/negative rate (FPR/FNR) on three benchmark models including Erd?s-Rényi (ER) networks, random regular (RR) networks, and scale-free (SF) networks. We show that ER networks are equivalently robust against RA and LA only when FPR equals zero or the initial network is intact. We find several interesting crossovers in RR and SF networks when FPR is taken into consideration. By defining the cost of attack, we observe diminishing marginal attack efficiency for RA, LA, and TA. Our finding highlights the potential risk of underestimating or ignoring FPR in understanding attack robustness. The results may provide insights into ways of enhancing robustness of network architecture and improve the level of protection of critical infrastructures.     

Mitigation strategies on scale-free networks against cascading failures

According to the dynamic characteristics of the cascading propagation, we introduce a mitigation mechanism and propose four mitigation methods on four types of nodes. By the normalized average avalanche size and a new measure, we demonstrate the efficiencies of the mitigation strategies on enhancing the robustness of scale-free networks against cascading failures and give the order of the effectiveness of the mitigation strategies. Surprisingly, we find that only adopting once mitigation mechanism on a small part of the overload nodes can dramatically improve the robustness of scale-free networks. In addition, we also show by numerical simulations that the optimal mitigation method strongly depends on the total capacities of all nodes in a network and the distribution of the load in the cascading model. Therefore, according to the protection strength for scale-free networks, by the distribution of the load and the protection price of networks, we can reasonably select how many nodes and which mitigation method to efficiently protect scale-free networks at the lower price. These findings may be very useful for avoiding various cascading-failure-induced disasters in the real world and for leading to insights into the mitigation of cascading failures.