Ball,sphere, and all,all, all

The relationship of multidimensional geometry with statistical thermodynamics and with laws of large numbers is described.     

Contextualism,art, and rigidity: Levinson,Currie and Davies

The topic of this paper is the role played by context in art. In this regard I examine three theories linked to the names of J. Levinson, G. Currie and D. Davies. Levinson’s arguments undermine the structural theory. He finds it objectionable because it makes the individuation of artworks independent of their histories. Secondly, such a consequence is unacceptable because it fails to recognise that works are created rather than discovered. But, if certain general features of provenance are always work-constitutive, as it seems that Levinson is willing to claim, these features must always be essential properties of works. On the other hand, consideration of our modal practice suggests that whether a given general feature of provenance is essential or non-essential depends upon the particular work in question or is “work relative”. D. Davies builds his performance theory on the basis of the critical evaluation of Currie’s action-type hypotheses (ATH). Performances, says Davies, are not to be identified with “basic actions” to which their times belong essentially, but with “doings” that permit of the sorts of variation in modal properties required by the work-relativity of modality. He is also a fierce critic of the contextualist account. Contextualism is in his view unable to reflect the fact that aspects of provenance bear upon our modal judgements with variable force.In the second part of the paper I consider Davies’s “modality principle”. Davies is inclined to defend the claim that labels used for designation of works are rigid designators. Such a view offers a ground for discussion about the historicity of art. What has been meant when people claim that art is an historical concept? I argue that any historical theory implies a two-dimensional notion of “art”. At the end of the paper I suggest that Davies should embrace the theory of contingent identity and not the colocationist view about the relationship that exists between a particular artwork and its physical bearer.     

Discretization,decomposition, and supercomputers

This paper considers potential advantages of the decomposition method for computers.     

Uniformities,hyperspaces, and normality

LetX be a completely regular space and 2 ^X the hyperspace ofX. It is shown that the uniform topologies on 2 ^X arising from Nachbin uniformity onX, which is the weak uniformity generated byC(X, ), and from Tukey—Shirota uniformity onX, generated by all countable open normal coverings ofX, agree. They, both, coincide with a Vietoris-type topology on 2 ^X , the countable locally finite topology, iffX is normal.     

Self-expression,Expressiveness, and Sincerity

This paper examines some aspects of Mitchell Green’s account of self-expression. I argue that Green fails to address the distinction between success and evidential notions of expression properly, which prevents him from adequately discussing the relation between these notions. I then consider Green’s explanation of how a speech act shows what is within, i.e., because of the liabilities one incurs and argue that this is false. Rather, the norms governing speech acts and liabilities incurred give us reason to think that the speaker is in a particular state of mind. It thus supports an evidential rather than success notion. Finally, I suggest that it is because of the sincerity of what is said, rather than the liabilities incurred, that you show what is within.     

Instability,complexity, and evolution

In this paper, we consider a new class of random dynamical systems that contains, in particular, neural networks and complicated circuits. For these systems, we consider the viability problem: we suppose that the system survives only the system state is in a prescribed domain Π of the phase space. The approach developed here is based on some fundamental ideas proposed by A. Kolmogorov, R. Thom, M. Gromov, L. Valiant, L. Van Valen, and others. Under some conditions it is shown that almost all systems from this class with fixed parameters are unstable in the following sense: the probability P _t to leave Π within the time interval [0, t] tends to 1 as t → ∞. However, it is allowed to change these parameters sometimes (“evolutionary” case), then it may happen that P _t  < 1 − δ  < 1 for all t (“stable evolution”). Furthermore, we study the properties of such a stable evolution assuming that the system parameters are encoded by a dicsrete code. This allows us to apply complexity theory, coding, algorithms, etc. Evolution is a Markov process of modification of this code. Under some conditions we show that the stable evolution of unstable systems possesses the following general fundamental property: the relative Kolmogorov complexity of the code cannot be bounded by a constant as t → ∞. For circuit models, we define complexity characteristics of these circuits. We find that these complexities also have a tendency to increase during stable evolution. We give concrete examples of stable evolution. Bibliography: 80 titles. To the memory of A. N. Livshitz Published in Zapiski Nauchnykh Seminarov POMI, Vol. 360, 2008, pp. 31–69.     

Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure

It is widely thought that if knowledge requires sensitivity, knowledge is not closed because sensitivity is not closed. This paper argues that there is no valid argument from sensitivity failure to non-closure of knowledge. Sensitivity does not imply non-closure of knowledge. Closure considerations cannot be used to adjudicate between safety and sensitivity accounts of knowledge.     

Knowledge,Assertion, and Inference

This paper argues that three plausible principles are mutually inconsistent: (KA) One ought to assert only what one knows; (AP) If it is proper to assert some proposition q, then it is, barring special and not very common circumstances, proper to assert any proposition p from which q has been competently inferred; and (AKN) Some propositions are both properly assertible and known by competent inference from propositions which one does not know. Each pair of two principles constitutes an argument against the remaining principle, but which principle should one drop?     

Toughness,trees, and walks

A graph is t‐tough if the number of components of G\S is at most |S|/t for every cutset S ⊆ V (G). A k‐walk in a graph is a spanning closed walk using each vertex at most k times. When k = 1, a 1‐walk is a Hamilton cycle, and a longstanding conjecture by Chvátal is that every sufficiently tough graph has a 1‐walk. When k ≥ 3, Jackson and Wormald used a result of Win to show that every sufficiently tough graph has a k‐walk. We fill in the gap between k = 1 and k ≥ 3 by showing that, when k = 2, every sufficiently tough (specifically, 4‐tough) graph has a 2‐walk. To do this we first provide a new proof for and generalize a result by Win on the existence of a k‐tree, a spanning tree with every vertex of degree at most k. We also provide new examples of tough graphs with no k‐walk for k ≥ 2. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. J Graph Theory 33:125–137, 2000     

Woodhouse, babbage, peacock, and modern Algebra

In a recent article, J. M. Dubbey [Historia Mathematica 4 (1977), 295–302] showed that George Peacock's A Treatise on Algebra (1830) was similar to an unpublished work written by Charles Babbage in 1821. Evidently perplexed about the absence of a dispute over priority, Dubbey concluded that Peacock had unconsciously assimilated Babbage's ideas, and that Babbage was too busy with other activities to be concerned. The thesis of this article is that the innovative aspects of the work of both Babbage and Peacock are extensions of ideas put forth in 1803 by Robert Woodhouse, and that probably neither Babbage nor Peacock was overly concerned with acknowledgments because their approach to algebra was not unique at Cambridge.