基于多方参与的“碳核查”业务权利寻租行为监管及控制研究

针对“碳核查”业务权利寻租问题,考虑政府、控排企业及第三方核查企业对其治理的影响,运用演化博弈理论分析各参与主体在“碳核查”业务权利寻租问题治理过程中的决策行为。研究结果表明:碳核查”业务权利寻租行为的发生受各主体不同决策行为的共同作用,如何约束控排企业的行为是解决“碳核查”业务权利寻租问题的关键;中低强度的复查抽检率无法有效约束控排企业的寻租行为,而高复查抽检率则可有效约束控排企业的寻租行为;因寻租成本不同,控排企业及第三方核查企业对政府惩罚力度的敏感性不同;中高强度的复查率及惩罚力度,有助于降低控排企业及第三方核查企业权力寻租行为的发生。     

基于提前期压缩的供应链三方利益博弈

讨论基于提前期压缩的供应链利益协调问题。供应商采用批量分解方式向采购商供货,由3 PL承担运输。供应链成员通过提前期赶工压缩提前期,降低成本。基于斯坦克尔伯格博弈模型,设计一种决策原则,对采购商、供应商、3PL和系统四方成本节约情况进行比较并根据决策原则挑选出最佳方案。仿真分析讨论了相关参数变化对决策变量和各方成本节约额的影响。结论表明,三方博弈的结果倾向于选择A模式或D模式,且当采购商单位库存成本较大时,各方成本节约额随采购商订货成本变化波动较大。结论证明了基于提前期压缩的博弈决策方式的有效性。     

光伏发电投资决策的实证分析——基于ARMA-GARCH模型修正后的动态规划法

运用可靠方法评估项目的最优临界值和最大机会价值是光伏发电投资决策面临的关键问题。本研究选取了与某光伏企业发电投资项目价值“孪生”的一只股票的836个日收盘价格(从2012年1月4日至2015年6月24日)建立波动率预测模型,并在此基础上修正了该项目投资决策的动态规划法。然后给出了该投资的最优临界值、最大机会价值以及不同波动率下的这两个值的变化趋势。研究表明:该“孪生”股票价格的条件异方差使得最优临界值和最大机会价值对波动率的敏感程度不同——当波动率增大时,上述两个值虽然都增加,但增加的程度不同;当波动率增大到一定程度时,这两个值增加的程度都明显提高。因此,将波动率纳入光伏发电投资决策分析中有助于提高决策质量,减少企业损失。     

FIDIC合同条件下工程索赔的博弈模型*

索赔是工程项目各参与主体共同关注的焦点,索赔决策直接影响业主方和承包方的利益。研究通过分析工程索赔的特性,结合FIDIC合同条件下的索赔条款,提出索赔的博弈基础;分析博弈论和贝叶斯法则与索赔决策之间的契合程度,构建工程索赔的基本博弈模型;基于工程索赔的四种情境,构建完全信息有限多轮博弈模型、资金时间价值对博弈模型的影响、不完全信息有限多轮博弈模型和非完全对立的不完全信息有限多轮博弈模型并求解“纳什均衡”,模拟工程参与方做出索赔决策的路径,寻求相应情形下承包方和业主方的最优策略,提出工程参与方优化索赔策略的建议。     

企业营销网络上的价值增值博弈决策研究北大核心

企业营销网络的形态已由链条式向网络化演变,然而,当前对企业营销网络的研究多针对单个营销渠道上下游成员之间的博弈行为研究．在分析企业营销网络中不同营销渠道之间的复杂竞合关系基础上,基于博弈论,构建企业营销网络价值增值均衡模型,研究企业营销网络中不同营销渠道之间的静态博弈决策和成本信息不对称下的博弈决策,并通过算例给出相关的经济解释,为企业营销网络管理提供科学依据．     

低碳供应链纵向减排合作下的政府补贴策略

为了研究低碳供应链减排合作的政府补贴问题,分别构建了在纳什博弈、斯塔克尔伯格博弈和供应链集中决策三种不同的博弈关系下,政府对制造商和零售商合作减排投入进行补贴的博弈模型。分析了企业的最优减排成本投入和政府的最优补贴率,并进一步讨论了政府补贴行为和企业选择减排合作行为之间的互动博弈。研究显示:政府提供的减排补贴和企业的收益随着供应链上下游合作的紧密程度不同而不同,在纳什博弈下最高,在集中决策下最低,斯塔克尔伯格博弈下介于两者之间。比较了力量不对等供应链中企业分别处于领导者和跟随者时获得的政府补贴的差异。同时在政府补贴行为和供应链企业合作行为的交互博弈中,政府的最优策略是不对任何一方实行减排补贴。     

最小化破产概率的保险人鲁棒投资再保险策略研究

在模型不确定条件下,研究以破产概率最小化为目标的模糊厌恶型保险公司的最优投资再保险问题. 假设保险公司可投资于一种风险资产,也可购买比例再保险. 分别考虑风险资产的价格过程服从随机波动率模型和非随机波动率模型的两种情况,根据动态规划原理建立相应的HJB方程,得到保险公司的最优鲁棒投资再保险策略和价值函数的解析解. 最后,通过数值模拟分析了各模型参数对最优策略和价值函数的影响.     

基于随机响应时间及准时交货激励的供应链博弈-协同模型与算法

在供应链战略合作伙伴关系的体系框架下,针对采购双方动态交互决策过程建立了以供应链中核心生产企业为主方,供应商为从方的Stackelberg博弈-协同模型.基于最优性分析讨论了准时采购过程中双方决策的交互影响关系,分析了Stackelberg均衡解的必要条件.最后提出了该模型的内嵌内点法的模拟退火算法.     

生产率差异与企业对外直接投资进入模式选择

基于企业异质性视角,借鉴演化博弈理论探究企业通过OFDI“走出去”时的跨国并购方和标的方在全要素生产率上的差异对企业OFDI进入策略选择的影响机制。利用Hotelling模型构造资本密集型企业与劳动密集型企业OFDI进入策略选择博弈模型,讨论两类企业OFDI进入方式决策在并购双方生产率差异变化之下的变迁机理。研究发现:当并购方和被并购方生产率差异较小时,市场达到两类企业都倾向于跨国并购策略的演化稳定状态;当并购双方生产率差异较大时,企业的生产要素密集度及其结构对其OFDI进入模式决策具有重要的作用,知识或技术密集度较高的资本密集型企业与综合实力强势的部分劳动密集型企业采取跨国并购战略,而另一部分劳动密集型企业选择绿地新建方式进入国际市场。即企业OFDI进入策略选择因其所属的行业生产要素密集度及其结构不同而具有差异性。研究结论在一定程度上弥补了现有研究的不足,为以后的研究工作提供一定的理论参考。     

安全生产下政府、煤矿企业、员工的决策行为演化研究

安全生产对于煤矿企业至关重要,本研究将政府、煤矿企业和员工纳入演化博弈模型中,探究三方主体间决策的博弈关系和演化路径。研究表明:政府、煤矿企业和员工的决策向理想状态的演化过程受到诸多因素的影响,不同因素取值范围对三方主体向理想状态收敛速度产生差异化影响;当满足一定条件时,三方主体的决策行为能够演化为理想状态,政府有效监管能够促进企业由惩罚型向激励型模式转化,激励型模式能够有效激发员工安全主动行为。以期为政府制定安全监管决策、企业转化安全生产管理模式、员工激发安全主动行为提供有益的建议。     

Game theoretic analysis of negotiations under bankruptcy

We extend the contingent claims framework for the levered firm in explicitly modelling the resolution of financial distress under formal bankruptcy as a non-cooperative game between claimants under the supervision of the bankruptcy judge. The identity of the class of claimants proposing the first reorganization plan is found to be a key determinant of the time spent under bankruptcy, the likelihood of liquidation and the renegotiated value of claims. Our quantitative results confirm the economic intuition that a bankruptcy design must trade-off the initial priority of claims with the viability of reorganized firms.     

OPTIONS-GAME ANALYSIS FOR FIRM WITH INSURED DEBT

The strategic model for insured bond of firm is a new model which is developed based on options pricing model and game theory. When firm‘s bond was insured against bankruptcy, some interesting results about endogenous bankruptcy and optimal capital structure are obtained.     

Predicting the event and time horizon of bankruptcy using financial ratios and the maturity schedule of long-term debt

We study the problem of simultaneous and coherent assessment the probability of a firm’s bankruptcy at various time horizons in future. In contrast with usual (one-period) formulations of the problem, such multi-period formulation better matches the nature of bankruptcy process (bankruptcy occurs in time) and allows an easier and more natural incorporation of bankruptcy (default) prognoses in valuation of risky debt and equity, optimization of corporate capital structure etc. The study uses a new mathematical apparatus—multi-alternative decision rules of statistical decision theory. We investigate a new type of predictive variables that can be extracted from the maturity schedule of a firm’s long-term debt. The study develops Bayesian-type forecasting rules that use both maturity schedule factors and traditional financial ratios. These rules noticeably enhance bankruptcy prediction (compared with the familiar one-period Z-score rules of Altman) for bankruptcy within the first 1, 2 or 3 years. Predictive factors derived from schedule information enhance bankruptcy prediction at distant time horizons.     

Research and Development with Stock-Dependent Spillovers and Price Competition in a Duopoly

This paper investigates the research and development accumulation and pricing strategies of two firms competing for consumer demand in a dynamic framework. A firm’s research and development is production-cost-reducing and can benefit from part of the competitor’s research and development stock without payment. We consider decisions in a game characterized by Nash equilibrium. In this dynamic game, a player’s action depends on whether the competitor’s current research and development stock are observable. If the competitor’s current research and development stock are not observable or observable only after a certain time lag, a player’s action can be solely based on the information on the current period t (open-loop strategy). In the converse case, it can also include the information on the competitor’s reaction to a change in the current value of the state vector (closed-loop strategy), which allows for strategic interaction to take place throughout the game. Given the cumulative nature of research and development activities, a primary goal of this paper is to determine whether, regardless of the observability of the competitor’s current research and development stock, free research and development spillovers generate a lower level of scientific knowledge than research and development appropriability. A second objective of the paper is to determine how the observability of the rival’s current research and development stock affects a firm’s research and development and pricing decisions and payoffs under imperfect research and development appropriability.     

Optimal dividends and bankruptcy procedures: Analysis of the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process

This paper investigates the impact of bankruptcy procedures on optimal dividend barrier policies. We specifically focus on Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, which allows a firm in default to continue its business for a certain period of time. Our model is based on the surplus of a firm that earns investment income at a constant rate of credit interest when it is in a creditworthy condition. The firm pays a debit interest rate that depends on the deficit level when it is in financial distress. Thus, the surplus follows an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck (OU) process with a negative surplus-dependent mean-reverting rate. Default and liquidation are modeled as distinguishable events by using an excursion time or occupation time framework. This paper demonstrates how the optimal dividend barrier can be obtained by deriving a closed-form solution for the dividend value function. It also characterizes the distributional property and expectation of bankruptcy time subject to the bankruptcy procedure. Our numerical examples show that under an optimal dividend barrier strategy, the bankruptcy procedure may not prolong the expected bankruptcy time in some situations.     

Optimal dividends and bankruptcy procedures: Analysis of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process

This paper investigates the impact of bankruptcy procedures on optimal dividend barrier policies. We specifically focus on Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, which allows a firm in default to continue its business for a certain period of time. Our model is based on the surplus of a firm that earns investment income at a constant rate of credit interest when it is in a creditworthy condition. The firm pays a debit interest rate that depends on the deficit level when it is in financial distress. Thus, the surplus follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process with a negative surplus-dependent mean-reverting rate. Default and liquidation are modeled as distinguishable events by using an excursion time or occupation time framework. This paper demonstrates how the optimal dividend barrier can be obtained by deriving a closed-form solution for the dividend value function. It also characterizes the distributional property and expectation of bankruptcy time subject to the bankruptcy procedure. Our numerical examples show that under an optimal dividend barrier strategy, the bankruptcy procedure may not prolong the expected bankruptcy time in some situations.     

Game Options Analysis of the Information Role of Call Policies in Convertible Bonds

Abstract

In debt financing, existence of information asymmetry on the firm quality between the firm management and bond investors may lead to significant adverse selection costs. We develop the two-stage sequential dynamic two-person game option models to analyse the market signalling role of the callable feature in convertible bonds. We show that firms with positive private information on earning potential may signal their type to investors via the callable feature in a convertible bond. We present the variational inequalities formulation with respect to various equilibrium strategies in the two-person game option models via characterization of the optimal stopping rules adopted by the bond issuer and bondholders. The bondholders’ belief system on the firm quality may be revealed with the passage of time when the issuer follows his optimal strategy of declaring call or bankruptcy. Under separating equilibrium, the quality status of the firm is revealed so the information asymmetry game becomes a new game under complete information. To analyse pooling equilibrium, the corresponding incentive compatibility constraint is derived. We manage to deduce the sufficient conditions for the existence of signalling equilibrium of our game option model under information asymmetry. We analyse how the callable feature may lower the adverse selection costs in convertible bond financing. We show how a low-quality firm may benefit from information asymmetry and vice versa, underpricing of the value of debt issued by a high-quality firm.     

The Value of Information Structures in Zero-sum Games with Lack of Information on One Side

Two players are engaged in a zero-sum game with lack of information on one side, in which player 1 (the informed player) receives some stochastic signal about the state of nature. I consider the value of the game as a function of player 1’s information structure, and study the properties of this function. It turns out that these properties reflect the fact that in zero sum situation the value of information for each player is positive.     

网球发球的最佳策略

本文为网球运动员提供了如何选择快发球和慢发球的策略来提高赢球的概率 .通过用决策树表示F F,F S,SF,SS几种不同的策略 ,根据最大概率和最大期望值准则提出了概率意义下的最佳策略 ,考虑到网球运动的特点 ,为赢得全盘的胜利又制订了 BT策略 .最后 ,通过计算机模拟对两种策略进行了比较 .     

Stochastic optimal control on dividend policies with bankruptcy

ABSTRACT

When a firm is at the edge of bankruptcy, it would endeavour to attract bailouts from governments or financial institutions to cast off bad situation. If this effort fails, then the firm would face to sell off their properties to pay their debts to loaners or shareholders. In this paper, from these two cases of bankruptcy, two optimal dividend policies are considered and analysed, respectively. In the case of unrestricted dividend payment rate, a terminal bankruptcy model with non-zero terminal value is put forward. An analytic solution for the optimal objective function, which maximizes the expected value of total discounted dividends before bankruptcy and the residual value at bankruptcy, is provided and verified. As a significant application, a non-terminal bankruptcy problem with bailouts is considered, an explicit solution and the corresponding control policies are also obtained. In the end, some numerical examples are listed and the influence of the recovery rate on the optimal strategies is also discussed.