| 基于多方参与的“碳核查”业务权利寻租行为监管及控制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 王丹丹,菅利荣,付帅帅.基于多方参与的“碳核查”业务权利寻租行为监管及控制研究[J].运筹与管理,2022,31(9):225-231. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王丹丹 菅利荣 付帅帅 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.南京航空航天大学 经济与管理学院,江苏 南京 210016; 2.东南大学 经济管理学院,江苏 南京 211189 |
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| 基金项目： | 江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目(2019SJZDA036); 国家自然科学青年基金资助项目(72101109) |
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| 摘 要： | 针对“碳核查”业务权利寻租问题,考虑政府、控排企业及第三方核查企业对其治理的影响,运用演化博弈理论分析各参与主体在“碳核查”业务权利寻租问题治理过程中的决策行为。研究结果表明:碳核查”业务权利寻租行为的发生受各主体不同决策行为的共同作用,如何约束控排企业的行为是解决“碳核查”业务权利寻租问题的关键;中低强度的复查抽检率无法有效约束控排企业的寻租行为,而高复查抽检率则可有效约束控排企业的寻租行为;因寻租成本不同,控排企业及第三方核查企业对政府惩罚力度的敏感性不同;中高强度的复查率及惩罚力度,有助于降低控排企业及第三方核查企业权力寻租行为的发生。
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| 关 键 词： | 碳核查 多方博弈 权利寻租 监管控制 |
| 收稿时间： | 2020-09-14 |
The Supervision and Control of Rent-Seeking Behavior of Carbon Verification Business Rights Based on Multi-Party Participation |
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| WANG Dan-dan,JIAN Li-rong,FU Shuai-shuai.The Supervision and Control of Rent-Seeking Behavior of Carbon Verification Business Rights Based on Multi-Party Participation[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2022,31(9):225-231. |
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| Authors: | WANG Dan-dan JIAN Li-rong FU Shuai-shuai |
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| Affiliation: | 1. College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China; 2. School of Economics and management, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, China |
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| Abstract: | For the rent-seeking problem of “carbon verification” business rights, we consider the supervision and influence of the government, emission control companies, and third-party verification companies. An evolutionary game model is established to explore the evolutionary equilibrium of the governance of “carbon verification” business rights rent-seeking behavior in different situations strategies. The results show that the rent-seeking behavior of carbon verification business rights is affected by the different decision-making behaviors of various entities. How to restrain and control the behavior of enterprises is the key to solving the problem of “carbon verification” business rights rent-seeking. The recheck and random inspection rate cannot effectively restrict the rent-seeking behavior of the emission control companies, while the high re-check random inspection rate can effectively restrict the rent-seeking behavior of the emission control companies. Due to the different rent-seeking costs, the sensitivity of the emission control enterprises, and the third-party verification enterprises to the government's punishment is different. Medium and high-intensity review rates and punishment intensity are helpful to reduce the possibility of power rent-seeking by emission control enterprises and third-party verification enterprises. |
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| Keywords: | carbon verification multi-party game right rent-seeking regulatory control |
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